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Abstract
Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA) enables Ad-Networks to capitalize
on the popularity of digital Publishers in order to target users with context-
aware promotional materials from Advertisers. OBA has been shown to be
very effective at engaging consumers but at the same time presents severe
privacy and security threats for both users and Advertisers. Users view OBA
as intrusive and are therefore reluctant to share their private data with Ad-
Networks. In many cases this results in the adoption of anti-tracking tools
and ad-blockers which reduces the system’s performance. Advertisers on
their part are susceptible to financial fraud due to Ad-Reports that do not
correspond to real consumer activity. Consequently, user privacy is further
violated as Ad-Networks are provoked into collecting even more data in order
to detect fictitious Ad-Reports.
Researchers have mostly approached user privacy and fraud prevention
as separate issues while ignoring how potential solutions to address one prob-
lem will effect the other. As a result, previously proposed privacy-preserving
advertising systems are susceptible to fraud or fail to offer fine-grain target-
ing which makes them undesirable by Advertisers while systems that focus
on fraud prevention, require the collection of private data which renders
them as a threat for users. The aim of our research is to offer a com-
prehensive solution which addresses both problems without resulting in a
conflict of interest between Advertisers and users. Our work specifically fo-
cuses on the preservation of privacy for mobile device users who represent
the majority of consumers that are targeted by OBA. To accomplish the
set goal, we contribute ADS+R (Advert Distribution System with Report-
ing) which is an innovative advertising system that supports the delivery of
personalized adverts as well as the submission of verifiable Ad-Reports on
mobile devices while still maintaining user privacy. Our approach adopts
a decentralized architecture which connects mobile users and Advertisers
over a hybrid opportunistic network without the need for an Ad-Network to
operate as administrative authority. User privacy is preserved through the
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2use of peer-to-peer connections (serving as proxy connections), Anonymous-
download technologies and cryptography, while Advertiser fraud is prevented
by means of a novel mechanism which we termed Behavioural Verification.
Behavioural Verification combines client-side processing with a blockchain-
inspired construction which enables Advertisers to certify the integrity of
Ad-Reports without exposing the identity of the submitting mobile users.
In comparison to previously proposed systems, ADS+R provides both (1)
user privacy and (2) advert fraud prevention while allowing for (3) a tunable
trade-off between resource consumption and security, and (4) the statistical
analysis and data mining of consumer behaviours.
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Introduction
The digital advertising market has exhibited a steady expansion over the last
two decades [76]. The first digital advert was published by HotWire.com on
October 27, 1994 and shortly after digital advertising started to become
adopted across the internet [84]. Much like their printed counterparts, the
first digital adverts were simple static banners that were presented at web-
site viewers. However, it soon became evident that digital platforms offered
the potential for more sophisticated advertising methods that were not pre-
viously possible. Unlike traditional media such as televising, radio, maga-
zines and billboards which are directed at large audiences, digital media are
accessed by individual consumers, thus allowing for the illustration of per-
sonalized content. To fully exploit the potential of digital media, marketers
began to develop elaborate methods for segmenting audiences to evermore
refined consumer groups [62]. Eventually, marketers were able to target dis-
tinctive users based on their personal demographic traits and online habits.
This was made possible through an approach known as Online Behavioral
Advertising (OBA). The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC )
defines OBA as ‘the practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in
order to deliver advertising that is tailored to the individual’s interests[61].
In practical terms, OBA is an advanced marketing technique for determin-
ing a user’s consumer needs for the purpose of matching them with specific
adverts.
Compared to non-targeted forms of advertising, OBA has been shown to
be more adept at engaging consumers [21, 153, 16, 26, 25, 55]. For Adver-
tisers, greater user engagement practically signifies increased sales while at
the same time allowing them to build brand recognition and loyal customer
following [74]. An assessment by Google estimates that in 2017, their adver-
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tising services were responsible for generating 283 billion US dollars for more
than 1.5 million businesses in the US [64]. For the second quarter of 2017,
Facebook reported an advertising revenue of 9.16 billion US dollars while
additional research suggests that 26% of Facebook users who clicked on an
advert reported making a purchase [10, 129]. Currently, Google and Face-
book dominate the digital advertising industry with a combined US market
share of 63% [45].
Advertisers were quick to recognize the profitability potential of OBA
which provoked an increased interest towards digital Publishers [13]. Es-
timates for 2018 show that 61% of all adverts in the United Kingdom are
published on digital media while digital advert spending in the US is cal-
culated at 93.7 billion US Dollars which amounts to 43.6% of the country’s
total marketing budget with estimates for a steady increase to 51.3% by
2021 [40, 12]. On a global scale, digital advert spending is valued at 273.3
billion US Dollars with analysts foreseeing a gradual rise by the year 2022
to 427.2 billion US Dollars that will account for 53.9% of all advert spend-
ing [47].
Publishers on their part, view OBA as a viable business model. By capi-
talizing on the popularity of their platforms, Publishers are able to generate
sufficient revenue through adverts, thus being able to offer their content
for no added cost. In that regard, digital advertising also provides an in-
direct benefit for users who gain access to the free Publisher services such
as informative websites, social networks, hosting platforms, email, instant
messaging, cloud storage and freeware (free software). Indicative of how
much users gain from advertising is the fact that 95% of apps for Android
and 88% for iOS are offered to users for free [11, 131]. Arguably, it would
not had be possible for developers to offer their mobile apps for free if not
for the prospect of advertising revenue.
From a business point of view, it can be stated that OBA is mutu-
ally beneficial for all participating stakeholders, including users. In a way,
OBE has helped shape digital media and at the same time revolutionized
the marketing industry [53]. Nevertheless, that is not to say that OBA
does not also come with important concerns, limitations and drawbacks. It
has long been argued that OBA presents a significant threat for user pri-
vacy [109, 128, 85, 116, 33]. Directly effected are billions of digital users
with estimates indicating that 80% of the population in North America and
Western Europe is accessing the internet on a daily basis [49]. This accounts
for nearly 280 million users in the US alone with figures expected to rise by
2019 to more than 3.84 billion people worldwide [48, 44]. Although most
users hold misconceptions about OBA and are not fully aware of the extent
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of the threat to their privacy, the vast majority denounce of the way that
their information is being exploited when informed about the invasive na-
ture of OBA [105, 104, 139]. Recent surveys confirm the negative sentiment
towards OBA with 71% of US users reporting a noticeable upsurge in the
intrusiveness of targeted adverts in the last three years while in the UK
only 6% of users are expressing a liking in re-targeted adverts (adverts for
products they have previously browsed) [52, 50]. Regardless of their pri-
vacy concerns, consumers still view tailored adverts as useful but the lack of
available alternatives to OBA has prompted many of them to reject adver-
tising altogether [141]. As a result, consumers are turning to the adoption
of add-on software such as anonymizers, cookie managers and ad-blockers.
Estimates for 2018 show that 12.2 million users in the UK and as many as
21.4 million in Germany are running ad-blocking software [46]. The wide
proliferation of ad-blockers has caused notable concerns to the marketing
industry with many researchers proclaiming that the viability of internet
advertising is under threat [126, 127, 123, 97]. As a response, some Publish-
ers have begun to limit access to their content for users who are running
ad-blockers [110].
From the perspective of Advertisers, even more concerning than the
losses due to adware and ad-blockers is the susceptibility of the currently
implemented OBA model to fictitious advert views and clicks. Attackers
exploit the system’s vulnerability in order to defraud Advertisers ether for
personal financial gain or with the intent to engage in corporate espionage
against competitors by depleting their advertising budget [59]. To conduct
these attacks, the perpetrators can either employ the services of human op-
erators to click on adverts (known as click-farms) or use automated malware
programs such as auto-clickers and clickbots [34]. Clickbots, in particular,
have been widely used to conduct large-scale fraud to a great effect [35].
Attributing to the widespread use of clickbots is their effectiveness, accessi-
bility, low cost and ability to avoid detection [149, 106]. Researchers indicate
that the majority of popular mobile Ad-Networks are liable to attacks from
clickbots [27]. Estimates by eMarketer show that up to 10% of the market-
ing budget of UK businesses is vulnerable to advert fraud while other reports
suggest that Advertisers are likely to lose up to 51 million US dollars per
day in 2018, totaling 19 billion US dollars over the entire year with figures
expected to rise up to 44 billion by 2022 [51, 120]. To combat advert fraud,
Ad-Networks attempt to detect invalid traffic through the enforcement of
policy-based filtering mechanisms but this approach has not been entirely
effective [107]. As a response, researchers have proposed the adoption of
more sophisticated filtering methods [83, 145, 81, 157]. For traffic filtering
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to be feasible however, Ad-Networks will be inclined to collect even more
data which will further infringe user privacy. Although the technologies that
are used to filter advertising reports are proprietary and therefore not ac-
cessible to the public, Advertisers have been critical of Ad-Networks for not
pursuing fraud detection aggressively enough [79]. To support this claim,
academics have pointed out that Ad-Networks may be biased towards the
matter as both themselves as well as Publishers directly benefit from invalid
traffic [88, 151]. A more suitable approach for the marketing industry would
therefore be to assign the auditing of traffic to a third party [151]. For such
an approach to be adopted, the Advertisers and Ad-Networks would need to
cooperate and agree on the establishment of an independent authority which
would be entrusted to manage the submitted Ad-Reports. However, it would
be highly unlike for Ad-Networks to agree on such a setup as it would re-
quire the third party to be granted direct access to the Ad-Network’s system
which would be considered a serious security risk.
1.1 Problem Statement
Previous attempts to address user privacy and fraud prevention as separate
issues have been able to partially resolve one of the two problems, but only
at the expense of the other. More specifically, privacy-preserving advertising
systems are susceptible to fraud, or fail to offer fine-grain targeting (present
tailor made adverts which match specific user interests), making them unde-
sirable by Advertisers while systems that focus on fraud prevention require
the collection of private data which renders them as a threat for users. To
the best of our knowledge there has never been a comprehensive solution
that is mutually beneficial for both users and Advertisers.
1.2 Research Aim
The aim of our work can be summarized as follows: We aim to offer an
alternative implementation of OBA (Online Behavioural Advertising) for
mobile devices, which provides both user privacy and Advertiser protection
against advertising fraud while retaining fine-grain targeting capability.
1.3 Proposed System Overview
In this thesis we introduce ADS+R (Advert Distribution System with Re-
porting) as an innovative advertising system which supports the delivery of
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personalized adverts as well as the submission of verifiable Ad-Reports on
mobile devices while still maintaining user privacy. Our approach adopts a
decentralized architecture which connects mobile users and Advertisers over
a hybrid opportunistic network without the need for an Ad-Network to op-
erate as administrative authority. The system takes advantage of client-side
processing to allow users to compose their own Ad-Requests and Ad-Reports.
The Ad-Requests are generated based on a locally stored user interest profile
which can support fine-grain advert targeting while the Ad-Reports do not
contain any information which could compromise the user’s identity. The hy-
brid opportunistic network is then used to deliver both Ad-Requests and Ad-
Reports to the Advertisers for processing. Ad-Requests are answered with
matching adverts while Ad-Reports are independently verified and awards
are issued to the concerned Publishers.
User privacy against Advertisers is preserved through the use of peer-to-
peer connections which serve as partially trusted proxies and anonymous-
download technologies that allow mobile devices to transfer data without
compromising the user’s identity. To further enhance privacy and security,
cryptography is applied on both the Ad-Requests and Ad-Reports in order
to prevent intermediate network nodes and eavesdroppers from obtaining
private user information or sabotaging the system by injecting fake adverts
and other malicious content.
ADS+R also preserves bandwidth and memory by enabling multiple
users to collectively have access to the same encrypted adverts while still
maintaining their privacy. To allow users to identify adverts that may be of
shared interest, the system incorporates four profile comparison algorithms
Demographic Profile Comparison (D-PC ), Fragmented Profile Comparison
(F-PC ), Selective Profile Comparison (S-PC ) and Collaborative-Selective
Profile Comparison (CS-PC ). The aforementioned profile comparison algo-
rithms allow for a trade off between resource conservation and privacy which
is tunable based on the individual user’s preferences.
Advertiser fraud is prevented by means of a novel mechanism which we
termed Behavioural Verification. Behavioural Verification combines client-
side processing with a blockchain-inspired construction in order to classify
users as honest or dishonest. What constitutes a user’s honesty for our
system is the manner in which they access adverts on their mobile device.
Dishonest users submit multiple reports over a short period of time while
honest users behave as consumers who view adverts at a balanced pace while
engaging in typical social activities such as making online purchases, moving
through space and interacting with other users. We argue that it is hard for
dishonest users to fake honest behaviour and we exploit social behavioural
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patterns to identify fraudulent Ad-Reports without compromising the iden-
tity of the submitting users. A supplementary feature of our approach is
that it also enables us to perform anonymous statistical analysis of con-
sumer behavioral patterns. This includes the ability to identify correlations
between advertising interests (e.g., users with interest in product A are also
interested in product B), visited location (e.g., users that visit location A
are interested in product B) and social affiliations (e.g., users with interests
in product A are closely affiliated with users with interest in product B).
ADS+R entirely disrupts the operation of the currently iterated OBA
system as it makes Ad-Networks obsolete and outsources their functionality
to the users, Advertisers and Publishers. More specifically, ADS+R exploits
the processing power of mobile devices in order to allow users to locally de-
termine their advertising needs and collect the appropriate targeted adverts
from the Advertisers. In a similar fashion, the users also compose and submit
their own Ad-Reports which are independently verified by the concerned Ad-
vertisers and can then be shared with the Publishers. For both operations,
users, Advertisers and Publishers establish a direct line communication over
a decentralized network without the need for an Ad-Network to operate as
administrative authority. The decentralized architecture of ADS+R is easy
to establish and fully supported by currently available networking technolo-
gies such as 5G. Client-side processing is also feasible by currently available
smart-phone devices and arguably more effective than cloud-based process-
ing as it offers greater targeting accuracy when considering the fact that local
services have direct access to user data while cloud-hosted services need to
rely on tracking protocols and voluntarily shared data. Lastly, ADS+R also
offers greater flexibility for Advertisers as it supports the fusion of multiple
targeting algorithms. In turn, this will allow Advertisers to tailor the sys-
tem’s functionality to their own needs and usher the development of new
targeting approaches.
1.4 Contributions
We claim the following contributions:
• Privacy-preserving distribution of targeted adverts: ADS which
was published in [99] and is presented in Chapter 4 is an advertising
system which supports fine-grain targeting while providing complete
mobile user privacy against all other stakeholders (including other
users) and security against sabotage from attackers.
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• Resource conservation within opportunistic networks: The
four profile comparison algorithms (D-PC, F-PC, S-PC and CS-PC )
which are presented in Chapter 5 can be used to conserve bandwidth
and memory within an opportunistic network by identifying similari-
ties between the advertising interests of system users (network nodes)
and allowing them to share access to the same adverts without com-
promising their privacy.
• Privacy-preserving detection of advert fraud: ADS+R which
was published in [98] and is presented in Chapter 6 is an extension
of ADS (see Chapter 4) which enables Advertisers to independently
verify the validity of submitted Ad-Reports without requiring any trust
towards a third party (an Ad-Network) while maintaining the privacy
of the submitting mobile users.
– Anonymous statistical analysis of consumer behaviours:
One of the features of ADS+R which is presented in Section 6.2.6
is the anonymous statistical analysis of consumer behavioral pat-
terns. This includes the ability to identify correlations between
advertising interests, visited location and social affiliations.
1.5 Publications
The research presented in this thesis has contributed to the following pub-
lications:
• ”Private and secure distribution of targeted advertisements to mobile
phones.” Future Internet 9.2 (2017): 16.
• ”Behavioural Verification: Preventing Report Fraud in Decentralized
Advert Distribution Systems.” Future Internet 9.4 (2017): 88.
The first publication titled ”Private and secure distribution of targeted
advertisements to mobile phones.” consists the entirety of the research which
is presented in Chapter 4 and an initial version of the research work that
can be found in Section 5.1.2 of Chapter 5. The second publication titled
”Behavioural Verification: Preventing Report Fraud in Decentralized Ad-
vert Distribution Systems.” consists the entirety of the research which is
presented in Chapter 6.
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1.6 Thesis Structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 offers a preliminary
knowledge of the OBA model and a technical overview of the particular
threats which are faced by the marketing industry. Chapter 3 presents a
detailed analysis and scrutiny of the related work in regards to preservation
of user privacy as well as the prevention of advert fraud. In Chapter 4 we
present ADS (Advert Distribution System), a novel approach for distribut-
ing personalized adverts over a social network of mobile users while preserv-
ing user privacy. In Chapter 5 we present four profile comparison algorithms
(D-PC, F-PC, S-PC and CS-PC ) which can be used as an add-on to ADS.
Our profile comparison algorithms aim to conserve memory and bandwidth
within the opportunistic network that ADS operates on by identifying users
(network nodes) with the same consumer interests and allowing them to
share access to the same content without compromising their privacy. In
Chapter 6 we present ADS+R (Advert Distribution System with Report-
ing) which is an extension of ADS. ADS+R utilizes the same infrastructure
as ADS but also introduces the concept of Behavioural Verification. Be-
havioural Verification is a novel approach for preventing advert fraud while
still maintaining user privacy and also allows for the statistical analysis of
consumer behavioural patterns. Lastly, in Chapter 7 we summarize our
work, reflect on the innovations and limitations of our system and discuss
our perspectives for future research.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we offer a brief insight on advertising technologies and the
manner in which they are applied. In particular, in Section 2.1 we introduce
the stakeholders of the OBA (Online Behavioural Advertising) ecosystem
and detail their operation. In Section 2.2 we analyze the various user track-
ing methods which are available and then proceed to explain how they violate
user privacy in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we analyze the most prominent
forms of advertising fraud and lastly in Section 2.5 we provide an overview
of the methods which are currently being used to combat them.
2.1 OBA: Online Behavioural Advertising
Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA) is an advanced marketing method
for targeting digital users with context-aware adverts. The OBA ecosystem
consists of four parties as shown in Figure 2.1. Advertisers are represen-
tatives of businesses who wish to promote products and services through
advertising campaigns. Users represent potential consumers who may be
interested in a particular product or service which is offered by Advertisers.
Publishers are digital platforms such as websites, software applications or
other services which attract user traffic. Lastly, Ad-Networks are compa-
nies such as Google Ads and Yahoo! AdNet which operate as a middleman
between Advertisers, Publishers and users.
To take part in the OBA system, Advertisers create promotional ma-
terials (digital adverts) and supply them to an Ad-Network. Publishers on
their part, reserve within their user interfaces (whether websites or software)
certain visual areas which can be used by an Ad-Network for the illustration
of adverts. Known as Ad-Boxes, these visual areas are controlled by the
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Ad-Network with the use of a JavaScript code which is embedded within
the Publisher’s source code. When a user visits the platform of a Publisher,
the embedded code forwards a request to the Ad-Network who selects an
advert from one of the Advertisers and features it to the user within one of
the Publisher’s Ad-Boxes.
The selection of the advert which is to be displayed by the Ad-network
on each individual instance is performed through an operation called Advert
Auctioning. To participate in an auction, Advertisers place bids which rep-
resent the price they are willing to pay to the Ad-Network for every time
their adverts are viewed or clicked on by users. The bidding strategies which
are applied by an Advertiser to estimate the value of a placed bid varies for
each advert publication as it is typically determined based on contextual
data of the particular Publisher and user. For example, an Advertiser who
promotes holiday deals may be willing to offer a higher bid when their advert
is displayed on the platform of a Publisher who offers tourist information
and is being displayed to a user who is near an airport. Once the bids from
all participating Advertisers have been placed, the Ad-Network ranks the
candidate adverts based on their potential profitability. To calculate the
rankings, the Ad-Network applies a formula which combines the bid value
of each candidate advert with a quality score that expresses the likelihood
of set advert being relevant to the user’s interests. The quality score of
each distinct user is determined by the Ad-Network based on contextual at-
tributes (e.g., age, gender, location and search history) which are obtained
by tracking the user’s activities and is determined based on statistical data.
Upon completing the auction, the Ad-Network declares the highest rank-
ing candidate advert as the winner and features it to the user within the
Publisher’s Ad-Box.
Regarding the rewards which are issued to the participating stakeholders
for their services, the OBA system supports three pricing models. The first
and most simple model is referred as Pay-Per-Mille or PPM and is founded
on the principle that an Advertiser awards the Ad-Network for every one
thousand times their advert is viewed by a user (hence the term ’mille’
which is Latin for ’thousand’). The second model is called Pay-Per-Click or
PPC and is used to award Ad-Networks every time one of the adverts they
illustrate is clicked by a user. The third and final model is known as Pay-
Per-Action or PPA and awards Ad-Networks when the user who clicked on
an advert also performed a specific action. Most typically this action is the
completion of a purchase or the creation of an account [54]. Based on the
pricing model which is enforced, the Ad-Network can claim their reward by
filing an Ad-Report to the corresponding Advertiser and afterwards awards
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a commission to the Publisher for providing the Ad-Box.
The interaction between Publishers and Advertisers takes place in real
time and is facilitated by the infrastructure of the Ad-Network. The main
component of the Ad-Network is the Real Time Biding (RTB) platform
which supervises the Advert Auctioning and establishes a communication
link between Publishers and Advertisers. The RTB platform may also in-
corporate additional modules for assigning, matching and storing the con-
textual attributes of the Publishers and the users. Publishers connect to
the RTB platform through an Ad-Network provided panel (e.g. Google
AdSense) which manages the inventory of available Ad-Boxes, sets the pa-
rameters of each entry (media format, price floor, pricing model, etc.) and
provides sale feedback. In a similar fashion, the Advertisers access the RTB
platform via their own Ad-Network provided panel (e.g. Google AdWorks)
which is used to store adverts, run biding strategies and manage advertis-
ing campaigns. Alternatively, the Publishers and Advertisers can connect
to the Ad-Network via third-party platforms which are respectively known
as the Supply Side Platform (SSP) and the Demand Side Platform (DSP).
The main advantage of the use of SSP and DSP is that they allow the Pub-
lishers and Advertisers to simultaneously connect to multiple Ad-Networks,
thus establishing and extended advertising market which is known as the
Ad Exchange.
2.2 Consumer Tracking
In order to determine the advertising needs of consumers, OBA relies on
tracking technologies which collect and analyze vast amounts of data across
multiple platforms. The most prominent types of information which is typ-
ically collected by Ad-Networks and the ways it can be exploited for advert
targeting are analysed in the following paragraphs.
Demographics: Demographic data is defined as a set of factors that ex-
press the socioeconomic characteristics of an individual [39]. This may in-
clude traits such as age, gender, ethnicity, spoken language, religion, marital
status, occupation and income. A user’s demographics can be inferred by
their social media profiles, service registration forms and other online activ-
ities. Demographic data is typically used to segment users into consumer
groups which are associated to specific interests. For example, female con-
sumers of higher income may be associated to adverts for designer clothes.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 25
Figure 2.1: OBA (Online Behavioural Advertising) model architecture.
Browsing and Search History: A user’s browsing and search history
can be tracked primarily through the use of technologies such as web cookies,
browser fingerprinting and third-party domain requests. Cookies are files
that are downloaded from browsed websites and remain locally stored on the
user’s machine until they can be sent to the Ad-Network via another domain
that is visited by the user [89]. Browser fingerprinting is a technique for
identifying users based on the unique configurations of their browsers (e.g.,
languages, fonts, extensions, etc.) [18, 42]. Third-party domain requests are
sent by a browser in order to obtain elements which are embedded in the
code of a visited website but are stored in a different domain (e.g., banners,
media files, social network share buttons, etc.) [103, 118]. Browsing and
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search history logs are particularly useful to marketers as they can reveal
a user’s consumer interests. For example, a user who performs a search
for holiday destinations can be assumed to be interested in traveling and
targeted with adverts of airline companies. Browsing and search logs can
also be used for even more advanced targeting strategies such as re-targeting.
Re-targeting is a fine-grain targeting method which is used to present users
with adverts of specific products that they have previously browsed. As an
example of re-targeting consider a scenario where a user visits the website
of a retail store, navigates through the catalog of female clothing and selects
a jacket. When the user navigates to another website, she will not simply
be presented with an advert which is relevant to female clothing but rather
an advert that depicts the exact same jacket that she previously selected for
viewing.
Purchase History: A user’s purchase history can be used for the promo-
tion of products which are relevant or supplementary to the user’s previous
purchases. For example, a user who bought a pair of sports shoes may be tar-
geted with adverts for other sporting equipment and a user who purchased a
car may be targeted with adverts by insurance companies. Purchase history
information is mostly used by online retailers such as Amazon and eBay but
it can also be exploited by other marketers through the use of credit services
such as Apple Pay, Android Pay and PayPal.
Social Media Publications: The information that is shared on social
media is often exploited for advert targeting as it offers a very detailed in-
sight of a user’s consumer preferences. Other than providing demographic
data (age, gender, occupation, etc.), social media publications can also re-
veal personal affiliations, attended events, visited locations and interests for
specific activities or brands. For example, a user who has attended events
at Stamford Bridge stadium and is a member of a Facebook group that is
dedicated to football may be targeted with adverts for Chelsea FC para-
phernalia while a user who follows Apple on Twitter can be targeted with
adverts for the latest iPhone.
Location Data: Location Based Advertising or LBA is a marketing method
for promoting location-specific products and services [87]. Location data can
be obtained primarily via GPS but can also be revealed by the IP addresses
of WiFi hot-spots that the user connects from, social media check-ins or
even Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons. As an example, consider a sce-
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nario where a user with a Bluetooth enabled device appears within range of
a BLE beacon during lunch time. The signal which is transmitted by the
beacon is picked up by the device which is directed to a cloud server in order
to download adverts for restaurants within the user’s vicinity.
Hardware and Software Data: Hardware and software data may reveal
the make and model of a user’s device, the operating system that is run,
installed apps or even connected peripheral devices. The simplest way to
exploit hardware and software information is by identifying the electronic
devices that the user is already employing and target him/her with adverts
for relevant products. A simple example of the aforementioned targeting
method would be to show adverts for a new Apple product to a user who
is accessing the web via iOS. Additionally, marketers may also infer other
information about a user based on their hardware and software. For exam-
ple, owning an expensive premium device can reveal high financial status or
using a VR headset and a game-pad controller may indicate an interest for
mobile gaming.
Linguistic Data: Linguistic data refers to the written information that
users share in mediums such as emails, instant messages, calendar entries
and social media posts. Ad-Networks and market researchers have been
known to exploit linguistic data with a technique called Opinion Mining.
Opinion Mining is a method for uncovering opinion-oriented information
from written text [115]. Opinion Mining is made possible through the ap-
plication of Natural Language Processing (NLP) which is the research area
that explores how computers can be used to understand and manipulate
natural language for the purpose of performing useful tasks [29]. An exam-
ple of the use of Opinion Mining in marketing would involve the targeting
of a user with hotel adverts after they have sent an email where they express
their intention of going on a holiday.
Sensor Data: Sensor data is any information which can be gathered by
smart devices such as health monitors, voice controllers, network cameras,
programmable dash buttons or other gear which is integrated to the IoT (In-
ternet of Things). The Internet of Things is a relatively new technology but
despite this, IoT devices are already incorporated into targeted advertising
with the most notable example being the use of Amazon’s virtual assistant
for the gathering of consumer information [65, 136].
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2.3 Privacy Concerns and Countermeasures
OBA can be stated to be mutually beneficial for all participating parties,
including the users who not only get informed about products that are rel-
evant to their needs but also enjoy free Publisher services. Never the less,
the current implementation of the OBA model is far from ideal as it also
presents serious privacy concerns. The private data that is collected by
Ad-Networks may reveal sensitive user information such as income, health
status, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, political and social opinions, ide-
ological inclinations, location patterns, shopping and browsing habits and
lifestyle preferences.
The intrusive information gathering which is conducted for the purpose
of advert targeting has provoked many users to adopt countermeasures such
as ad-blockers, cookie managers and obfuscation software. Ad-blockers such
as AdBlock [46], Ghostery [6], uBlock [9] and Disconnect [2] have seen a
notable rise in popularity over the past years [113]. Ad-blockers are secu-
rity software tools for preventing third-party domain requests [152]. The
use of third-party domain requests is one of the primary methods to ob-
tain a user’s browsing history, as outlined in Section 2.2. Cookie managers
are security tools which are used to remove web cookies. Cookie managers
are typically implemented as browser add-ons or can even be integrated
in security-oriented browsers such as Brave [7], Firefox Focus [5], Epic [4]
and Yandex [3]. Obfuscation software applications are privacy tools which
obscure the user’s activity by generating fake information with the intent
to produce noise. Some prominent examples of obfuscation tools include
the following: TrackMeNot [8] is a browser add-on which performs ran-
dom searches in order to confuse search engines about the user’s real search
queries. AdNauseam [1] follows a similar approach to TrackMeNot [8] but fo-
cuses on misleading Ad-Networks by automatically clicking on web adverts.
NOYB [68] fills out registration forms with fake data which is indistinguish-
able from real entries. The real data can still be obtained by authorized
users through a cryptographic process. ProfileGuard [140] is a mobile ob-
fuscation tool for preventing Ad-Networks from profiling users based on the
apps they download on their mobile devices. Lastly, MockDroid [17] is a
modified version of the Android operating system which allows users to in-
put fake system information (e.g., device ID, GPS location, internet access,
etc.) on the installed mobile apps.
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2.4 Advertising Fraud
Advertising fraud is committed by malicious Publishers who are able to
claim service commissions for artificially created views and clicks on their
platforms. Some of the most prominent methods of advertising fraud are
considered in the following paragraphs.
Keyword Spamdexing: Keyword spamdexing, also known as keyword
stuffing, is the practice of repeating certain keywords within the text of a
website for the purpose of misleading web crawlers [148]. Web crawlers, also
known as spiders or spiderbots, are automated programs that are tasked
with classifying the content of websites for the propose of search engine in-
dexing. By engaging in keyword spamdexing, a fraudulent Publisher can
deceive Ad-Networks into over-evaluating her platform during an Advert
Auctioning [132]. Consider a simple example where an Advertiser that pro-
motes plane tickets participates in an Advert Auction. Based on her bidding
strategy, the Advertiser typicaly places a bid of $1 for an available Ad-Box
but is willing to raise the bid to $1.5 when the Ad-Box appears within a web-
site that relates to traveling. To trick the Advertiser into placing a higher
bid, the malicious Publisher can misrepresent the content of her website by
stuffing it full of keywords which relate to travel (e.g., holiday, vacation,
trip, hotel, etc.). To avoid raising the suspicion of visitors, the Publisher
can place the keywords within HTML tags or make them illegible by using
text that is too small to read or text that is the same color as the website’s
background [132].
Advert Placement Fraud: Advert placement fraud, also known as ad-
vert farming, is carried out by a rogue Publisher who loads a score of advert
banners which are not visible to the user [95]. To implement fraud of this
type, Publishers can stack multiple adverts on top of each other, perpetu-
ally reload advert banners, open hidden pop-under windows or change the
size of advert banners which are sometimes made as small as a single pixel.
An indicative example of advert farming is disclosed in [43] where the au-
thors proclaim the discovery of a fraudulent Publisher called Hula. Similar
findings are presented by Liu et al. [96] who were able to uncover more
than a thousand mobile apps that were committing fraud by misplacing or
modifying advert banners.
Coercion: Coercion is performed by Publishers who dupe users into click-
ing on adverts for reasons other than their content [132]. To perform this
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type of fraud, Publishers can disguise adverts as links, make them invisible
or embed them within other elements of the website such as flash games [34].
Forced Browser Clicks: Forced clicks can be artificially performed by a
browser without the user’s knowledge with the use of a client-side script [132].
The script is inlaid within the Publisher’s source code and perceived as a
legitimate part of the visited website. Gandhi et al. [63] demonstrate such
an attack where the functionality of the JavaScript which is used by the
Ad-Network to load adverts is altered by a second malicious JavaScript. By
carrying out the aforementioned attack, the authors were able to simulate
clicks even on adverts that were placed on a different domain than the one
viewed by the victimized user.
Manual Clicking: Performing manual clicks is a simple and low-tech
method for artificiality generating advert revenue. For maximized effec-
tiveness, Publishers can employ the services of click-farms. Click-farms are
facilities, typically in developing countries, that accommodate groups of low-
paid workers who click on digital adverts. Depending on the scale and the
rate at which the fraud takes place, forged clicks may potentially be detected
by Ad-Networks through policy-based filtering. As a means of avoiding de-
tection, fraudsters can use proxies to hide their source IP addresses and also
obfuscate their activity by mixing it with the traffic of other users.
Auto-clickers: Auto-clickers are simple programs which can be used to
automate the clicking process on the system they are installed. Auto-clickers
are readily available and easy to operate but suffer from the same short-
comings as manual clicking. Namely, auto-clickers produce a large volume
of traffic which can easily be detected by Ad-Networks. Some advanced
auto-clickers, which have been specifically designed for click fraud, may also
incorporate proxy connections as a means of covering their tracks.
Clickbots: Clickbots are malicious software programs which perform au-
tomated clicks on adverts. Unlike auto-clickers which are intentionally in-
stalled by the operator of a system, clickbots run on infected machines while
the victimized users remain unaware. Multiple infected machines can inter-
connect to each other to form a botnet which can be coordinated to launch
large scale fraud. Clickbots are notoriously difficult to detect as they of-
ten employ very sophisticated methods in order to mimic real user activity.
A notable example of how elaborate clickbot activity can be is Methbot.
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Methbot was discovered by White Ops in 2016 and is thought to be one of
the biggest and most profitable click-fraud operations to date with an esti-
mated loot of 3 to 5 million US dollars per day. To avoid detection, Methbot
performed mouse movements and clicks, faked social media log-ins, manip-
ulated geolocation information and employed specialized countermeasures
against the code from over a dozen ad-tech companies [150].
2.5 Advertising Fraud Detection
To detect instances of advertising fraud, Ad-Networks rely on filtering sys-
tems which analyze the traffic patters of Publisher platforms for suspicious
activity. What constitutes as suspicious activity is any abnormality on the
platform’s qualitative and quantitative metrics. Some prominent examples
of traffic abnormalities which may reveal fraudulent activity are examined
in the following paragraphs.
Repetitive Source IP Addresses: Source IP addresses which appear
repeatedly can be attributed to clicks from the same network. When the
clicks take place between regular or unrealistically short intervals of time, it
can indicate the operation of an auto-clicker or a simplistic clickbot. Activity
of this type is relatively easy to detect and block. On the other hand, clicks
that take place between longer and more irregular intervals of time may
originate from a manual clicker or a sophisticated clickbot that runs on an
infected machine. Identifying fraudulent activity of this type is much harder
and resource consuming as it requires the examination of large segments of
data streams (often called ’windows’ in data mining).
Non-residential IP Addresses: Legitimate users are typically expected
to be accessing the web from private connections which are allocated resi-
dential IP addresses. In that regard, activity from commercial IP addresses
can signify the operation of a data-center proxy which is used to hide the
real source of the traffic. Identifying source IP addresses which are regis-
tered as commercial is straightforward but it may not always be enough as
commercial IPs are also utilized by users who employ the services of a VPN
provider.
Obscure Publisher listings: According to marketers, the majority of ad-
vertising fraud originates from obscure websites while real consumers mostly
view adverts on well-known Publishers [101]. By auditing the listings of
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reports, Ad-Networks may potentially be able to recognize suspicious Pub-
lishers and blacklist them or submit them to further investigation.
Traffic Spikes: A sudden increase in views or clicks may be triggered by
the operation of an auto-clicker or unsophisticated clickbot. Rapid traffic
changes are easy to recognize, even by the analytics software of the Adver-
tisers [100].
Inflated or Similar CRTs CTR (Click-Through Rare) is a metric that
expresses the ratio of clicks on a specific advert to the number of views.
Unusually high CTRs can be a tell-tale sign of fraud while CTRs that share
similar values can be the result of an auto-clicker or clickbot.
Poor or Repetitive Clickstreams: A clickstream is a virtual record of
a user’s internet activity. Clickstrams include information such as the web-
sites the user has visited, how much time was spent on each site, any data
that was downloaded or uploaded (media files, messages, log-ins, etc.) and
even the emails that the user has exchanged with other users. Clickstreams
that show minimal user activity beyond the clicking on adverts are likely
to originate from auto-clickers or click-farms. Similarly, clickstreams that
exhibit repetitive and formulaic activity may be the result of elaborate click-
bots which have been designed to mimic human behaviour based on scripted
instructions.
2.6 OBA Issues and Solution Approaches
The operational practices of the currently implemented OBA system greatly
threaten the interests of both users and Advertisers. For users, the intrusive
collection of personal data by Ad-Networks creates a serious privacy threat
which has provoked the adoption of tools that endangers the financial via-
bility of the online advertising market. The risk to user privacy is further
increased by the proliferation of cloud services which promotes the concen-
tration of data within the care of a limited number of cloud providers thus
creating a single point of failure. A preferable alternative which can poten-
tially reduce the privacy threat of consumer data collection is the adoption
of client-side processing which enables end users to locally process their own
data. In the context of advertising, client-side processing can be exploited
to track a user’s activity and determine their advertising interests without
any data ever leaving the user’s smart phone. Client-side process is one of
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the prime technologies that forms the basis of privacy-preserving advertising
systems as further discussed in Section 3.1.
The ever-increasing expansion and the sophistication of advertising fraud
call for the deployment of more effective countermeasures. The data filter-
ing methods which are presently being deployed by Ad-Networks for the
detection of invalid traffic have been proven to be incapable to rise up to the
challenge [88], thusly spawning a dire need for the development of alterna-
tive designs. To address the new challenges of advertising fraud, researchers
have shifted their focus to new and innovative technologies which are further
detailed in Section 3.2
Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter we provide a detailed consideration of the related work in
the research area of advertising. The chapter is separated into three distinct
sections. In Section 3.1 we examine privacy-preserving advertising systems
and establish the four main approaches which are typically used to ensure
privacy. In Subsection 3.1.1 we scrutinize the most prominent designs and
in Subsection 3.1.2 we proceed to identify their limitations. In Section 3.2
we focus on the field of advertising fraud. In Subsection 3.2.1 we analyze
the available fraud prevention mechanisms and in Subsection 3.2.2 we point
out their respective limitations. Finally, in Section 3.3 we perform a critical
summary of our literature analysis and specify how our design expands upon
the existing work.
3.1 Advertising Privacy
Providing privacy for targeted advert delivery models is a research problem
that several academics have attempted to resolve. Most researchers agree
that sensitive user data should be kept outside the reach of the Ad-Network,
Advertisers, Publishers, and any other party that is not considered trusted.
To address this problem, previously proposed models have incorporated var-
ious combinations of architectures and privacy mechanisms which are briefly
summarized in the following paragraphs.
Trusted Proxy The simplest method of achieving anonymity is by intro-
ducing some form of trusted third party that acts as a proxy between users
and the Ad-Network. The role of the proxy is to mask the identity of the
user by forwarding requests after replacing any identifying information with
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a temporary identifier. The Ad-Network uses this temporary identifier to
reply to the proxy with relevant adverts which are then conveyed back to
the user. In order to further increase privacy, public key encryption can be
used to encrypt requests and adverts. When paired with cryptography, the
proxy is aware of the identity of the user that is sending a request but cannot
see the content of the requests or the corresponding adverts. In turn, the
Ad-Network can read the encrypted requests but is not aware of the user’s
true identity as it is masked by the proxy.
Pool-of-Ads Schemes that are based on the pool-of-ads approach make
use of client-side processing to allow users to select adverts that best satisfy
their needs out of a wider collection (pool) of available content. The pool
can be populated by various methods with the simplest one being by making
a generic request. When following this approach, a user issues a request for
adverts that fall under a very broad category which includes their specific
interest. For example, if a user is interested in running footwear they may
make a generic request for sporting equipment. The Ad-Network responds
with multiple adverts that satisfy the request and it is up to the user to keep
the ones that best match their particular interest and discard the rest.
Anonymous-Download Schemes which use this approach enable users
to directly download broadcast adverts through the use of specialized hard-
ware and software. Advertisers store their adverts at broadcasting stations
that operate in publicly accessible locations. As a user comes into proximity
of these stations, their device downloads the available adverts. The user’s
device is then responsible for sorting through the collected adverts and se-
lecting the most relevant while the rest are discarded. Anonymity is achieved
through the use of protocols that enable mobile devices to connect to the
broadcasting stations without disclosing any information that exposes the
user’s identity such as username or network address. Some of these systems
also enable users to connect and exchange adverts with each other. In these
systems, a user downloads adverts from a broadcasting station and then
propagates them to other users that they later come into proximity with.
This extends the reach of the broadcasting stations but it also requires a
certain level of trust among users.
Aggregation Systems that incorporate this approach accumulate the re-
quests of multiple users with the intent to obfuscate the interests of each
participant within the aggregate. The requests are then placed either by a
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single user or a trusted proxy to the Ad-Network. The Ad-Network responds
with the appropriate adverts which are distributed to the requesting users.
The Ad-Network is able to learn the interests of the entire group of par-
ticipating users but cannot distinguish the preferences of any specific user
within the group. Depending on the enforced level of security, such sys-
tems may also incorporate cryptography or mix networks in order to offer
additional privacy between users.
3.1.1 Literature Review
MyPULSE [38] is a client-server mobile application that delivers specialized
advertisements by utilizing contextual information. The GPS coordinates
of a client are associated with a local ZIP code which is sent to a server
who responds with location-relevant adverts. The server does not obtain
the exact position of the user but is still aware of the general geographical
area as well as other consumer interest information. This architecture is
easy to implement and adopt but offers limited effectiveness as it primarily
focuses on location based adverts.
P2PMM [134] relies on a trusted proxy that is referred to as the Interme-
diary Services Provider (ISP). The ISP is entrusted with storing the user’s
sensitive information and directly answering requests with adverts that are
provided directly from merchants. P2PMM offers adequate targeting effec-
tiveness but heavily relies on the integrity of the ISP in order to provide
privacy. Although the ISP has no immediate interest to expose any infor-
mation to the merchants, the existence of a single point of failure presents
a notable risk.
Juels [80] also uses a proxy, that is called the Negotiant and is responsible
for matching user profiles to a specific set of adverts. The adverts are then
aggregated and posted on a bulletin board where they can be answered by
advertisers. The work presents a variety of different schemes which account
for different levels of security by utilizing methods such as public key cryp-
tography and mix networks1. The system offers substantial privacy against
advertisers but assumes the integrity of the Negotiant which presents a po-
tential threat.
Tran et al. [138] make use of a hybrid approach which combines client-
side processing and a trusted proxy for re-targeting. Re-targeting is a mar-
keting strategy which is used to present consumers with specific products
that they have viewed in the past. The system makes use of a decentralized
1Mix networks are protocols which obfuscate the origin of a message by forwarding it
through a chains of proxies.
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architecture where the Ad-Network is broken down into an Ad Exchange
(ADX) service and a set of Retargeters. Users are responsible for determin-
ing their own re-targeting preferences which are forwarded to Retargeters
via the ADX in encrypted format. The Retargeters then place a bid to the
ADX for an available Ad-Box on a Publisher’s platform and the Retargeter
that wins the auction publishers their advert via a trusted proxy. Provided
that the proxy is not compromised, the ADX only sees the placed bids and
not the user’s re-targeting preferences or the published advert.
MoMa [20, 19] is a proxy based advertising system that also makes use
of a commonly accessible bulletin board. Users create a series of orders
based on a hierarchically organized catalogue of products and services. A
trusted party is then used to post the user’s orders on MoMa. At the
same time, advertisers also publish offers of their products based on the
same catalogue. The system detects matches between orders and offers
and contacts the trusted party which notifies the appropriate user. MoMa
presents a decentralized architecture which is appealing from a practical
point of view but relies heavily on a trusted proxy in order to ensure user
privacy.
Privad [66, 67] performs a selection from a pool-of-ads but also incorpo-
rates a trusted third party (the Dealer) to operate between the users and
the Ad-Network. Unlike MoMa [20, 19] that operates with orders from a
specific catalogue, Privad allows the user to select a general interest cate-
gory and send it to a Broker (system equivalent of the Ad-Network) through
the Dealer. Upon receiving the message, the Broker uses the same path to
respond with a pool-of-ads which are relevant to the user’s interest. The user
then sorts through the delivered pool-of-ads and selects the most prominent
to be displayed while discarding the rest. Although this method is simple
to incorporate into the existing model, it assumes the existence of a fully
trusted third party to act as the Dealer. The Dealer is also a single point
of failure and, if compromised, the security of the entire system can be by-
passed. A fully functional prototype of Privad was constructed and tested
in [121]. The results identify some limitation of Privad in terms of profil-
ing and anonymity when dealing with a small number of users. Regardless
of this, the work determines that a proxy-based solution is effective and
practically feasible. The research outlined in [122] expends the capability
of Privad by proposing an auctioning mechanism for privately ranking and
calculating the cost of adverts.
ObliviAd [15] follows a similar architecture as other proxy-based systems
but with the use of a secure hardware device that is placed on the Ad-
Network side. The device receives requests from clients and responds with
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a number of matching adverts that are obtained from the Ad-Network’s
database. The system accounts for click reports and maintains privacy by
deploying a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) mechanism which allows
the client to access the Ad-Network’s database, while preventing the Ad-
Network from learning about the query and the resulting answer [28]. Aside
from requiring additional computational power, this architecture does not
guarantee that the operator of the Ad-Network will not bypass security by
physically tampering with the device.
RePriv [60] is a browser extension that offers effective advert delivery
but also addresses the issue of privacy. The application tracks the user’s
activity and builds a dynamic profile of consumer interests which are shared
with advert providers. Privacy is enforced by allowing the user to explicitly
give consent for what kind of information is disclosed to each party. This
direct security approach is straightforward and easy to implement but is also
very impractical for users. This may potentially make RePriv ineffective as
frustrated users are likely to simply decline the sharing of all data.
MoRePriv [36] is an evolution of RePriv [60] with a special focus in mo-
bile advertising. MoRePriv is implemented as part of the mobile Operating
System (OS) and allows users to manage the sharing of private informa-
tion is a similar manner as location data is managed by current systems.
Additionally, MoRePriv offers support for private targeting by associating
the advertising habits of users to a predetermined set of typical consumer
profiles which are referenced as Personaes. The system supports a total of
eight Personaes which can be associated to specific advertising interest is
a similar fashion as demographic data is being utilized in traditional tar-
geting. Although the system offers some flexibility by assigning a weight to
each Personae in order to signify the extend in which it relates to a user, the
limited number of Personaes result is fewer options for targeted advertising.
Leontiadis et al. [90] propose a framework to control the stream of private
information which is disclosed to the Ad-Network. Contrast to RePriv [60]
which requires users to determine what kind of information is shared, Leon-
tiadis argues that the flow of information should not be left in the hands
of the user. Instead, the model takes a market-oriented approach in order
to balance the flow of private information in accordance to the generated
effectiveness. Consequently, access to private data is allowed to Publishers
(mobile apps) which generate a low CTR (Click Through Rate refers to
the ratio clicks per advert impression) while Publishers with high CTR are
restricted in the amount of data they have access to.
Hardt et al. [72] argue that the optimal trade-off between targeting ef-
fectiveness and privacy can only be achieved through a hybrid system which
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combines client-side profiling with a trusted proxy. The authors propose
a framework which allows users to control the flow of private information
which is shared with a partially trusted server. Based on the provided data,
the server is able to respond to general interest requests with a pool-of-ads
which satisfy the user’s request. The user is then tasked with selecting the
most prominent advert and discard the rests. The multilayered architecture
of the system does increase privacy but the use of a pool-of-ads creates un-
necessary overhead and may also not be entirely effective when the user’s
request is too generic.
Adnostic [137] composes a local profile which is not disclosed to any out-
side parties but is used locally for the purpose of making a selection out
of a pool-of-ads. When a user visits a website, a number of adverts that
are relevant to the contextual theme of that particular website are sent by
the Ad-Network. The advert which is the most relevant to the user’s in-
terest profile is then selected and displayed while the rest are discarded.
This approach is wasteful on resources and also offers limited targeting ef-
fectiveness as the delivered adverts are based on a very general assumption
of the user’s interests. The system also allows the reporting of viewed ad-
verts with the application of homomorphic encryption which is implemented
with the assistance of a trusted party. The level of privacy therefore hinges
on the integrity of the trusted party that manages the cryptographic keys.
Should the Ad-Network gain access to advert reports, then user privacy is
compromised despite the method which is used for advert delivery.
Kodialam et al. [86] also follow a pool-of-ads approach which is similar
to Adnostic [137]. The authors propose a role reversal scheme where the
Ad-Network sends to the user a series of interest profiles along with a set
of matching adverts. The user stores the adverts that correspond to the
profile that is the most similar to her own and the rest are discarded. This
approach may potentially be more effective than Adnostic since users have
a wider variety of adverts to choose from but the generated overhead is also
increased to a negative effect.
BlueMall [124] offers a rudimentary application of anonymous-download
technologies. The model uses Bluetooth broadcasting in order to deliver ad-
verts within a mall. Access points broadcast location aware adverts directly
to user devices when they come into proximity. Although the downloading
of adverts is private, the system also incorporates a central authority which
keeps track of user location patterns and downloaded adverts. In terms of
effectiveness, BlueMall is limited to local business and incapable of achieving
fine-grain targeting.
PervAd [23, 24] provides personalized adverts through broadcasting and
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can also support fine-grained content. Users who maintain a local inter-
est profile can collect relevant adverts as they move into proximity of cus-
tomized WiFi access points. The system reduces overhead by first sharing
some contextual information about the available adverts thus allowing users
to selectively download only specific content. The interest profile is specified
by the users themselves and the downloading process is performed anony-
mously. Even though this method achieves a substantial level of privacy, it
is susceptible to malware as users have no means of verifying the integrity of
downloaded content. Additionally, PervAd is also impractical as users need
to manually compose their profiles and physically travel to specific locations
in order to download adverts.
MobiAd [70, 71] is based on the principal idea of anonymous-download
but also incorporates Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN). Users of the system
maintain a local profile and are free to collect adverts via publicly accessible
broadcasting stations such as Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Services
(MBMS) and WiFi hotspots. The system focuses on targeting effective-
ness and therefore is limited to the collection of small volumes of fine-grain
adverts. MobiAd also takes into account the issue of click report delivery
by taking advantage of Delayed Tolerant Networks (DTNs) and public key
cryptography.
Straub et al. [133] adopts a word-of-mouth approach in order to dis-
tribute adverts over a social network of peers. Users who appear within
proximity of broadcasting stations are free to download adverts in accor-
dance to a consumer profile which remains local. Additionally, users are
able to also exchange adverts with each other by maintaining two lists which
are referred to as ’iHave’ and ’iWish’. The ’iHave’ list stores the adverts
which are held by a particular user while ’iWish’ keeps adverts that the user
wishes to obtain. To offer incentive for user participation, the system also
includes a bonus point model which rewards users who propagate adverts.
eNcentive [119] adopts a very similar approach to propagate adverts over
an opportunistic network and also offers a rewarding method in order to
provide user incentives. Both schemes provide privacy against Advertisers
(local merchants) but for the most part ignore privacy concerns between the
users. An additional factor that neither system does not account for is the
presence of malicious users that may spread fake adverts or malware.
The Let’s Meet! [111] framework uses a client-server architecture which
establishes a cooperation link between mobile users who share an interest
for a particular offer but may be unrelated to each other. More specifi-
cally, Let’s Meet! enables consumers to take advantage of group offers by
physically bringing them together in the location of a local vendor. The
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authors emphasize privacy and security by incorporating mechanisms that
prevent the disclosure of sensitive consumer information and defend against
malicious users who may launch impersonation attacks or attempt to forge
offer-coupons.
Artail et al. [14] and Fawaz et al. [58, 57] take advantage of user coop-
eration in order to achieve anonymity via aggregation. Nearby devices that
wish to download adverts get connected and aggregate all of their interest
profiles into a single device. The collective request is then forwarded to the
Broker (system equivalent of the Ad-Network) who responds with the re-
quested adverts. The received adverts are then delivered to the participants.
The protocol achieves privacy against the Broker as well as other users by
taking advantage of techniques such as mix networks and asymmetric en-
cryption. This may put great strain to the hardware of the mobile device,
especially if you take into consideration that the system operates in real
time.
MASTAds [125] combines interest aggregation with the use of a partially
trusted party that is called the AMS. The AMS tracks the contact patterns
of users in order to divide them into communities. The interests of all
members of a community are then aggregated and sent to the AMS which is
responsible for fetching adverts from the Ad-Network. The relevant adverts
are obtained by the AMS and are then propagated through the community
via opportunistic networking. MASTAds reduces bandwidth and battery
consumption and also has the prospects of achieving fine-grained targeting.
The system also offers privacy among the users of a community and the
Ad-Network but still relies heavily on the integrity of the AMS which has
access to user meeting patterns.
Wang et al. [147] exploit the cooperation of users within a certain area
as a means of delivering private location-based adverts. The model divides
users into those who are sensitive about their location privacy (SUs) and
those who are not (ISs). IUs are rewarded by assisting SUs within their
vicinity to obtain location-relevant adverts. IUs download and broadcast a
series of advert identifiers adIDs which are collected by nearby SUs. SUs
select the adIDs which are relevant to their interests and forward them to
a Publisher (content provider). The Publisher is then tasked to operate as
a trusted proxy and present the requested adverts directly on his platform
without exposing the users identity to the Ad-Network. This architecture
offers a substantial level of privacy against the Ad-Network and other users
but not against Publishers. Although this approach distributes trust to
multiple Publishers rather than a single Ad-Network, the fact that Publishers
have every incentive to expose user information to the Ad-Network presents
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a definite privacy risk.
The authors in [146] attempt to work around the problem of user privacy
by approaching the advertising model from a game theory perspective. The
proposed framework aims to motivate users to share their private data in
exchange for monetary compensation from the Ad-Network. Their simula-
tions demonstrate that when all parties are incentivized to actively engage in
targeted advertising, the system eventually settles to an equilibrium which
yields the optimal reward for the participants. The authors state that click
fraud is assumed to be prevented by existing means. This may not be en-
tirely accurate however since this design can serve as a catalyst for multiple
malicious users to perform invalid clicks. Arguably, this will provoke a dis-
tributed form of fraudulent behaviour and make the problem of click fraud
even more severe and harder to combat.
3.1.2 Limitations of Advertising Privacy Systems
Table 3.1 shows a detailed scrutiny of all of the examined privacy-preserving
advertising systems. Our analysis focuses on three aspects, namely pri-
vacy, targeting effectiveness and practicality. Privacy indicates the system’s
ability to protect the user’s private data from all other parties (including
other users). Targeting effectiveness articulates the system’s ability to sup-
port fine-grained targeted adverts. Lastly, practicality expresses the level of
practical difficulty which is required for the system to be implemented and
maintained.
Systems which rely on anonymity proxies can be easily incorporated into
the current architecture and achieve an adequate level of privacy without
seriously reducing the targeting effectiveness and the efficiency of the sys-
tem. Regardless, such systems assume the existence of a trusted or partially
trusted third party that can act as the proxy. This assumption is not entirely
realistic and also creates a single point of failure that threatens the integrity
of the system if compromised. In essence, systems of this type do not really
solve the problem but only transfer accountability to a different entity. The
aforementioned limitations could potentially be resolved through the adop-
tion of a proxy network such as TOR. By distributing trust across multiple
proxies, the threat of a potential compromise is reduced but at the same
time there is a significant increase in complexity and latency.
Performing a selection from a Pool-of-Ads maintains privacy by tak-
ing advantage of the computational capability of mobile devices. Systems
which incorporate this design do not require any trust between the partic-
ipants and, depending on the method that is used to populate the pool,
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they can achieve a satisfactory level of privacy. Although these systems are
not too difficult to introduce, they suffer greatly in terms of targeting effec-
tiveness as the information that is shared with the Ad-Network may be too
generic to effectively retrieve adverts that accurately correspond with the
user’s interests. Additionally, a significant amount of unnecessary overhead
is generated by these systems as multiple adverts need to be downloaded
and stored only to be discarded afterwards.
Systems that incorporate Anonymous-Download technologies offer the
highest level of privacy but may also be impractical due to the fact that
users need to physically travel to designated locations where broadcasting
station are accessible. When enhanced with opportunistic networking, the
practicality of Anonymous-Download systems may increase but this will also
raise trust issues among the nodes of the network.
Systems which enforce the aggregation of adverts from multiple users
offer variable levels of privacy depending on their design. Models which
combine aggregation with a proxy are not entirely private as they assume
the trust of a third party. On the other hand, models that only rely on
user cooperation have the potential of offering adequate privacy against the
Ad-Network but not against other users. Some designs attempt to mitigate
the aforementioned shortcoming by incorporating cryptography and mix-
networks but this has the negative side effect of also increasing complexity
and overhead which is not ideal for real-time applications.
All of the systems that were examined, rely on user profiles that are
stored either locally or on a trusted proxy. This design assumes that each
user only connects through a single device and that multiple users do not
have access to the same device. If a user were to connect through multiple
devices, then each device would only have partial knowledge of the particular
user’s advertising profile which could cause a significant reduction of target-
ing effectiveness. To overcome this limitation, a system would need to be
able to track users across multiple devices which is not easily feasible with-
out infringing user privacy. In a similar fashion, an advertising profile which
is associated with a particular device would be skewed if the device were
to be accessed by multiple users. This eventuality can however be avoided
when the device is able to distinguish between different users and compose
separate advertising profiles. Regarding the submission of Ad-Reports, none
of the examined systems is able to offer an architecture which is resilient to
fraud while maintaining user privacy and targeting effectiveness.
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System Privacy Targeting Practicality
MyPULSE [38] Limited Poor Good
P2PMM [134] Limited Good Good
Juels [80] Limited Good Limited
Tran [138] Limited Limited Limited
MoMa [20, 19] Limited Limited Limited
Privad [66, 67] Limited Poor Good
ObliviAd [15] Poor Good Poor
RePriv [60] Good Poor Poor
MoRePriv [36] Good Limited Poor
Leontiadis [90] Limited Limited Good
Hardt [72] Good Poor Limited
Adnostic [137] Good Poor Poor
Kodialam [86] Good Poor Poor
BlueMall [124] Poor Poor Good
PervAd [23, 24] Good Good Poor
MobiAd [70, 71] Good Good Limited
Straub [133] Poor Good Limited
Let’s Meet! [111] Limited Limited Limited
Artail [14] Good Good Poor
Fawaz [58, 57] Good Good Poor
MASTAds [125] Poor Good Limited
Wang [147] Poor Limited Poor
Wang [146] Limited Limited Poor
Table 3.1: Evaluation table of advertising privacy preserving systems.
3.2 Fraud Prevention
A number of researchers have contributed different mechanisms with the
aim to combat advert fraud. As there are many ways of approaching the
issue, their work varies greatly. Some focus on preventing fraudulent reports
by detecting and blocking them at their source while others attempt to
filter out illegitimate reports by validating their quality after they have been
submitted.
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3.2.1 Literature Review
CCFDP [83, 145] offers real time click fraud protection capability through
the fusion of data (evidence of suspicious behaviour) which is provided by
multiple collaborating sources. Three modules are used to independently
evaluate reported clicks from both the sever and client side and individ-
ually return probabilistic estimates of a click’s legitimacy which are com-
bined to produce an overall score. The results are shown to improve the
quality assessment of incoming traffic by an average of 10% compared to
what is separately achieved by the individual modules, thus allowing the
system to identify sources of fraudulent clicks more accurately and success-
fully block them. CCFDP offers increased effectiveness in comparison to
currently adopted systems but it also endangers user privacy as it requires
the collection of data from both the server and the client.
Rather that filtering our fraudulent clicks, Juels et al. [81] promotes the
use of premium clicks which represent reports from users whose legitimacy
can be verified through the use of cryptographic credentials, simply known
as Coupons. Designated websites, referred as Attestors, provide their visitors
with coupons when they perform specific tasks which are indicative of real
user behaviour (e.g., making an online purchase). The coupon can be then
attached to future Ad-Reports and works as a form of proof that a particular
click was performed by a verified user. The model is implemented in such
way that the users’ identity is substantially protected against a curious ad-
versary and also offers protection against coupon-replay attacks. Although
the system is highly effective, one potential limitation lies on the fact that
the submission of numerous reports will require the same number of Coupons
which may not always be easily available.
Haddadi et al. [69] argues that click fraud is progressively becoming
harder to detect through traditional threshold techniques (identifying mul-
tiple reports from the same source) as botnet activity is becoming evermore
sophisticated through the employment of such means as proxies and dis-
tributed attacks. To address the problem, the paper proposes the use of
specialized adverts which are called Bluff-ads. Bluff-ads operate as a from of
honeypot which allures automated clickers but repels real users. While most
adverts are typically targeted at a specific user by being context-specific to a
consumer’s profile, Bluff-ads are purposely designed to be entirely irrelevant
to the user’s interests (e.g., an advert for female clothes that is shown to
a male user). As Bluff-ads are of no real significance to the targeted user,
when they are being clicked they serve as indicators of suspicious activity.
Although this idea to be very creative, the fact needs to be stated that
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Bluff-ads are unlike to be adopted as they take up valuable space which can
be used for real (profitable) adverts.
FCFraud [77] runs locally on the devices of individual users as a means of
preventing them from being part of a botnet. Botnets are groups of infected
devices which are used to commit click-fraud by generating fake reports
without the user’s knowledge. The model is incorporated into the operating
system as an anti-malware software which monitors submitted click-reports
to detect if they correspond to real activity (physical mouse clicks) or have
been artificially created by a malicious software. FCFraud is shown to be
highly effective at recognizing infected machines but is ineffective against
actors who intentionally commit such as click-farms and auto-clickers.
Faou et al. [56] provide a detailed examination of a click-fraud malware
called Boaxxe over a long period. The authors run Boaxxe in a controlled
environment and managed to reconstruct a redirection chain which maps
the path of different domains that the malware follows before been directed
to the targeted Advertiser’s website. By representing this data in a graph,
they were able to identify key actors who have a critical role in the scheme
and target them more effectively with the intent of disrupting the malware’s
operation.
Zhan et al. [157] offers a pair of algorithms, GBF and TBF, which can be
used to detect duplicate clicks on data streams which make use of Decaying
Windows. The Decaying Window approach is a data mining method which
is based on the premise of separating a data stream into segments (windows)
which are examined individually. The objective of their work is to optimize
the identification of clicks which appear in multiple windows with the use
of Bloom filters. Their designs are shown to significantly reduce memory
consumption while achieving a low rate of false positives and zero rate of
false negatives.
MAdFraud [32] is a tool for identifying apps that engage in fraudulent
behaviour. The system adopts a sandbox approach to trigger fraudulent ac-
tivity by emulating user behaviour. MAdFraud was able to identify multiple
apps which conduct fraud either by submitting impressions while running in
the background or by fabricating fake clicks. From their results, the authors
infer that fraudulent apps exhibit sophisticated stealth mechanisms such as
pacing the rate of reports or using different Ad-Networks. Such means of
remaining stealthy allows apps to avoid detection from systems which rely
on filtering analysis on the server side.
DECAF [96] is a software implementation which analyzes the structural
layout of mobile apps in order to identify developer violations of the regula-
tions which are promoted by the Ad-Network. Namely, apps which commit
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fraud by mismanaging adverts. This includes practices such as altering
banners, publishing multiple adverts within the same Ad-Box/Ad-Slot or
triggering fake clicks by placing adverts under other visual element of the
UI.
AdAttester [92] is a proposed advert report verification framework which
is based on the use of a secure hardware extension named ARM TrustZone.
The device is capable of monitoring a phone’s input and output by directly
connecting to the touch sensor and display modules. This allows TrustZone
to verify both impressions (advert views) and clicks by comparing the user’s
touch input to the location of a displayed advert on the screen. AdAttester
appears to be highly effective at detecting fraudulent behaviour but it also
requires the use of custom hardware which is costly and not always available.
A similar approach to AdAttester [92] but without the use of specialized
hardware is proposed by Cho et al. [27]. The authors perform an empirical
study of click fraud by implementing their own malicious software called
ClickDroid. As a countermeasure against automated clickers, they suggest
tracking the user’s clicks from the touch sensor at the kernel level. This is
achieved with the installation of a middle-ware which collects the sensor’s
output and logs it into a separate file. The log can then be used to verify
if a particular report corresponds to a physical click. Assuming that the
middle-ware cannot be bypassed by sophisticated bots, the system is still be
susceptible to click-farms.
Hua et al. [75] propose an alternative architecture with the existing stake-
holders of the advertising ecosystem. The authors suggest that users play
a more active role in the process by directly forwarding reports to the con-
cerned Advertisers and Publishers. Both parties then anonymize and for-
ward their data to the Ad-Network who is responsible for matching and
awarding each report. Reports are encrypted in such a way that Advertis-
ers have access to the clicked advert but not the identity of the Publisher
who presented it. This enables Advertisers to directly check the legitimacy
of each click but may also incentivize them to commit themselves fraud
against Publishers by denying the validity of submitted reports.
3.2.2 Limitations of Fraud Prevention Systems
Fraud prevention systems can be loosely classified in two categories in terms
of the approach which they follow. The first, and most prominent clas-
sification, focuses at detecting fraudulent activity by analyzing the traffic
patters of user activity on the server side. The challenge which is faced by
this approach is in regards to the bulk of available information which makes
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processing difficult and costly. Furthermore, systems that rely on filtering
algorithms are not entirely effective against click-farms and sophisticated
clickbots that mimic real user behaviour. Concerning privacy, set approach
heavily relies on sensitive data and therefore constitutes as a threat for users.
The second classification consists of mechanisms which are aimed at detect-
ing malicious activity at its source. Such systems adopt a variety of means
such as sandbox analyzers, honeypots, adware programs, secure hardware
and digital certificates. Systems of the second classification may have an
advantage over traffic filtering as they are cheaper to operate and gener-
ally require less or no private user information. Nevertheless, such systems
have mostly been deployed in supplementary roles as they also exhibit seri-
ous drawbacks in terms of effectiveness and practicality. More specifically,
sandbox analysis and honeypots are only effective at identifying malicious
programs but have no means of preventing their use. Furthermore, certain
sophisticated blibkbots have been known to be able to detect the presence
of sandbox analyzers and honeypots. Adware programs and secure hard-
ware operate on the client side and are therefore only effective at preventing
users from involuntarily installing malicious software. Against users who
are not concerned with actively preventing clickbots and against operators
who intentionally commit fraud, such apparatuses have no effect. Lastly,
digital certificates offer promising potential at addressing advertising fraud.
It needs to be mentioned however that, if not implemented correctly, digi-
tal certificates may be susceptible to fabrication and may also violate user
privacy.
3.3 Related Work Summary
Our assessment of the related work, in both research areas of advertising
privacy and fraud prevention, shows that previously proposed systems have
notable shortcomings. Privacy-preserving advertising systems are typically
based on a combination of four approaches: (1) Trusted Proxy, (2) Pool-
of-Ads, (3) Anonymous-Download and (4) Aggregation. Regardless of the
approach being used, all systems that were examined fail to achieve an ac-
ceptable balance between privacy, targeting effectiveness and practicality
which renders them unsuitable. Fraud prevention systems adopt a wide
range of approaches which may partially be effective against certain types
of fraudsters but not against all. More importantly, none of the relevant
research addressed how the adoption of fraud prevention systems will affect
user privacy. Consequently, privacy-preserving systems rely heavily on the
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collection of private data which renders them as a serious threat for users.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the previously proposed designs offers
a comprehensive solution that ensures effective advert targeting and protec-
tion against advertising fraud while still maintaining user privacy. ADS+R
was designed to fulfill this role by offering both targeted advertising and
fraud prevention without violating user privacy. ADS+R adopts elements
from previous designs (e.g. client-side processing, anonymous broadcast-
ing technologies) and expands on the available research by incorporating
new features with the aim to offer a complete advertising solution which is
mutually beneficial for all concerned parties.
Chapter 4
ADS: Advert Distribution
System
The Advert Distribution System (ADS ), which was published in [99], is
a novel approach for distributing personalized adverts over a social network
of mobile users. ADS takes advantage of anonymous-download technologies
witch enable mobile devices to download promotional materials via publicly
accessible broadcasting stations. Previously proposed anonymous-download
designs such as [124, 23, 24, 70, 71] and [133] have been shown to offer a
substantial level of privacy against Ad-Networks but still suffer from serious
limitations as previously discussed in Section 3.1.2.
ADS aims to overcome the limitations of previous designs by achieving a
balance between privacy and practicality while maintaining fine-grained tar-
geting capability. Our design specifically focuses on mobile advertising which
is the most widely used form of advertising and also one of the most intru-
sive as it exploits sensitive information such as location patterns, app usage
and smart-phone sensor data. We expand on previous work by fusing client-
side processing and anonymous-download technologies with opportunistic
networking and public-key encryption. In comparison to contemporary de-
signs, the client-side processing capability of ADS allows for (1) fine-grained
targeting which offers greater advertising effectiveness. The combination of
anonymous-download technologies and opportunistic networking, which is
also present in ADS, helps to achieve (2) greater user privacy against the
Broker, Advertisers, Ad-Dealers and other users and at the same time (3)
makes the system more resilient to fake advert injection and sabotage at-
tacks. Lastly, the application of opportunistic networking (4) expands the
reach of the system by allowing limited mobility users, who do not appear
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within the vicinity of broadcasting stations, to still be able to transfer data
via their neighboring nodes.
In the following sections of this chapter we offer a detailed presentation,
analysis and evaluation of ADS. We define the system’s specifications in
Section 4.1 and then offer a detailed overview of the system in Section 4.2. In
Section 4.3 we summarize the protocol and lastly, in Section 4.4 we evaluate
our design.
4.1 System Specifications
In the following sections we define the specifications of ADS. We begin by
identifying the system’s stakeholders in Section 4.1.1 and determine the
trust relations between them in 4.1.2. Lastly, we proceed to set the system’s
functional requirements in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1 Stakeholders
ADS consists of five stakeholders, namely users, Advertisers, Publishers, Ad-
Dealers and lastly the Broker. The first three represent the same entities as
those of the OBA system which was exhibited in Section 2.1. We restate that
users represent consumers who view adverts on their mobile devices, Adver-
tisers are promotional companies and Publishers are digital platforms which
display adverts. The Broker is selected by the Advertisers as their trusted
representative. As Advertisers are too numerous to operate independently
while still remaining coordinated, they employ the services of the Broker
whose job is to function as an administrative authority. Lastly, Ad-Dealers
are local broadcasting stations who serve as communication gateways be-
tween users and Advertisers.
Users who appear within the proximity of an Ad-Dealer, send their re-
quests which are forwarded to the Advertisers. The corresponding adverts
are sent back from the Advertisers to the Ad-Dealer so they can be broad-
cast. The user who made the request is responsible for downloading the
broadcast adverts while the remaining users within the area ignore the trans-
mission. The role of Ad-Dealer may be cast to any regional entity with
physical presence in publicly accessible areas. This may include shopping
malls, WiFi hotspots and local businesses. Ad-Dealers are free to conduct
their own business independently and do not need to coordinate with each
other. The necessary hardware and software infrastructure is provided to
Ad-Dealers by the Broker who serves as their administrative authority on
behalf of the Advertisers. The users are the ones who select which adverts
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they want to download and send their requests directly to the Advertisers
through the Broker’s infrastructure. The Ad-Dealers are only responsible
for hosting the Broker’s hardware and do not need to interact with the Ad-
vertisers. For users, the only precondition to participate in ADS is to own a
smart-phone device which runs the required software while Ad-Dealers can
be added or removed dynamically.
4.1.2 Trust Model
The Broker is employed by the Advertisers to operate as their representative
in the system. Since the Broker does not receive a share of the advert
revenue, she has no benefit from deceiving the Advertisers and can therefore
be assumed as trusted. On behalf of the Broker, no trust is required towards
Advertisers.
Ad-Dealers are supplied by the Broker with specialized networking equip-
ment which is installed on site. Despite having no immediate benefit from
undermining the system, Ad-Dealers have the potential of tampering with
the Broker’s infrastructure. To ensure Ad-Dealer integrity, the Broker
can enforce preventive measures similar to Point Of Sale (POS) system
providers. Such precautions can include legal agreements and periodical
hardware checks. Since Ad-Dealers are registered businesses, they can be
assumed as unlike to engage in criminal activity that can easily be traced
back to them. The Broker and Advertisers are therefore suspicious of Ad-
Dealers but do not consider them malicious. On behalf of Ad-Dealers, no
trust towards the Broker and Advertisers is required.
Users consider the Broker, Advertisers and Ad-Dealers as honest enough
to provide them with legitimate adverts but also curious and very deter-
mined to obtain private user data. Users can therefore trust the provided
material but are not willing to expose any information that can link to
their true identity (name, address, banking details, etc.). Users are also
very distrustful of each other despite being part of the same social group.
Compromised users can potentially expose sensitive data of other users or
propagate fake adverts. Additionally, compromised users can sabotage the
entire system by attacking Ad-Dealers. Users are therefore considered as ma-
licious by the Broker, Advertisers, Ad-Dealers as well as other users. Lastly,
Publishers only associate with users and operate independently to the rest
of the system. No trust is therefore required between Publishers and other
stakeholders.
Table 4.1 shows the trust relations between the system’s stakeholders.
The first column lists the system stakeholders and each line exhibits the
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level of trust of the respective stakeholder towards the remaining entities.
A ’Trusted’ label indicates that a stakeholder can be trusted to not perform
any action that undermines the system. This level of trust is only exhibited
by the Advertisers towards the Broker. A ’Suspicious’ label indicates that a
stakeholder has no benefit from acting maliciously but she is still expected
to provide proof of her integrity. This level of trust is exhibited by the Bro-
ker and the Advertisers towards the Ad-Dealers. A ’Curious’ label indicates
that a stakeholder is trusted to not cause harm (for e.g. spread malicious
software) but cannot be trusted to handle private information. The ’Curi-
ous’ label is attributed to stakeholders that have no reason to undermine
the functionality of the system as this would inevitably cause them direct
financial or legal damage. However, the same stakeholders are still willing to
mishandle private information and are also able to do so without exposing
themselves. This level of trust is exhibited by the User towards the Ad-
vertisers, Ad-Dealers and the Broker. Lastly, a ’Malicious’ label indicates
that a stakeholder is expected to act with criminal intent. This level of
trust is exhibited by all system stakeholders (including users) towards any
compromised user who may attempt to steal data or sabotage the system.
Advertisers Broker Ad-Dealers Users Publishers
Advertisers - Trusted Suspicious - -
Broker - - Suspicious Malicious -
Ad-Dealers - - - - -
Users Curious Curious Curious Malicious -
Publishers - - - - -
Table 4.1: Table of trust relations between ADS stakeholders.
4.1.3 System Requirements
In this section we list the functional requirements of ADS in consonance
with the trust model that we established in Section 4.1.2. The ensuing re-
quirements will serve as the criteria upon with our system will be evaluated.
• User anonymity against Ad-Dealers: Users view Ad-Dealers (and
by association the Broker and Advertisers) as ’Curious’ of their private
data. It should therefore not be a way for Ad-Dealers to obtain any
information that links a user’s identity to their advertising interests.
• User privacy against other users: Users consider other users as
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’Malicious’. The advertising interests of a particular user should there-
fore not be accessible to other users.
• User security against malicious users: Malicious users are not
restricted to the collection of private data but may also attempt to
actively harm legitimate users by injecting fake adverts into the sys-
tem. ADS should therefore not allow malicious users to propagate any
harmful content to their peers.
• Robustness against sabotage attacks: Users are viewed as ’Ma-
licious’ by the remaining stakeholders as a compromised user may
attempt to sabotage the system. ADS should therefore be protected
against any attacks which may be launched by malicious users.
4.2 System Overview
ADS establishes a communication link between mobile device users and Ad-
vertisers by combining anonymous-download technology and opportunistic
networking as shown in Figure 4.1. The Broker initiates the operation of
the system by collecting adverts from the Advertisers and supplying them
to the Ad-Dealers. Users run specialized software which automatically de-
termines their advertising needs and requests suitable adverts when they
appear within proximity of Ad-Dealers. The adverts are stored locally in
the the users’ devices until they can be displayed by a Publisher.
Alternatively, users can connect to Ad-Dealers indirectly via Agents
who are themselves mobile users within the same social network. Agents
are highly mobile users who regularly appear within range of Ad-Dealers
and can therefore contribute to their community by downloading adverts on
behalf of other users. This architecture allows users, who do not enter the
proximity of Ad-Dealers often enough, to obtain their adverts by exploiting
the mobility of Agents within their social cycle. Additionally, the presence
of the opportunistic connection boosts the system’s anonymity as Agents
serve the role of a partially trusted proxy.
To establish an opportunistic connection with the Ad-Dealers, a mobile
user, who will from now forth be referred to as Requester, sends a request
message to the Agent. The Agent physically ferries the request message
to an Ad-Dealer and collects the relevant adverts. The Agent can then
forward the collected adverts back to the Requester the next time the two
of them come within proximity. An Agent can serve multiple Requesters
simultaneously. Furthermore, users can operate as both Requester and Agent
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at the same time. This would involve a user Alice sending a request to Bob
who then forwards it to a third user named Charlie. In this scenario, Bob
is the Requester for Charlie but at the same time serves as the Agent for
Alice. ADS can support interactions with multiple users but for the sake of
simplicity we will just explore the most basic scenario where only two users
(a Requester and an Agent) are involved.
Both requests and adverts are transmitted across ADS in encrypted for-
mat. The use of cryptography preserves Requester privacy and also prevents
the injection of fake adverts by a malicious Agent. Furthermore, the system
incorporates authentication protocols which prevent attackers from imper-
sonating users or Ad-Dealers. The detailed technical operation of ADS can
be broken down in four phases which are described in Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.4.
Figure 4.1: ADS (Advert Distribution System) architecture.
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4.2.1 Phase 1: Setup
The preparatory phase of the system involves the recruitment of Ad-Dealers
and the installation of a software client on the user’s mobile devices. The
client is responsible for determining the user’s advertising interests and also
registering the user’s contacts with his/her peers. Users are identified by
a unique User Identity Name IDu which is inputted on the client at the
moment of installation. Additionally, users are required to select a secret
Master Password MPWu. The IDu and MPWu are used to identify and
authenticate the users to each other and are kept secret from all other stake-
holders. The technical details of the aforementioned operations are provided
in the following paragraphs.
Ad-Dealer Recruitment: The Broker launches ADS by recruiting a net-
work of Ad-Dealers who are identified by a unique reference number Aid
(Ad-Dealer Identity). The Ad-Dealers are then equipped with specialized
networking hardware which can support anonymous-downloading. The Bro-
ker also supplies the Ad-Dealers with two cryptographic keys, SysDK (Sys-
tem Decryption Key) and ADKsig (Ad-Dealer Signing Key). SysDK is an
asymmetric decryption key which remains private among the Ad-Dealers.
The corresponding public Encryption Key SysEK is pre-installed within a
mobile client which is downloaded by the users. Users can encrypt their
requests with SysEK and privately send them to Ad-Dealers who are able
to decrypt them with SysDK. The second encryption key ADKsig is meant
to be used for authentication and must therefore remain private among Ad-
Dealers. The corresponding public key ADKver is known as the Ad-Dealer
Verification Key and is also pre-installed in the user’s mobile client.
Advertising Interest Profile (AIP) Composition: Mobile devices have
access to a multitude of user information such as browsing logs, search his-
tory, emails, text messages, mobile app data, GPS and WiFi access-point
locations, purchase logs (via services like Apple Pay or PayPal) and also
data from on-board sensors such as accelerometers, pedometers and activity
monitors. ADS taps into a smartphone’s resources and utilizes client-side
processing in order to determine a user’s advertising needs with much higher
effectiveness than a remote observer. The AIP is updated automatically
based on the changes of the user’s activity. Similar approaches have been
applied in the past by various systems such as [66, 67, 36, 72, 137, 70, 71]
and [133].
Users join ADS by downloading and installing a mobile software client
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which is tasked with constructing the user’s AIPu (Advertising Interest Pro-
file). The AIPu is standard throughout the entirety of the system and repre-
sents a list of common consumer interests (automotive, technology, food and
drink, etc.) which can be marked in binary format as ’TRUE’ or ’FALSE’.
To refer to each contained interest, ADS uses a unique identifier Iid (for
e.g., I1,I2,...In). When given the right permissions, the mobile client can
determine the user’s advertising interests and mark them as ’TRUE’ on the
AIPu.
The AIPu is not shared with any other parties but remains local where
it can be dynamically maintained based on changes in user behavior. The
process which is used to deduce the user’s interests is independent to the rest
of the system, thus offering a great deal of versatility. Individual Advertisers
would be able to fine-tune ADS by implementing their own proprietary
tracking algorithms which will be fully compatible with the rest of the system
for as long as they produce an output that follows the standard AIPu format.
Contact Registration: In addition to composing the AIPu, mobile clients
also perform periodic scans (e.g., via Bluetooth or WiFi) in order to records
the user’s encounters with his/her peers as well as with Ad-Dealers. When
two mobile users appear within range for the first time, both clients re-
quest a manual confirmation to exchange IDus. Once confirmation has
been achieved, the users generate a pair of Contact Authentication Pass-
words ConPW u2u1 and ConPW
u1
u2 . To generate ConPW
u2
u1 and ConPW
u1
u2
each user combines their own Master Password MPWu1 or MPWu2 with
the other user’s User Identity Name IDu1 or IDu2. The results are then
individually hushed to produce ConPW u2u1 and ConPW
u1
u2 as shown in Equa-
tions 4.1 and 4.2. Once successfully generated, ConPW u2u1 and ConPW
u1
u2
are exchanged and the two users are registered as Contacts. Ideally, an out-
of-band channel (SMS, QR code, email or keyboard input) should be used
for the exchange but alternative channels such as Bluetooth or WiFi can also
be used. Although the use of an insecure channel simplifies the exchange,
it also creates the risk of passwords being sniffed by nearby eavesdroppers.
The compromise between security and utility can be left to the discretion of
the user.
ConPW u2u1 = h(IDu2,MPWu1) (4.1)
ConPW u1u2 = h(IDu1,MPWu2) (4.2)
When the two registered Contacts meet again in the future, they can log
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their encounter 1 after they have both verified each other with a challenge-
response password handshake as depicted in Figure 4.2. The handshake
begins with the two users u1 and u2 (1) exchanging their User Identity
Names IDu1 and IDu2 as well as two random nonce challenges R1 and
R2. (2) The users then calculate ConPW u2u1 and ConPW
u1
u2 in the same
way as when they first registered as contacts. Alternatively, the users can
keep Contact Passwords stored. This will reserve processing power at the
expense of memory. (3) Users then calculate two Temporary Passwords
P1 = h(ConPW u2u1 , R2) and P2 = h(ConPW
u1
u2 , R1) and (4) exchange them.
Once P1 and P2 have been received, (5) the users recover from memory their
own copies of each others Contact Password ConPW u2u1 and ConPW
u1
u2 and
they (6) calculate P¯1 and P¯2. Lastly, each others identity is authenticated
if (7) P1 = P¯1 and P2 = P¯2.
Similarly to encounters with peers, users also log their encounters with
Ad-Dealers. Ad-Dealers advertise their presence in an area by broadcasting
messages which are known as Ad-Dealer Location Tags or ADLTs. ADLTs
are singed with the Ad-Dealer’s Signing Key ADKsig and can therefore be
verified with the matching verification key ADKver which is installed in
the user’s client. ADLTs are periodically updated as they contain the Ad-
Dealer’s identity Aid as well as a time-stamp. This prevents replay attacks
but also serves additional system functions which are detailed in Chapter 6.
4.2.2 Phase 2: Advert Requesting
Phase 2 takes place when the AIPu has been marked with ’TRUE’ con-
sumer interests and the user wishes to obtain relevant adverts. The advert
requesting process involves two stages. During the first stage, the user com-
posed a series of Advert Request Messages or ARMs. ARMs contain marked
advertising interests from the user’s AIPu and are transferred in encrypted
form to preserve privacy. For the second stage of the process, the user can
choose to either forward the ARMs to an Ad-Dealer directly or via one of the
available Agents. In order to obtain his/her adverts as fast as possible, the
user approximates the time delay of each available route and selects the op-
timal option. The technical details of the ARM composition and forwarding
procedures are provided in the following paragraphs.
1Note that in practice, there might be occasions where rapid encounters will be detected
as two devices come in and out of range. For this reason, two encounters are considered
as separate events only when a certain amount of time passes in between.
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Figure 4.2: Visual representation of the handshake protocol which is used
by ADS for user authentication.
ARM (Advert Request Message) Composition: The user begins the
composition ARMs by first creating a sequence of one-time keys which are
termed Delivery Keys (DelKuseri ). Since Delivery Keys are symmetrical,
they can easily be generated with the use of a hash chain. The user only
needs to randomly create the first key and then each consecutive key can be
generated by hashing the previous key as denoted in Equation 4.3.
DelKuseri = h(DelK
user
i−1 ) (4.3)
To compose the actual ARMs, the user first pairs each of the generated
Delivery Keys DelKuseri to Advertising Interests Identifies Iids which have
been marked as ’TRUE’ in the user’s AIPu. The user then encrypts the
ARMs with the Ad-Dealer’s public key SysEK (which came pre-installed
in the client) as shown in Equation 4.4. Encrypted ARMs are labeled with
a unique identifier which is referred to as the Order Identity or OrderID.
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Lastly, the ARMs and the matching Request Keys are stored in memory
until they can be transmitted. Note that the composition ARMs does not
need to take place in real time. Users can therefore preserve resources by
composing ARMs while their devices are idle.
ARM(OrderID) = ESysEK [Iid, ReqK
user
i ] (4.4)
The user can create a different ARM for each of the ’TRUE’ advertising
interest of the AIPu or pack multiple interests into a single ARM. The
number of interests which are contained in an ARM has minimal affect
on ADS. In Chapter 5 however, we introduce a mechanism which reduces
memory overhead and requires that each interest is composed into a different
ARM.
ARM (Advert Request Message) Forwarding: ADS users have the
option to either deliver their own ARMs directly to an Ad-Dealer or to
establish an opportunistic connection via one of the available Agents. To
establish the opportunistic network, ADS adopts a history based proba-
bilistic approach which is inspired by PRoPHET [94]. Our opportunistic
routing method is based on the calculation of two time metrics, EToCuser
(Estimated Time of Collection) and EToDAgent (Estimated Time of De-
livery). EToCuser describes the approximated period after which the user
is expected to be able to directly collect adverts from an Ad-Dealer and
EToDAgent represents the approximated period after which the user is ex-
pected to have adverts delivered if she uses the services of a particular Agent.
Both the EToCuser and EToDAgent are calculated based on the average time
periods between past consecutive encounters. In accordance with similar
history-based opportunistic routing protocols such as [94, 41, 135, 156, 37]
and [78], the average time value represents the prevalent encounter rate be-
tween two network nodes and is used to perform estimated predictions of
future encounters. By comparing the two metrics, the user is able to form
an intelligent opinion about his/her available options and select the most
beneficial.
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the prospective Requester initiates the in-
teraction by (1) expressing to the Agent his/her intent to possibly use his
services. Both users then proceed to (2) calculate their respective EToCReq
and EToCAgent. As shown in Equation 4.5, a user’s EToCuser is calculated
by first computing the Average Wait between the user’s past encounters
with an Ad-Dealer AW userAD and subtracting RTuser which represents the
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time which has already passed since his/her last encounter2. Upon comple-
tion, the Agent (3) sends his own EToCAgent to the prospective Requester
and awaits a response. If EToCReq < EToCAgent, the prospective Requester
(4) sends a negative reply and terminates the interaction. Alternatively, the
prospective Requester references her logs and (5) computes the Average Wait
between consecutive meetings with the Agent AWReqAgent. AW
Req
Agent represents
the expected time intervals between future meetings of the two users. This
allows the prospective Requester to (6) calculate the Agent’s EToDAgent
as the smallest multiple of AWReqAgent which is greater than EToCAgent or
in more simple terms, as the time period until the future meeting which
will take place after the Agent has visited the Ad-Dealer. Lastly, (7) if the
prospective Requester’s Estimated Time of Collection is smaller than the
Agent’s Estimated Time of Delivery (EToCReq < EToDAgent), the former
sends a negative response or otherwise (8) proceeds to forward ARMs.
EToCuser = AW
user
AD −RTuser (4.5)
In the example of Figure 4.4, Alice (the prospective Requester) is con-
sidering using the services of Bob (an Agent) at time t0 = 0. Alice’s en-
counters with Ad-Dealers typically take place between intervals of Average
Wait AWAliceAD = 45 hours and her last encounter was RTAlice = 24 hours
ago. Alice’s Estimated Time of Collection can therefore be calculated as
EToCAlice = 45− 24 = 21 hours which is expected to take place at Collec-
tion Time CTAlice = t0 + EToCAlice = 21.
On the other hand, Bob’s Average Wait is AWBobAD = 24 hours and he
last encountered an Ad-Dealer RTBob = 13 hours ago. This computes to an
Estimated Time of Collection EToCBob = 24 − 13 = 11 hours and places
his next encounter at CTBob = t0 +EToCBob = 11. Furthermore, Alice and
Bob encounter each other between intervals of AWBobAlice = 5 hours which
means that their future meetings are expected to take at t1 = t0 + 5, t2 =
t1 + 5, ..., ti = ti−1 + AWBobAlice. Based on this knowledge, Alice can deduce
that Bob’s Estimated Time of Delivery EToDBob is equal to the time of
the encounter which takes place immediately after tBob which means that
Delivery Time DTBob = t3 = 15.
4.2.3 Phase 3: Advert Collection
When appearing within vicinity of an Ad-Dealer, users must first authenti-
cate the Ad-Dealer’s identity and then forwards their stored ARMs (if the
2Note that when a user’s next encounter with Ad-Dealer is overdue, EToCuser returns
a negative value.
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Figure 4.3: Visual representation of the ARM (Ad-Request Message) for-
warding sub-protocol.
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Figure 4.4: Example of the ARM (Ad-Request Message) forwarding sub-
protocol.
user also operates as Agent, this includes ARMs that they ferry on behalf of
Requesters). The Ad-Dealer on his part, recovers the Advertising Interests
Identifiers Iids and Delivery Keys DelK
user
i from the ARMs and uses them
to respond with encrypted massages which contain the relevant adverts. The
exact technical aspects of the advert collection process are described in the
following paragraphs.
Ad-Dealer Authentication
Before placing a request, users need to first authenticate the Ad-Dealer. As
mentioned before, Ad-Dealers advertise their presence by broadcasting Ad-
Dealer Location Tags or ADLTs. ADLTs consist of fourteen integer numbers
where the first four indicate the Ad-Dealer’s unique reference number Aid,
the six following numbers represent the current date in standard format
(DD −MM − Y Y ) and the last four represent the current time is 24-hour
clock format (hh −mm). ADLTs are singed with the Ad-Dealer’s Signing
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Key ADKsig and can therefore be authenticated with the matching verifi-
cation key ADKver which users hold on their clients. Alternatively, more
cautious users are given the option for a more secure authenticating by gen-
erating their own message (a random nonce) and asking the Ad-Dealer to
sign it. In contrast to ADLTs which can be pre-computed, signing a user
generated nonce takes place in real time and is more taxing for the Ad-
Dealer. Ad-Dealers can therefore serve a limited number of authentication
requests at the time. In order to protect the Ad-Dealers from being tricked
into signing fake ADLTs, user-selected messages are not permitted to resem-
ble the format of an ADLT. It is therefore a requirement that any random
nonce which is offered for signing must include both numbers and letters
and have a smaller size than an ADLT.
Request Placement
Once the Ad-Dealer’s identity has been authenticated (and the encounter
has also been logged), the user goes on to forward ARMs. The ARMs are
decrypted by the Ad-Dealer with his private decryption key SysDK and the
contained Iids and DelK
user
i are recovered. The Ad-Dealer then forwards
the Iids to the Broker and awaits a response.
In order to minimize workload for Ad-Dealers, the Broker stores adverts
in encrypted format. As a means of increasing privacy, the Broker can
also keep multiple copies of the same advert each encrypted with a different
key. The Broker who receives the Ad-Dealer’s Iids, replies with the relevant
pre-encrypted adverts AD1, AD2, ..., ADi as well as the matching symmetric
keys Key1,Key2, ...,Keyi which are needed to decrypt the adverts.
As soon as the Broker’s replay is received, the Ad-Dealer organizes the
adverts into groups which are termed Bundles. The adverts within a Bundle
are identified by a sequence number SNi. The Ad-Dealer then labels each
Bundle with a unique reference number which is known as BundleID and
finally calculates the hash digest h(Bi) of each Bundle. The Ad-Dealer then
constructs Delivery Messages or DMs for each of the received ARMs. The
DMs are intended as responses to the ARMs and contain the information
that the user needs in order to locate his/her adverts within a Bundle,
verify their integrity and lastly to decrypt them. More specifically each DM
contains (1) the BundleIDs of the Bundles where the user’s adverts are
stored (2) the hash digest h(Bi) of that particular Bundle, (3) the Sequence
Number SNi of each of the requested adverts within the particular Bundle
and (4) the appropriate keys Keyi which are needed to decrypt each advert.
To complete the process, the Ad-Dealer encryps the DMs with the ap-
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propriate Delivery Key DelKuseri (which was included in the ARM ) and
labels them with the same OrderID (Order Identity) as the corresponding
ARM as depicted in Equation 4.6. Lastly, the Ad-Dealer sends the Bundles
and the encrypted DMs back to the submitting user.
DM(OrderID) = EReqKuseri [BundleID, h(Bi), SNi,Keyi] (4.6)
4.2.4 Phase 4: Advert Delivery
In order to view adverts which have been collected from an Ad-Dealer,
the user must first decrypt the received DM with his/her Delivery Key
DelKuseri . From within the now decrypted DM, the user obtains the ap-
propriate BundleIDs of the Bundles in which his/her adverts are stored,
the hash digest h(Bi) of that Bundle, the Sequence Number SNi of each
individual requested advert and the corresponding Keyi which can be used
to decrypt each particular advert. With this information, the user is able to
locate his/her adverts, verify their integrity and decrypt them.
For DMs and adverts which are not addressed to the submitting user
but one of his/her Requesters, they are stored in encrypted form until the
can be delivered. When the user (Agent) who made the collection from the
Ad-Dealer appears within proximity of the Requester, the stored DMs can
be delivered. After a mutual authentication has taken place, the Requester
makes an inquires about the state of his/her order to which the Agent re-
sponds with the DMs that are addressed to the particular Requester (or
with a negative reply if the collection has not yet been made). The Re-
quester decrypts the DMs and recovers the BundleIDs of the Bundles in
which his/her adverts are stored. The Requester then asks for the specific
Bundles and verifies their integrity with the h(Bi). The Requester uses the
the Sequence Number SNi to locate his/her adverts within the set Bundles
and finally decryptes them with the appropriate keys Keyi. The remaining
adverts which are contained in the Bundles but are still encrypted are of no
use for the Requester and can therefore be discarded.
Note that if a specific advert has been requested by both the Agent and
the Requester, then only a single copy of the advert needs to be sent. This
reduces memory overhead but also presents a potential privacy hazard. To
ensure privacy, the Ad-Dealer constructs the Bundles in such a way that it is
not easily feasible for a curious Agent to guess which adverts are intended for
multiple users. This is achieved by placing the adverts with multiple recip-
ients in Bundles which also contain adverts that are individually addressed
to the set users. Naturally, this approach consumes additional bandwidth
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since the Requester needs to download data which is later discarded but at
the same time preserves his/her privacy against the Agent.
4.3 Protocol
The ADS protocol is depicted in Figure 4.5 is used for the acquisition of
adverts.
1. The user computes a symmetric key DelKU . The user then composes
ARMU (Advert Request Message ) which contains DelKU and the
marked interests Iid from his/her Advertising Interest Profile AIPu.
Lastly, the ARMU is encrypted with the System Encryption Key
SysEK.
2. The ARMU is sent to an Agent.
3. The Agent forwards the user’s ARMU along with his/her own ARMA
to an Ad-Dealer.
4. The Ad-Dealer decrypts both ARMs with the corresponding System
Decryption Key SysDK.
5. The Ad-Dealer forwards the contained interests Iid to the Broker.
6. Upon receiving the Ad-Dealer’s message, the Broker recovers the ap-
propriate adverts in encrypted form.
7. The Broker sends the encrypted adverts and matching keys back to
the Ad-Dealer.
8. The Ad-Dealer organizes the adverts into Bundles and composes the
keys into Delivery Messages DMU and DMA which are encrypted with
the keys DelKU and DelKA that he received from the ARMs.
9. The DMs and the Bundles are sent back to the requesting Agent.
10. The Agent decrypts DMA and uses the contained information to locate
and decrypt his/her adverts from within the Bundle.
11. The Agent forwards DMU and the Bundle to the user.
12. The user decrypts DMA and uses the contained information to locate
and decrypt his/her adverts from within the appropriate Bundle. The
remaining adverts, which are still encrypted, are discarded.
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Figure 4.5: Advert Collection sub-protocol.
4.4 Evaluation
In the section we evaluate ADS in accordance with the system requirements
which we determined in Section 4.1.3. The primary focus of our evaluation
is privacy and security for all system stakeholders. The practicality and
efficacy of ADS are further enhanced by supplementary sub-systems which
are evaluated separately in a later chapter.
4.4.1 User Privacy Against Ad-Dealers
By incorporating opportunistic networking to anonymous-download sys-
tems, ADS not only extends the system’s reach but also offers an increased
level of privacy compared to contemporary designs. Intermediate nodes of
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the opportunistic network (Agents) function as proxies which further mask
the Requester’s identity from Ad-Dealers. An inherit benefit of this setup
lies on the fact that Agents are themselves users and therefore have no im-
mediate benefit from colluding with Ad-Dealers to compromise Requesters,
especially those who belong in the same social cycle. In addition to this, the
availability of different Agents distributes risk of compromise in contrast to
most proxy architectures which present a single point of failure. A side ben-
efit of the opportunistic network is that it also offers additional security even
for users who directly connect to Ad-Dealers. Since the system allows for
ARMs (Advert Request Messages) from multiple users to be aggregated and
delivered by a single Agent, an Ad-Dealer is not able to distinguish if a spe-
cific request belongs to the submitting user or if set user operates as Agent
on behalf of a Requester. However, it needs to be stated that Ad-Dealers
may potentially be able to bypass this security measure by analyzing the
keys which are included within the ARMs. As users generate encryption
keys with the use of a hush-chain, Ad-Dealers are able to identify subse-
quent ARMs that were created by the same user even if different Agents are
used for the transmission of each ARM. It is therefore necessary for users to
update their keys as often as possible. From a practical point of view, this
is entirely feasible as the system uses symmetric keys which can be created
with relative ease.
One last aspect that needs to be considered is how the opportunistic
network could potentially have negative consequences should user anonymity
were to be compromised. If Ad-Dealers were to uncover the identities of
users, then not only would they be able to associate them to their advertising
interests but they would also learn of their social affiliations with each other.
However, the only way that user anonymity could be exposed would be if
the Broker were to tamper with the mobile clients which could easily be
detected. Despite not being easily feasible to achieve without being exposed,
such behavior constitutes as malicious and therefore falls outside the scope
of this research which assumes the Broker as curious but honest.
4.4.2 User Privacy Against Curious Users
ADS ensures user privacy against a curious user U˜ by enforcing the use
of cryptography. ARMs (Advert Request Messages) are encrypted with the
System Encryption Key SysEK and can therefore not be decrypted by U˜
as he/she does not have access to the corresponding System Decryption Key
SysDK which remains private among Ad-Dealers. By analyzing the size of
encrypted ARMs, U˜ may infer the number of contained Advert Interests
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Identities Iids however, U˜ is not able to uncover which specific Iids by
launching a known plain-text attack (attempting to identify the cryptograms
by encrypting her own ARMs). Since ARMs consist of a user selected
Delivery Key DelKuseri , it is unlikely that any two ARMs will produce the
same cryptograms even if they happen to contain the exact same Iids.
Adverts are also encrypted with Broker generated keys Keyi which are
contained within DMs (Delivery Messages). DMs are themselves encrypted
with Delivery Keys DelKuseri and are therefore visible only to the user who
constructed the matching ARMs. Adverts which are addressed to more than
one users are always sent in Bundles which also consist of adverts which are
individually addressed to the respective users. U˜ can therefore not access
adverts that are not addressed to him/her nor identify which adverts are
addressed to multiple recipients. However, it is possible for U˜ to uncover
the interests of other users without having to decrypt DMs. If U˜ were to
place an order for all adverts which are available in the system, he/she would
have access to every Keyi. U˜ could then operate as Agent and determine the
interests of her Requesters by simply decrypting all the adverts which are
included within each Bundle. To prevent this attack from being effective, the
Broker makes sure to regularly update the keys Keyi which are used for the
encryption of adverts. The Broker is able to do that with minimal overhead
since Keyi are symmetric keys and therefore relatively easy to generate.
4.4.3 User Security Against Malicious Users
The spread of harmful content in opportunistic networks is a serious threat
that has not been addressed by analogous advert distribution systems. As
data is propagated through peer-to-peer connections, fake adverts could
quirky spread across the network and infect multiple nodes before being
detected. In opportunistic connections with multiple intermediate nodes,
it would also be very difficult to detect and isolate the perpetrator of the
attack, especially while still maintaining user privacy.
ADS minimizes the threat of fake adverts by incorporating cryptographic
countermeasures which enable users to easily identify content which has not
been dispatched by valid Ad-Dealers. Ad-Dealers dispense Bundles of en-
crypted adverts and DMs to Agents with the intent for them to be delivered
to their Requesters. In order for a malicious Agent Û to replace or insert
a fake advert ÂDi into a Bundle, he/she would need to first encrypt ÂDi
with the appropriate key Keyi. This presents us with two possible attacks
scenarios as detailed in the following paragraphs.
If Û has no access to Keyi, he/she has no other option but to use a
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different K̂eyi of his/her own choosing. For this attack to be effective, Û
would also need to replace the original Keyi with K̂eyi within the DMs
which are addressed to the Resuester. The Requester’s DMs are however
encrypted with a Delivery Key DelKRequesteri which Û does not know. For
Û to gain access to DelKRequesteri , he/she would first need to decrypt the
Requester’s ARMs which is not possible without the System Decryption Key
SysDK that remains private among AD-Dealers. If Û were to only replace
the original advert ADi with the fake advert ÂDi without updating the
DMs, his/her attack would fail since the victimized Requester would not be
able to decrypt ÂDi with the original key Keyi which was obtained form
the received DM.
Û can potentially obtain Keyi by also submitting a request for the par-
ticular ADi. Since Keyi is a systematic key, Û could use it to encrypt a
fake advert ÂDi and replace it in the Biddle without the need to alter the
Requester’s DMs. The victimized Requester would then be able to decrypt
ÂDi with the original Keyi which was obtained by decryption his/her DMs.
To prevent such an attack, DMs include a hush digest h(Bi) of each Bun-
dle that contains adverts which are addressed to the requesting user. The
Requester can use h(Bi) to verify the integrity of a Bundle after receiving
them from Û . If the confirmation were to fail, the Requester would had been
able to perceive the attack without even having to decrypt any adverts.
4.4.4 Robustness Against Sabotage Attacks
Contemporary advertising systems often ignore the threat of sabotage. Even
when user privacy is protected, an attacker can still undermine the integrity
of a system by interfering with its correct operation. In the case of adver-
tising systems (especially those which make use of decentralized architec-
tures), sabotage comes in the form of impersonation attacks or spoofing. To
launch a spoofing attack, an attacker impersonates the identify of a legiti-
mate system stakeholder in order to trick a victim into performing a certain
operation. The stakeholders of ADS who may be threatened with imper-
sonation attacks are users and Ad-Dealers. The advent of an impersonation
attack presents us with four potential scenarios as detailed in the following
paragraphs.
Attack Scenario 1: For our first scenario, the identity of a user U is
spoofed by an attacker Û in order to victimize a second user Uvic. If U and
Uvic are registered Contacts, Û can trick Uvic into logging fake encounters
with U which will decrease the Average Wait between consecutive meetings
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AW VvicU This will interfere with the correct operation of the opportunistic
routing algorithm as Uvic can be deceived into selecting U or Û as his/her
Agent. This will result in Uvic either revising adverts slower that originally
anticipated or even not receiving them at all.
Attack Scenario 2: For the second scenario, the identify of Agent A is
impersonated by an attacker Â in order to victimize one or the Agent’s
Requesters R. During an interaction with Â, R could be tricked into down-
loading fake adverts. Although ADS protects R from falling victim to fake
adverts, R would still be deceived into believing that the real Agent A is
malicious and refrain from using his/her services in the future.
Attack Scenario 3: For the third scenario, the identity of a Requester
R is impersonated by an attacker Rˆ in order to victimize an Agent A. The
encounter between Rˆ and A takes place before A has had the chance to make
a collection from an Ad-Dealer, then the effects of the attack will be minimal
as Rˆ will make an inquiry about the state of his/her order to which A will
simple respond negatively. However, if the encounter takes place after A has
visited an Ad-Dealer and before he/she had the chance to meet the real R,
then A will be tricked into forwarding to Rˆ the DMs which are addressed
to R. The privacy of R is not compromised as DMs are encrypted, however
A will be deceived into thinking that a successful delivery has taken place
and will discard the DMs which will prevent him/her from completing the
actual delivery when the meeting with the real R takes place.
Attack Scenario 4: For the final scenario, an attacker Dˆ impersonates
the identity of an Ad-Dealer to victimize a user U who appears within prox-
imity. This can result in U sending ARMs to Dˆ and possibly downloading
fake adverts and DMs. The effects of this attack would be minimal as only
registered Ad-Dealers are capable of decrypting ARMs and encrypting ad-
verts or DMs. However, if U is not interested in making a collection at
that time, he/she will still log a fake encounter with an Ad-Dealer which
will effect his/her Average Wait AWUAD and potentially interfere with the
operation of the opportunistic network.
Attack Prevention: To counter the aforementioned attacks, ADS incor-
porates strong authentication mechanisms. Users are authenticated with
mutual password verification which prevents them from logging encounters
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and exchanging data anyone other than their registered contacts. The pro-
tocol protects against reply attacks by incorporating a standard challenge-
response handshake and prevents attackers from stealing or guessing pass-
words by using out-of-band channels and cryptographically secure hush func-
tions. Ad-Dealers are authenticated by broadcasting data which have been
singed with the Ad-Dealer’s Signing Key ADKsig and can therefore be ver-
ified by users with ADKver. The signed data are either Ad-Dealer Location
Tags ADLTs which contain time-stamps or random messages which are se-
lected by the users themselves. The Ad-Dealer’s Signing Key ADKsig is
only used for the verification and Ad-Dealers are prevented from singing
fake ADLTs as user-selected messages which are requested for signing are
not permitted to resemble the standard format of ADLTs. The signing of
ADLTs and random messages prevents replay attacks but is still susceptible
to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. To perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack, an
adversary needs to collect ADLTs from one location and rebroadcast them
at a different location before the time-stamps are expired. The damage from
such an attack is limited as the victim is tricked into logging fake encounters
with an Ad-Dealer but user privacy is still not compromised. Man-in-the-
Middle attacks are difficult to protect against but are also very impractical
and therefore pose minimal risk for the system. Overall, the integrity of
ADS is substantially protected against all conceivable forms of sabotage.
4.5 ADS: Advert Distribution System Summary
In this chapter we presented ADS as a privacy-oriented alternative to the
currently adopted OBA system. ADS expands on previous work by com-
bining anonymous-download technologies with opportunistic networking in
order to provide a advertising distribution scheme which overcomes the lim-
itations of older designs. The system’s infrastructure is based on a mul-
tilayered architecture which is practical, inexpensive and simple to launch
as well as to manage. Through a series of quality evaluation scenarios, we
demonstrated that ADS offers notable user privacy against all other con-
cerned parties (including other user) and also provides additional security
against impersonation attacks and sabotage. Overall, ADS was shown to of-
fer considerable advantages in comparison to contemporary systems in terms
of privacy, security and practicality.
Chapter 5
Private Profile Comparison
Resource consumption is an inherent issue of opportunistic networking as
nodes are required to download and store data on behalf of their peers. To
make matters worse, many opportunistic routing protocols generate multiple
copies of the same data which places additional strain on the already limited
resources of mobile devices. As demonstrated in Chapter 4 Section 4.2.4,
ADS reduces bandwidth and memory consumption by implementing an en-
cryption scheme which allows a single copy of encrypted data to be delivered
to multiple mobile users. When an Agent requests the same advert as one
of the Requesters that they serve, the Ad-Dealer only needs to send a single
advert which is addressed to both users.
Relevant research has shown that users within the same social network
tend to share cultural preferences and influence each others behavioural
inclinations [91, 112, 93, 31]. It therefore stands to reason that Agents
and Requesters within ADS are likely to have shared advertising interests.
Considering however that Requesters select which advert to request from
each prospective Agent at random, it is understandable that the probability
of requesting an advert of shared interest is entirely left to chance. This
offers the optimal level of privacy but at the same time fails to exploit
the system’s full potential at conserving resources. Alternatively, if Agents
and Requesters were to openly compare their respective Advertising Interest
Profiles AIPA and AIPR in order to identify shared interests, this would
result in maximized resource conservation but it would come at the expense
of privacy. To strike a trade-off between resource utilization and privacy,
we propose a variety of profile comparison mechanisms. The techniques
we implement in our designs increase the probability of selecting adverts of
shared interest but still maintain an acceptable level of privacy.
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5.1 Profile Comparison
A user’s Advertising Interests Profile (AIP ) is represented as a list of com-
mon advertising interests which are marked as either ’TRUE’ or ’FALSE’.
The AIP is kept locally where it is updated dynamically based on the user’s
activity. By performing a profile comparison, a Requester is able to select
a set of ’TRUE’ interests out of their AIPR with an increased probability
that the same interests are also marked ’TRUE’ within the Agent’s AIPA.
The challenging aspect of the profile comparison however, is that it needs
to be performed in such a way that user privacy is preserved. This presents
us with a paradox as we aim to increase the probability of two users
selecting a shared interest but not to the point where the selec-
tion of a shared interest is guaranteed. If a profile comparison were
to always guarantee the selection of a shared interests, then privacy would
be compromised. In Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.3, we present a variety of pro-
file comparison algorithms which are supported by ADS. In Sections 5.2 we
experimentally test the performance of our design via a series of simula-
tions. Finally, in Sections 5.3 we discuss the results of our experiments and
evaluate our design.
5.1.1 D-PC : Demographic Profile Comparison
Demographics offer essential insight towards targeting certain groups of con-
sumers with adverts which best fit their needs [117]. Demographic adver-
tising is the practice of segmenting a consumer audience into groups based
on demographic attributes. Each particular group is then targeted with ad-
verts which best associate to the characteristics of their demographics (e.g.,
adverts for luxury designer dresses which target adult females of high in-
come). For this type of advert targeting to be possible, it is necessary for a
third party (i.e. the Ad-Network) to be able to classify advert viewers into
demographic groups based on attributes such as gender, age, location and
income. Inevitably, this creates a significant privacy breach for consumers
as it requires the Ad-Network to have access to demographic information
which may be considered sensitive.
Demographic Profile Comparison (D-PC ) exploits the same principles as
demographic advertising for an entirely different purpose. D-PC compares
the demographic attributes of two users in order to identify advertising
interests which may be relevant to both. One important aspect that needs
to be considered at this point is how D-PC affects privacy. In traditional
targeting, all consumer demographics are considered sensitive as they expose
CHAPTER 5. PRIVATE PROFILE COMPARISON 75
private information to an untrustworthy third party (i.e. the Ad-Network).
It can however be argued that during face-to-face interactions, demographic
attributes which are already known about each user cannot be considered
as sensitive. Based on this notion, we can identify two types of demographic
attributes which are analyzed in Subsection 5.1.1.
Demographic Attribute Classification
The demographic attributes wich are exploited by D-PC can be classified
into two types, (1) physical and (2) social. Physical attributes are traits
that two users can easily infer about each other through simple observation.
Social attributes are traits that one user can deduce about the other based
on their social interactions. Considering the fact that each pair of users
have a different set of social interactions, it is evident that social attributes
of a user are conditional to the second user who makes the assessment.
For example, the social attributes which are assigned to Alice by Bob may
be entirely different to the social attributes which are assigned to Alice by
Charlie. The details of the exact manner in witch social attributes may
differ between sets of users are made clear in the following paragraphs.
As shown in Figure 5.1, the physical attributes which are exploited by D-
PC are Gender and Age and the social attributes are Location and Status.
For the purposes of our system, we assume Gender as binary which can
be classified as either ’Male’ or ’Female’ while Age takes a discrete value
that represents particular age groups which are typically used in adverting.
These are listed in Figure 5.1 as ’< 18’ for minors, ’Young Adult’ for the
ages between 18 and 34, ’Adult’ for 35 to 50 and ’> 50’ for users who
are older than 50. Gender and Age are manually selected by all users as a
precondition to use the service. Users who assume the role of Agent publicize
their physical attributes to their peers (prospective Requesters) when they
register as Contacts. This is done for reasons of simplicity as it would be
impractical if it was the Requester who had to manually insert the gender
and age of each Agent that they came into contact with. For an Agent to
publish false information would be counter intuitive as the entire premise
of a profile comparison is to reduce overhead on the Agent’s side. Even if
an Agent were to act against their interest, this would have no effect on the
Requester.
As previously stated, the physical attributes of a particular user remain
constant while social attributes differ based on the second user who makes
the observation. It is therefore possible for an Agent to have different social
attributes for different Requesters. Social attributes can be deduced by a
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Requester after socializing with anAgent. The two social attributes that are
administered by D-PC are Location and Status. Location is an attribute
which expresses the physical locations where two users typically encounter
each other. ADS is able to determine the Location attribute by process-
ing data that it already has in its disposal. More specifically, in Chapter 4
Section 4.2.1 we explained that ADS tracks the user’s visited locations and
also tracks the user’s encounters with her peers. We briefly remind you that
location tracking is used to determine the user’s advertising needs while en-
counters with peers are logged for the purpose of establishing opportunistic
connections. D-PC takes advantage of encounter logs and combines it with
location tracking in order to pinpoint the locations where user sightings typ-
ically happen. In more detail, when Alice logs a meeting with Bob, she also
registers the location of the meeting (when that is available). After a few
meetings have taken place, Alice can refer back to her records and derive in
which locations she and Bob meet the most often. Based on this knowledge,
Alice can infer that she and Bob are likely to have a mutual interest for
adverts which are relevant to those particular locations.
For reasons of both practicality and security, visited locations are not
kept as GPS coordinates. For our needs, it is only necessary to keep the type
of location in terms of its social utility (e.g., home, office, restaurant). D-PC
adopts the same taxonomy as Foursquare where venues are classified in cat-
egories and subcategories based on their utility. Figure 5.1 lists some of the
main categories of venues which are ’Residence’, ’Work related’, ’Education’,
’Nightlife’, ’Entertainment’, ’Food related’, ’Recreation’ and ’Travel’. These
categories can be further broken down in more specific subcategories. For
example, the venue category ’Entertainment’ includes a subcategory ’Per-
forming Arts’ which contains ’Opera’, ’Theater’ and ’Dance Studio’. For
each of the available venue categories and subcategories, meeting locations
are logged as a series of counters with each of them representing either a
category or subcategory of venue. Depending on the information that is
available, the user raises the appropriate counter or counters. For example,
if a meeting is registered inside an office, the device will raise the counters
for both the general category which is ’Work-related’ as well as for the spe-
cific subcategory which is ’office’. However, if the exact type of facility is
not known, the device will only raise the counter for ’work-related’.
The last social attribute which is used by D-PC is labeled in Figure 5.1
as ’Status’. Unlike the previously explored attributes of Gender, Age and
Location which are common in advertising systems, Status is unique to D-
PC and is used to classify the social relationship of a pair of users. The three
possible Status classifications are ’Close’, ’Casual’ and Professional’. These
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classifications are obtained based on user meeting patters in terms of time,
duration and location. More specifically, when two users regularly appear
within proximity in residential locations for extended periods of time, they
can be classified as having a ’Close’ Status. This classification indicates
a very strong social relation such as that of spouses, family members and
close friends. Pairs of users who have more irregular meetings that mostly
take place in locations which relate to entertainment, nightlife or recreation
can be classified as having a ’Casual’ Status. This classification is expected
from people who relate as friends and acquaintances. Finally, users who
meet on a daily basis during work hours and within locations which relate
to work or education can be classified as having a ’Professional’ Status.
Such classifications is expected of coworkers, colleagues and associates. One
final detail that needs to be stated is that the ’Status’ field is left blank
when the available data is too ambiguous to yield a definitive classification.
The absence of a Status attribute will have limited impact on the overall
performance as Status only serves as a supplementary piece of information.
Figure 5.1: Demographic attributes which was supported by D-PC (Demo-
graphic Profile Comparison).
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Interest Selection
Similarly to conventional targeting, D-PC requires that the advertising in-
terests which can be found in the AIP be associated to specific demographic
groups. To better comprehend this notion, consider a simple example where
we apply a single demographic attribute such as gender. The entries of the
AIP which target a specific gender can be classified as ’Male’ or ’Female’
and all the remaining entries which are relevant to ether gender are classi-
fied as Neutral’. When a D-PC between two users of different genders takes
place, gender-specific interests are excluded and the focus of the selection
can be limited to interests which are labeled as ’Neutral’. Similarly, when
two male users perform an D-PC, female-specific interests are excluded and
the selection is focused on the remaining interests which are classified as
’Male’ and Neutral’.
The association of interests to consumer demographics can be achieved
with the same market research models which are currently in use for tradi-
tional advertising. Gender, Age and Location are all demographic attributes
which are very commonly used in such advertising models and can therefore
be easily adapted to work with D-PC. Apart from the three aforementioned
demographics, market models also use other attributes such as occupation,
educational level, marital status, religion and income. The aforementioned
demographics were deliberately excluded from D-PC due to their sensitive
nature even in face-to-face interactions among peers. However, we need to
clarify at this point that the sensitivity of the same demographics is not
always absolute but may be conditional to the social relation that two users
share. For example, Alice may be reluctant to reveal her occupation to
Bob but her occupation is already known to Charlie who is her coworker.
The Status attribute is used by D-PC to specifically exploit this provisional
form of sensitive information. Status indicates the social relation between a
pair of users which in turn allows D-PC to infer certain characteristics that
these users may have in common. More specifically, a ’Close’ Status which
is attributed to spouses and family members may reveal that the two users
are likely to have a shared ethnicity, religion and socioeconomic status [82].
Users who have a friendly relationship and are therefore classified with a
’Casual’ Status, may share the same interests in terms of social lifestyle (for
e.g., hobbies, recreational activities, etc.) [142, 143]. Finally, users who have
a ’Professional’ Status can be assumed to have the same occupation, educa-
tional level and social class [102]. As is the case in traditional demographic
targeting, all of the affirmations demographics can be associated to specific
advertising interests.
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To perform the D-PC, the Requester begins by excluding all the interests
that do not comply with the Agent’s physical demographic attributes of
Gender and Age. The Requester then selects of the remaining interests
the ones which best relate to the social attributes that they share with
the Agent. For example, Bob, Charlie and Dave are all male adults who
work for a tech company. Most of their meetings take place in company
ground during work hours and are therefore classified (in pairs) as having
a ’Professional’ Status. However, Bob and Dave are also seen as having
meetings outside the workplace in venues which associate to recreation (e.g.,
gym, park, swimming pool). Based on this knowledge, an D-PC between
Bob and Charlie is likely to yield a interests which relates to their occupation
such as a personal electronic device (e.g., a new smart-phone) but an D-PC
between Bob and Dave is more likely to result in an interest which also
relates to athletic lifestyle (e.g., a wearable activity monitor). The exact
demographic model which is used for the selection of interests can operate
independently to the rest of the system. This offers great flexibility as it
allows for the adoption of existing advertising designs or the development of
entirely new ones.
5.1.2 F-PC : Fragmented Profile Comparison
Fragmented Profile Comparison (F-PC ) follows a probabilistic approach
which calls for the separation of the Agent’s Advert Interest Profiles AIPA
into f fragments which are then assigned a ranking score based on the total
number of marked interests they contain. The rankings are shared with the
prospective Requester who is then able to increase her chances of selecting
a common interest by focusing on the highest ranked fragments. In order
for the ranking scores to accurately represent the probabilities of selecting a
marked interest, the fragments need to be of equal size which requires that
the number of fragments f is a divisor of n (where n is the number of total
interests within the standard AIP format). However, such a restriction on
the possible values of f significantly limits the system. To therefore allow
for more flexibility, the system can also accept any f which results in the
last fragment to be slightly larger or smaller within a certain margin. For
example, an AIP or size n = 100 may be separated into f = 3 fragments of
sizes F1 = 33, F2 = 33 and F3 = 34.
The Agent initiates the F-PC by selecting f and sending it to the Re-
quester. When a large f is selected, the size of fragments becomes smaller
which increases the effectiveness of the comparison but at the same time
reduces the Agent’s privacy. In contrast, a small f of bigger size fragments
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offers more privacy for the Agent but comes at the expense of greater over-
head as it results in the selection of fewer common interests. It falls within
the discretion of the Agent to select an appropriate f which best serves
their priorities between privacy and overhead. Based on the selected f , the
two users separate their respective profiles AIPA and AIPR into fragments
which are identified by a sequence number Fi (e.g., F1, F2, ..., Ff ). The frag-
ments of the Agent’s AIPA are then ranked based on the number of interests
that are marked ’TRUE’ in each one. The highest ranking is assigned to
the fragment with the most marked interests while the lowest ranking is
reserved for the fragment with the least marked interests. The Agent then
composes the fragment identifiers Fi in descending order into a list L which
is shared with the Requester. Note that L contains only the fragment identi-
fiers Fi and not the fragments themselves. The Requester does not therefore
learn which of the Agent’s interests are marked as ’TRUE’ nor the number
of marked interests in each fragment. The only piece of information which
is obtained by Requester is the order in which the Agent’s fragments are
ranked (i.e. which fragments contain the most interests). This allows the
Requester to have a general overview of the Agent’s AIPA but still preserves
the Agent’s privacy.
Upon receiving the ranked list L, the Requester proceeds to select inter-
ests out of her own AIPR by prioritizing on entries out of fragments that
have the highest ranking in L. By focusing her selection on the highest
ranking fragments, the Requester increases her chance of selecting a shared
interest while still remaining unaware of the marked interests within the
Agent’s AIPA. After the selection has taken place, the Requester is free
to construct an ARM (Advert Request Message) with the selected interests
and forward it to the Agent.
In the example which is presented in Figure 5.2, the Agent’s AIPA of size
n = 200 is separated in f = 5 fragments of 40 interests. The fragments are
ranked and the fragment identifiers F1 to F5 are placed in descending order
in a list L = {F5, F1, F4, F2, F3} which is then made public to the Requester.
Upon receiving L, the Requester can select marked interests out of her own
AIPR by focusing their selection on higher ranked fragments such as F5 or
F1. Gaining access to L allows the Requester to know which fragment of
the Agent’s AIPA contains the most marked interests but she has no way
of inferring which interests or even how many interests are marked.
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Figure 5.2: Example of the ranking process which is performed by F-PC
(Fragmented Profile Comparison).
5.1.3 S-PC : Selective Profile Comparison
Selective Profile Comparison (S-PC ) is based on the principle that a Re-
quester is given the ability to perform multiple Candidate Selections (CSs)
(e.g., CS1, CS2, . . . , CSi) of interests and propose them to the Agent. The
Agent can then compare the proposed CSs and accept the one which offers
the best conservation of bandwidth. To perform the selection, the Agent
needs to be able to calculate the number of shared interests in each CS.
However, the Agent should not be able to see which exact interests are
included in each CS as this would compromise the Requester’s privacy. Pre-
forming the aforementioned selection is made possible through the use of
homomorphic encryption.
Homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic method which allows for
the calculation of certain mathematical operations on encrypted data. Such
cryptographic schemes have gained considerable notoriety in recent years
and especially in the research field of cloud computing. The Paillier [114]
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public key crypto-system is such a homomorphic scheme which exhibits an
additive property. More specifically, given two messages m1 and m2 which
produce cipher-texts c1 = E{m1} and c2 = E{m2}, we are able to calculate
the cipher-text of their sum c3 = E{(m1 + m2)} from the multiplication
c3 = c1 ∗ c2. This enables an non-trusted party to compute E{m1 + m2}
without knowing m1 and m2. Additionally, Paillier also has a self-blinding
property that allows for one cipher-text to be changed into another without
effecting decryption. Given c = E{m} we can therefore compute c¨ so that
D{c¨} = m.
The Agent initiates the S-PC by computing a pair of asymmetric encryp-
tion keys. The decryption key is stored for future use and the encryption
key is used to produce an encrypted version of the Agent’s User Interest
Profile ÂIPA = E{AIPA}. Note that each of the entries of ÂIPA (’ones’
and ’zeros’) are encrypted as individual digits and not as a binary number.
For an AIPA=
[
I1 I2 . . . Ix
]
we should have ÂIPA=
[
C1 C2 . . . Cx
]
.
It needs to be stated that two equal interests Ix = Iy are going to produce
cipher-texts that are not equal to each other Cx 6= Cy. This is one of the fea-
tures of Paillier which ensures that no two cryptograms are the same even if
they are produced from the same plain-text. To achieve this, Paillier incor-
porates into the encryption method a random input which effects the form
of the cipher-text but does not effect the way the cipher-text is decrypted.
A detailed explanation on the inner workings of this process with numerical
examples are demonstrated by Sridokmai et al. [130]. After the encryption
has been performed, the generated ÂIPA is sent to the Requester but the
decryption key remains with the Agent. The Requester is therefore not able
to see if a particular interest is marked as ’TRUE’ or ’FALSE’ in ÂIPA.
Upon receiving ÂIPA, the Requester performs a series of CSs (Can-
didate Selections) and then precedes to calculate their wights WCS . The
calculation of the weight for a CS can be performed by multiplying the
specific cipher-texts of ÂIPA which correspond to the particular interests
which are contained within CS. For example, for CSj =
[
Ix Iy Iz
]
we
have WCSj = (Cx ∗ Cy ∗ Cz). Considering the additive property of Paillier,
we are able to infer that WCSj = E{Ix+ Iy + Iz} and since the value of each
I is either ’one’ or ’zero’, it also holds true that D{WCSj} is equal to the
number of interests in CSj which were marked as ’TRUE’ in AIPA. Before
sending the produced weights (WCS1 ,WCS2 , . . . ,WCSi) back to the Agent
however, the Requester must first alter them by exploiting the self-blinding
property. This is done as a means of enhancing security as otherwise the
Agent would have been able to deduce the three cipher-texts which produce
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a particular wight WCSj by exhausting all possible combinations. Lastly,
when the Agent receives the produced weights, he/she decrypts them, se-
lects the CS with the highest wight WCS and notifies the Requester so that
the appropriate ARMs may be forwarded.
To better comprehend the function of S-PC, consider the fowling sim-
ple example. The Agent sends to the Requester an encrypted profile of
ten interests ÂIPA=
[
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
]
which
is generated from a corresponding AIPA=
[
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
]
(I1 = I3 = I5 = I7 = I9 = 1 and I2 = I4 = I6 = I8 = I10 = 0). The
Requester makes two CSs of three interests CS1 and CS2 and computes
their wights as WCS1 = (C1 ∗ C3 ∗ C5) and WCS2 = (C6 ∗ C8 ∗ C10).
When the additive property of Paillier is considered, we can infer that
WCS1 = E{I1 + I3 + I5} = E{1 + 1 + 1} = E{3} and in similar fashion
WCS2 = E{I6 + I8 + I10} = E{0 + 0 + 0} = E{0}. Lastly, the Requester
applies the self-blinding property on WCS1 and WCS2 in order to produce
W˜CS1 and W˜CS2 before sending them back to the Agent. By decrypting
W˜CS1 and W˜CS2 , the Agent receives the weights WCS1 = 3 and WCS2 = 0.
Based on the results, the Agent is able to deduce that CS1 contains three
interest which are are common to his/her own while CS2 contains none.
However, the Agent remains unaware of the exact contents of CS1 and CS2
as there is no way of knowing which of the encrypted entries in ÂIPA were
added in order to produce W˜CS1 and W˜CS2 .
CS-PC : Collaborative-Selective Profile Comparison
Collaborative-Selective Profile Comparison (CS-PC ) is an extension of S-
PC which introduces multiple Requesters. When CS-PC is supported,
the Agent composes his/her encrypted profile ÂIPA in the same way as
S-PC and sends it to a Requester who is referenced as the Prime Re-
quester R0. To perform an CS-PC, R0 composes a series of Candidate Selec-
tions CS01 , CS
0
2 , . . . , CS
0
i and calculates the weights W
0
CS1
,W 0CS2 , . . . ,W
0
CSi
.
ÂIPA is then forwarded by R0 to r Secondary Requesters R1, R2, . . . , Rr
who compose their own Candidate Selections and calculate the respective
weights1. The Secondary Requesters then forward the weights and a set
of matching ARMs for each Candidate Selection back to R0. R0
exploits the additive property of Paillier in order to compute a set of overall
weights OWCSi as show in Equation 5.1 and forwards them to the Agent.
1The weights have all gone through the self-blinding operation which prevents R0 from
determining the content of the CSs of the Secondary Requesters.
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The Agent then performs a selection based on the decrypted weights and
informs R0 so that the appropriate ARMs (of both the Prime Requester and
the Secondary Requesters) can be forwarded. The remaining ARMs which
correspond to the Candidate Selections that were not selected are discarded.
OWCSi =
r∑
k=0
W kCSi (5.1)
To complete the delivery, the Agent collects adverts for all Requesters
but only sends them to the Prime Requester R0. Beyond that, it is the
responsibility of R0 to track down the Secondary Requesters and forward
their adverts. In a sense, the Prime Requester serves the role of a secondary
Agent who further extends the reach of the opportunistic network to more
users. However, serving the Secondary Requesters also increases the system’s
complexity and may possibly result in delayed delivery for the Secondary
Requesters.
Ideally, this approach is to be used in social networks where a set of
Secondary Requesters have sparse meeting with Agents and Ad-Dealers but
regular meeting with a user who can server as the Prime Requester. For
example, Alice enters the proximity of Ad-Dealers regularly and also has
regular meetings with Bob. Bob has regular meetings with Charlie and
Dana who themselves hardly ever appear within proximity Ad-Dealers or
any other users except Bob. Alice can therefore serve as Agent for Bob who
can operate as a Prime Requester for Charlie and Dana.
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5.2 Experiments
To test our Fragmented Profile Comparison (F-PC ) framework, we imple-
mented a series of simulations using Python. The first set of simulations,
which is presented in Section 5.2.1 offers an estimate of the average rate
of a successful selection of shared interests between two users. The second
simulation in Section 5.2.2 measures the efficiency of the model in terms of
total number of required attempts until a shared interest between two users
is selected successfully. Our final simulation in Section 5.2.3 measure the
expected bandwidth conservation of real data.
5.2.1 Shared Interest Selection Rate
In the experiments that are featured in the following sections, we simu-
late a series of F-PC profile comparisons between a requesting user R and
an Agent A. R and A have two non-identical Advertising Interest Profiles
AIPR and AIPA respectively. The profiles are represented as a list of 400
interests which are marked as ’TRUE’ or ’FALSE’ depending on the user’s
individual preferences. The goal is for R to select a ’TRUE’ interest I out
of AIPR so that there is a high probability that I is also marked as ’TRUE’
in the profile AIPA of the Agent A. We measure and compare the proba-
bility of R selecting a shared interest with A based on two methods. The
first method represents our benchmark where R performs a simple Ran-
dom Selection which mirrors the selection that would normally take place
by a Requester who has no information about the Agent’s AIPA. The sec-
ond method follows our F-PC (Fragmented Profile Comparison) framework
where the Agent’s profile AIPA is separated into fragments.
Experiment 1: Profiles Generated Randomly For our first experi-
ment we used profiles which were generated randomly. In order to simulate
a set of users with various types of consuming habits, we assigned to each
user a total number of interests which ranges between 40 to 120 (10% to
30% of the total profile). As shown in Figure 5.3, for the Random Selection
the success rate is on average of 20%. F-PC shows a steady increase as the
number of fragments increases. For a profile of 4 fragments of 100 interests
we have a success rate of 24.7%, for 20 fragments of 20 interests we have
a rate of 37.7% and a pic rate of 48.9% for 40 fragments of 10 interests.
These results are to be expected considering the fact that the profiles have
been generated randomly and therefore have a uniform spread of marked
interests.
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Figure 5.3: Success rate contrast of F-PC (Fragmented Profile Comparison)
and random selection with randomly generated profiles.
Experiment 2: Profiles Generated from Dataset For our second
experiment we utilize a dataset of Foursquare check-ins in 400 venues [154].
The venues represent the different advertising interests of the participating
users based on their location habits. For example, a user who checked-in
an airport is perceived as a consumer who is interested in traveling and
a user who checked-in a university is perceived as a consumer who may
be interested in student accommodations. As depicted in Figure 5.4, our
results for the Random Selection show an average success rate of 31% which
is not effected by the fragmentation of the profile. For the F-PC, we see
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a steady increase when the profile is separated into smaller fragments. In
more detail, we have a success rate of 37.6% for a profile with 4 fragments
of 100 interests, 44.9% success for 20 fragments of 20 interests and a pic
rate of 52.7% for 40 fragments of 10 interests. Comparatively to the results
of the first experiment, we witness an increase in success rate. This is due
to the fact that profiles which are generated based on real user habits show
less uniformity in that way that marked interests are spread.
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Figure 5.4: Success rate contrast of F-PC (Fragmented Profile Comparison)
and random selection with profiles generated from a dataset.
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Experiment 3: Profiles Generated Based on Pareto Principle For
our third experiment, we feature profiles which are composed based on the
Pareto principle. The Pareto principle states that 80% of the output of a
system is caused by 20% of the input. The Pareto principle is commonly
used in marketing, sales and decision making [30]. Considering the wide
approval of the Pareto principle, we make the assumption that it is possible
to construct an AIP where 80% of the most popular advertising interests
of a specific social network can be concentrated within 20% of the available
fragments.
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Figure 5.5: Success rate contrast of F-PC (Fragmented Profile Comparison)
and random selection with profiles generated from Pareto principle.
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As depicted in Figure 5.5, the output of the Random Selection shows
a success rate which starts at 31% but gradually decreases to 20%. This
can be explained by the fact that the Pareto principle cannot be effectively
applied to profiles that are separated in a small number of fragments. For
example, when we have 2 fragments of 200 interests, the simulation will
resolve into cramming into one fragments between 32 and 96 interests (80%
of 40 and 120 which corresponds to the range of a user’s total interests).
Depending on the way that the pseudo-random numbers are generated, the
simulation may primarily focus on the one half of the profile that contains
most of the user’s interests which would result in a high success rate.
The F-PC method yields a starting success rate of 36.6% for 2 fragments
of 200 interests but rapidly increases to 64.3% for 4 fragments of 100 inter-
ests. This is to be expected as the top-ranked fragments contain between 32
and 96 interests which gives an average of 64. For the remaining selections,
the simulation outputs a 78% success rate for 10 fragments of 40 interests
and a pic rate for 93% for 40 fragments of size 10. These extreme results are
not surprising since between 32 and 96 of the total interests are crammed
in the top 8 or 9 fragments (20% of 40).
5.2.2 Delivery Efficiency
In this section we evaluate the delivery efficiency of F-PC in terms of the
total number of times that an advert needs to be requested until it is even-
tually delivered. User R performs a series of random encounters with set
of Agents A = {A1, A2, . . . , A100}. Both the user and the Agents utilize a
standard AIP of 400 interests which is separated into 20 fragments of 20
interests is each fragment. As in our previous experiments, the profiles of
the Agents contain between 40 and 120 interests (10% to 30% of the total
profile) which are marked ’TRUE’. R however starts with a profile AIPR
which has all 400 interests marked as ’TRUE’. During each encounter with
an Agent, R is allowed to make a single selection. The selected interest is
marked as delivered (’FALSE’ ) within AIPR only when it is shared by the
encountered Agent. If that is not the case, the interest remains as ’TRUE’
until it is re-selected with success. The intent of the experiment is to mea-
sure the number of selection attempts until every interest in AIPR has been
selected successfully.
As show in Figure 5.6, F-PC yields 161 successful selections in the first
attempt in contrast to Random Selection which only achieves 75. After
the second attempt,F-PC has successfully selected 241 interests. This is
matched by Random Selection with 250 selections only after the fourth at-
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tempt at which point F-PC has successfully selected 305 interests which
corresponds to 3/4 of the entirety of AIPR. For the remaining attempts,
F-PC maintains a lead which is gradually reduced until the tenth attempt
which results in F-PC having selected 374 interests compared to 350 for the
Random Selection.
These results indicate that a user who takes advantage of F-PC will
require fewer requests in order to receive his/her desired adverts. It has to
be noted however that the present simulation is not entirely representative
of the actual operation of the model as the Agents are limited to serving
only interests that they share with R. In an actual implementation of the
model, this would not be the case as Agents would also serves requested
adverts for non-shared interests. Therefore, the results of the simulation are
not indicative of the number of failed request attempts that will be endured
by a user before his/her adverts are delivered but rather of the memory and
bandwidth that will be conserved on the Agent’s device.
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Figure 5.6: Delivery efficiency of F-PC (Fragmented Profile Comparison) in
comparison to a random selection.
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5.2.3 Resource Conservation
The experiments which were presented in the previous sections illustrate the
conservation of memory and bandwidth by calculating the number of shared
adverts. To assess how this conservation of resources translates to actual
memory size, we performed a simple simulation of the encryption process
with the use of real adverts. The adverts that we used were static PNG
images of standard dimensions (300x250 pixels) and average size of 12 KB.
As ADS was designed to support symmetric encryption, we used the
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm with a key size of 256 bits.
As anticipated, the encrypted adverts measure the same size as the original
images (12 KB) while the encrypted copy of the key only measured 4 KB,
thus constituting to a 66.6% conservation of memory for every advert of
shared interest. In terms of run time, the encryption of each advert image
required 0.464 seconds while the encryption of a key copy only required
0.182 seconds.
To also account for the prospective of adopting asymmetric encryption,
we repeated the simulation with the use of the RSA (Rivest Shamir Adle-
man) cryptosystem. Results showed a significant increase in the size of the
encrypted advert images to 16 KB while the key files also increased but only
slightly, keeping them within the 4 KB threshold. Considering the fact the
encrypted adverts require more memory that the originals, the conservation
of memory is increased to 75% for every advert of shared interest. Regarding
run time, the encryption of each advert image required 0.717 seconds while
the encryption of a key copy only required 0.448 seconds.
5.3 Evaluation
In accordance to the result of our experimentation and the findings of our
qualitative analysis, we dedicate the following sections to conduct a privacy
and performance evaluation of all three of the offered profile comparison
algorithms.
5.3.1 Demographic Profile Comparison (D-PC )
Demographic Profile Comparison (D-PC ) identifies advertising interests that
two users may potentially share based on the similarity of their demographic
attributes. Physical demographic attributes such as gender and age are
openly shared and therefore simple to take into account. Social attributes,
such as location and status, are however determined automatically based on
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the social interactions of the two users. The effectiveness of D-PC is there-
fore dependant on the availability of social demographic data, namely the
meeting patterns and meeting locations of the two users. Users who interact
for extended periods at locations of advertising value (locations which can
be associated to specific advertising preferences) are expected to produce
better results than users who meet more sporadically at locations of lesser
advertising significance. Arguably, this limits the effectiveness of D-PC but
at the same time offers the highest level of privacy as no personal data is
exchanged.
5.3.2 Fragmented Profile Comparison (F-PC )
Fragmented Profile Comparison (F-PC ) is designed to narrow the Requester’s
selection on the fragments of the Agent’s AIPA which offer the highest con-
centration of marked interests. In contrast, a Random Selection has a more
broad field of focus as it targets the Agent’s AIPA in its entirety. Based
on this premise alone, it is not surprising that F-PC yields better results
than a Ransom Selection as the selection is performed out a smaller and
more densely populated sample. One thing that is evident from our experi-
ments however, is the fact that the effectiveness of F-PC is relevant to the
manner in which a AIP is populated. On a randomly constructed AIP ,
the effectiveness of F-PC is significantly lower compared to AIPs which
were constructed based on a real user dataset or the Pareto principle. The
deviation in effectiveness can be explained when we consider the way that
marked interests are distributed within the AIP in each case. A randomly
generated AIP produces a more uniform distribution which results in all
fragments having a similar number of marked interests. Contrary to that,
and AIP of non-uniform distribution produce fragments of either very high
or very low numbers of marked interests. From a practical point of view, a
non-uniform distribution could stem when neighbouring entries within the
AIP represent related adverting interests. For example, a user who is very
active in sports would be likely to rank very highly a fragment that con-
tains the entries for sport shoes, truck suits and activity monitors. An AIP
of such design offers better effectiveness but also presents a potential pri-
vacy threat as an Agent’s top ranked fragments could reveal interest in a
particular consumer field. The structure of the AIP is therefore left in the
discretion of the system administrator based on the desired balance between
effectiveness and privacy.
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5.3.3 Selective Profile Comparison (S-PC )
Selective Profile Comparison (S-PC ) follows a cryptographic approach in
order to allow an Agent to select the best option between a series of Candi-
date Selections CSs. The Agent can see the exact number of shared interest
within each CS which practically means that the effectiveness of S-PC is
dependant on the total number of performed CSs. In regards to privacy, it
can be argued that S-PC is less secure than alternative profile comparison
methods as the Agent learns the number of shared interests in each CS.
For a malicious Agent it would even be possible to determine if the Re-
quester has a particular interest by fabricating his/her profile so that only
one interest is marked. Consequently, the malicious Agent would be cer-
tain that the victimized Requester has the particular interest marked if any
of the weights of the CSs is equal to ’one’. What renders the aforemen-
tioned attack even more dangerous is the fact it can be performed stealthily.
The Requester is also able to perform a similar attack by fabricating two
CSs which differ only by a single interest. As a valid example, consider
a scenario where a malicious Requester R̂ composes CS1=
[
I1 I2 I3
]
and
CS2=
[
I1 I2 I3 I4
]
. Note that CS2 differs to CS1 only by a single in-
terest which is I4. Consequently, if the particular interest is marked by the
victimized Agent, the weight of the corresponding CS2 will be higher and
would therefore be chosen. Collaborative-Selective Profile Comparison (CS-
PC ) can potentially mitigate the limitations of S-PC but at the same time
introduces certain practical shortcomings. Firstly, CS-PC requires multi-
ple meetings and cannot therefore be performed in real time. Secondly, the
Prime Requester R0 needs to temporarily consume additional memory to
accommodate for the data of Secondary Requesters.
5.3.4 Overall Evaluation
An evaluation summary of the various profile comparison methods is shown
in Table 5.1. The designations ’Good’ and ’Poor’ respectively indicate that
an approach offers optimal performance or entirely fails at a particular field.
The designation ’Adequate’ indicates that the performance of an approach
is not optimal bust still substantial while the designation ’Limited’ indicates
that the approach offers some level of performance which is however insuf-
ficient. Lastly, the designation ’Tunable’ is used to describe an approach
which than exhibit different levels of performance (ranging from ’Poor’ to
’Good’) depending on the selected input parameters. Demographic Profile
Comparison (D-PC ) is easy to implement and it does not require the ex-
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change of any personal information. D-PC therefore offers a ’Good’ level of
practicality and privacy for both participating users but also has a Limited
effectiveness which is conditional on the availability of social demographic
data. D-PC is ideal for users who have regular social interactions but are
reluctant to share any information about their consumer preferences. Frag-
mented Profile Comparison (F-PC ) grants a ’Tunable’ compromise between
privacy and effectiveness for Agent and ’Adequate’ privacy for the Requester
who does not need to share any information about his/her profile. F-PC
also offers great flexibility for the Agent who is free to configure the system
in order to achieve a desired compromise between effectiveness and privacy.
F-PC is the most preferable option when the priority is Requester privacy
while the Agent is willing to make a compromise between effectiveness and
privacy. Selective Profile Comparison (S-PC ) offers a ’Tunable’ effectiveness
level which is contingent to the number of Candidate Selections CSs. Given
enough CSs, S-PC can achieve optimal effectiveness but this will come as a
trade off to the privacy of the Requester. Furthermore, S-PC shows ’Limited
privacy as it’ is susceptible to attack from either one of the participants. S-
PC is therefore recommended for interactions where there is a partial level
of trust between the two users. Collaborative-Selective Profile Comparison
(CS-PC ) introduces additional Requesters to S-PC which increases privacy
to ’Tunalbe’ for all participants but it also adds complexity which makes it
’Poor’ in terms of practicality. CS-PC is recommended for large communi-
ties of users who have limited access to Agents and Ad-Dealers.
Privacy Effectiveness Practicality
D-PC Good Limited Good
F-PC Tunable Tunable Adequate
S-PC Limited Tunable Adequate
CS-PC Tubable Tunable Poor
Table 5.1: Evaluation table of profile comparison methods.
5.4 Private Profile Comparison Summary
In this chapter we call attention to the fact that opportunistic networks typ-
ically suffer from an wasteful utilization of resource. To resolve this issue for
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the opportunistic network of ADS we offer an scheme which allows multiple
users to cooperatively request and access the same encrypted adverts. To
enable users to identify adverts of shared interest within their respective
advertising profiles, we propose a series of profile comparison algorithms:
D-PC, F-PC, S-PC and CS-PC. The key innovation of all four designs lies
on the fact that they are built from the ground up to maintain user privacy.
To evaluate our algorithms, in both terms of accuracy as well as privacy, we
performed a series of qualitative evaluations and experimental simulations.
The results demonstrate that each algorithm is capable of achieving a varied
balance between accuracy and privacy which offers a great deal of flexibil-
ity to the users of ADS who can either prioritize on resource utilization or
privacy in accordance to their individual needs.
Chapter 6
ADS+R: Advert Fraud
Prevention
ADS+R (Advert Distribution System with Reporting) was published in [98]
as an extension of ADS. ADS+R utilizes the same infrastructure as ADS but
also introduces the concept of Behavioural Verification as a novel approach
for preventing advert fraud while still maintaining user privacy. ADS+R ac-
complishes both fraud prevention and user privacy by incorporating client-
side processing and a blockchain-inspired architecture which enables mobile
users to compose verifiable Ad-Reports and submit them without exposing
their identities. Although the majority of users have no immediate bene-
fit from submitting fraudulent Ad-Reports, this does not ensure that every
filled report corresponds to real consumer activity. As users need to remain
anonymous, identifying dishonest (malicious) reports through traditional
methods such as digital signatures is undesired. To address this limitation,
our contribution is a mechanism which enables the verification of reports
that were submitted by honest users without compromising the user’s iden-
tity. What constitutes users as honest or dishonest is the manner by which
they access adverts on their mobile devices. Dishonest users commit fraud
by submitting multiple fake reports over a short period of time while honest
users operate under the scope of consumers who view adverts at a balanced
pace while engaging in typical social activities such as making online pur-
chases, moving through space and interacting with other mobile users.
We argue that it is hard for dishonest users such as clickbots and click-
farms to fake honest behaviour and we exploit the behavioural patterns of
users in order to classify Ad-Reports as real or fabricated. ADS+R composes
an anonymous log of the user’s behavioural patterns which allows Advertisers
96
CHAPTER 6. ADS+R: ADVERT FRAUD PREVENTION 97
to determine her honesty by detecting anomalies such as deficiency of advert
engagement, lack of mobility and social interaction and unrealistically large
volumes of traffic over short periods of time. In contrast to previously pro-
posed systems, ADS+R offers a more secure reward-claiming model which
protects against fraud while still preserving user anonymity. To the best of
our knowledge, our system is the first to (1) successfully exploit behavioural
patters for the purpose of exposing advert fraud while (2) still preserving
user privacy and contrast to alternative methods, our approach (3) does not
require complex filtering to identify reports which originate from the same
source.
In Section 6.1 we offer the system specifications of ADS+R and then in
Section 6.2 we provide a detailed overview of the system. In Section 6.3 we
summarize the operation of the protocol and we finally evaluate our design
in Section 6.4.
6.1 System Specifications
In the following sections we offer the system specification of ADS+R. In
Section 6.1.1 we provide a high level description of the system’s architecture
and in Section 6.1.2 we describe our trust model. Finally in Section 6.1.3
we determine our system requirements which will also serve as evaluation
criteria for our design.
6.1.1 System Architecture
ADS+R is an extension of ADS that was presented in Chapter 4 and there-
fore shares much of the same components and architecture. Users, Publish-
ers, Advertisers, Ad-Dealers and Broker represent the same stakeholders as
in ADS but at the same time have the added functionality of managing
Ad-Reports. Users generate Ad-Reports which are forwarded to the Broker
via Ad-Dealers. The Broker is responsible for validating Ad-Reports on be-
half of Advertisers via a mechanism which we term Behavioural Verification.
Once reports have been validated, Advertisers reward the Ad-Dealers and
Publishers for their services. Users can directly interact with Ad-Dealer or
establish opportunistic connections via Agents who can ferry Ad-Reports in
addition to adverts, ARMs (Advert Request Messages) and DMs (Delivery
Messages). Both functions can be performed at the same time and by the
same Agent. Consider a simple example where Alice uses an Agent Bob to
transfers both ARMs and Ad-Reports. At the same time, Bob can be trans-
ferring ARMs for Charlie and additional Ad-Reports on behalf of Danna.
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Upon contacting an Ad-Dealer, Bob can perform both actions of submitting
the Ad-Reports and collecting adverts during a single session.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the complete architecture of ADS+R and provides
a high-level overview of the system’s operation which can be divided into
two stages (sub-protocols) which are detailed in the following paragraphs.
Figure 6.1: Advert Distribution System with Reporting (ADS+R) architec-
ture.
RF (Report Form) Issuing: The user initiates the first stage by compos-
ing an RF-Request, the purpose of which is to inform the Broker of his/her
intention to submit Ad-Reports. The RF-Request is encrypted with a public
key which belongs to the Broker and sent to an Agent who physically trans-
fers the RF-Request to one of the Ad-Dealers. The Ad-Dealer forwards the
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RF-Request to a Broker who decrypts it and issues an RF (Request Form).
The RF is encrypted with a key which was provided to the Broker within
the RF-Request and the RF is then sent back to the Ad-Dealer. Lastly, the
Ad-Dealer forwards the RF to the Agent so that it may be conveyed back
to the requesting user. The RF contains information which is needed by the
user in order to compose and submit Ad-Reports.
Ad-Report Submission: The second stage takes place after the user
has run ADS and has viewed his/her adverts through a Publisher. To
notify the Broker that the adverts have been viewed, the user composes
Ad-Reports and forwards them to an Agent (not necessarily the same Agent
that was used in the first stage) with the intent to be delivered to an Ad-
Dealer. The Ad-Reports are encrypted with the Broker’s public key and
therefore not accessible to the Agent or Ad-Dealers. The receiving Ad-
Dealer shares the Ad-Reports with the Broker, who verifies their authenticity
and notifies the appropriate Advertisers. Based on the information that is
provided within the Ad-Reports, the Advertisers can reward the Publishers
who featured the adverts as well as the two involved Ad-Dealers (the Ad-
Dealer who submitted the Ad-Reports but also the one that was responsible
for delivering the adverts to the user via ADS ).
6.1.2 Trust Model
The trust model we assume for ADS+R is an upgraded version of the trust
model which we used for ADS in Section 4.1.2. The Broker is therefore still
regraded as trusted by the Advertisers and the trust relations which concern
the users remain the same. Users are still regarded as non-malicious since
they have no immediate benefit to commit fraud. However, it is possible
for an adversary to submit fictitious Ad-Reports by assuming the identity
of a user without being exposed. The Broker and Advertisers are therefore
not threatened by the users but from Ad-Dealers and Publishers who may
assume the identify of a user in order to commit fraud. For that reason,
Ad-Dealers and Publishers but not users are upgraded to malicious in the
eyes of the Broker and Advertisers. The Advertisers are therefore willing
to accept the authenticity of an Ad-Report only after it has been verified
by the Broker. The Broker and Advertisers on their part can benefit from
altering the content of an Ad-Report in order to avoid paying a commission.
Ad-Dealers and Publishers have therefore no reason to trust the Broker
and Advertisers and also consider them as malicious. The updated trust
relations between the system’s stakeholders can be seen in Table 6.1 with
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the changes marked in bold letters.
Advertisers Broker Ad-Dealers Users Publishers
Advertisers - Trusted Malicious - Malicious
Broker - - Malicious Malicious Malicious
Ad-Dealers Malicious Malicious - - -
Users Curious Curious Curious Malicious -
Publishers Malicious Malicious - - -
Table 6.1: Table of trust relations between ADS+R stakeholders.
6.1.3 System Requirements
Having considered the trust relations between stakeholders in Section 6.1.2,
we dedicate this section to compose an index of system requirements that
will serve as the criteria under which the effectiveness and security of our
design can be evaluated.
• Reporting Effectiveness: Ad-Reports should include all necessary
information to ensure that participating stakeholders are able to effec-
tively claim their rewards. The Broker should be able to ensure that
each report is accounted only once and also there should exist a way
for users to confirm that a report was delivered successfully1.
• Reporting Fraud Prevention: The Broker should be able to pre-
vent any group of conspiring Ad-Dealers and Publishers from submit-
ting reports which do not correspond to real consumer activity.
• Reporting Integrity: It should not be possible for the Broker or Ad-
Dealers to alter the content of a submitted Ad-Report for the purpose
of deceiving each other.
• User Privacy: A user’s sensitive information should remain private
from all parties, including other users.
1The effectiveness of submitted reports is taken as a standard requirement by analogous
systems but in the case of our model it needs to be examined in more detail as it may
be affected by the additional mechanisms that are used to preserve privacy (opportunistic
networks and anonymous submission).
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6.2 System Overview
In the following sections we provide an analysis of ADS+R and offer a
detailed insight into our method for detecting fake Ad-Reports without any
need for knowing the identity of the submitting users. Our design is based
on a novel approach which we have termed as Behavioural Verification. We
argue that honest user behaviour is hard to fake by dishonest users such
as bonets and click-farms. Behavioural Verification exploits typical social
behavioural patterns in order to verify honest users without knowing their
identities.
As users view adverts on their devices, they generate Ad-Reports as
featured in Section 6.2.2. At the same time, users also collect a series of
Tokens when they perform certain daily activities such as purchasing goods,
visiting different locations or interacting with other users, as explained in
Section 6.2.5. To better comprehend the conceptual idea of Tokens, think
of a game of scavenger-hunt where players can prove to have performed a
required task (e.g., solved a puzzle or visited a location) by recovering some
type of artifact.
Tokens are then linked to Ad-Reports in the form of a blockchain-inspired
construction which is termed as ARC (Ad-Report Chain) and is further an-
alyzed in Section 6.2.3. As the ARC contains both the user’s Ad-Reports
and Tokens, it can be used by the Broker to verify that the Ad-Reports
were submitted by a user who exhibits honest social behaviour. Further-
more, Tokens work as time-stamps which allow the Broker to verify that
the Ad-Reports of an ARC were created at a paced rate and not in bulk
(as the creation of bulk amounts of Ad-Reports in short time is indicative
of fraudulent behavior). The Broker is responsible for validating the hon-
esty of submitted ARCs and notifies the Advertisers so that commissions
can be awarded to the concerned Ad-Dealers and Publishers. To maintain
user privacy, ARCs are encrypted and only visible to the Broker (and by
association to Advertisers) however, Ad-Dealers and Publishers are able to
audit the Broker’s integrity with the use of cryptographic hash functions.
Information among the system stakeholders is shared through the use of a
digital database termed as the SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board) as
specified in Section 6.2.4.
6.2.1 System Setup
For the submission of Ad-Reports, ADS+R utilizes a different set of crypto-
graphic keys than those used for the delivery of adverts. Users are required
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to encrypt their ARCs with a public key BroKPub which is also pre-installed
on their clients while the corresponding private key BroKPri is only know
to the Broker. The Broker also issues a different Token Singing Key ToKsigAid
(e.g., ToKsig1 , ToK
sig
2 ,..., ToK
sig
n ) to each individual Ad-Dealer. Ad-Dealers
keep their ToKsigAid private from each other as to ensure security. Token
Singing Keys are used for the signing of Tokens which can later be verified
by the Broker who has access to the corresponding Token Verification Keys
ToKverAid.
6.2.2 Ad-Reports
ADS+R offers three different types of Ad-Reports which can support all of
the available pricing models that are used in traditional OBA. The different
pricing models were described in detail in Section 2.1 but are also briefly
described below along their matching Ad-Report types.
• RoV (Report of View): RoV is used to support the PPM Pay-
Per-Mille model which grants an award when an advert is viewed by
a user.
• RoC (Report of Click): RoC is used to support the PPC Pay-
Per-Click model which grants an award when an advert is clicked by
a user.
• RoA (Report of Action): RoA is used to support the PPA Pay-
Per-Action model which grants an award when a specific action is
performed by a user after an advert has been clicked.
As depicted in Figure 6.2, all supported Ad-Report types incorporate
a sequence number N which indicates the order in which the reports were
created. The sequence number is what allows the system to link reports
into a blockchain-inspired architecture and it is therefore imperative that
each generated report contains the correct N . The Advert Code is a unique
reference number that is sent to the user alongside each advert. The Aid
has been analyzed before in Section 4.2.1 and accommodates the identity of
the Ad-Dealer who distributed the advert. Respectively, Pid represents the
identity of the Publisher who featured the advert to the user while the Date
field holds the date and time of the publication.
The C-Token (or Click-Token), which can be found in the RoC and RoA,
is a sequence of data which can be obtained by the user when an advert has
been clicked. The A-Token (or Action-Token) which is present in the RoA,
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follows a very similar format as the C-Token with the main difference being
that it is disclosed to a user only after a specific condition has been met
(e.g., the user made a purchase). Each Advertiser periodically generates
their own C-Token and A-Token which are uploaded within their domain.
The function which is used for this operation as well as the frequency upon
which the two tokens are updated fall under the responsibility of the respec-
tive Advertiser. Ideally, the C-Token and A-Token should be generated by
a cryptographically secure random number generator and as often as practi-
cally possible2. A design feature which is similar to Tokens is also presented
by Juels et al. [81] where the authors make use of cryptographic credentials
known as Coupons.
The rate at which the C-Token and A-Token are updated influences
the system’s accuracy of verifying the time that an Ad-Report was created.
More specifically, if Tokens are updated once every T time units, then the
ADS+R can verify the time of a user’s report with granularity T . The C-
Token is uploaded in the same cyberspace where the user is linked to when
clicking on the advert while the A-Token is placed in the location to which
the user is diverted to when they perform a specific action such as making
a purchase. Much like the way that web cookies work, the mobile client
obtains the C-Token and A-Token from the Advertiser’s website and places
them within the Ad-Report as the user is browsing. This enables Advertisers
to verify that a user accessed their website or performed a specific action
before creating a RoC or RoA. Having to obtain Tokens before creating
a new Ad-Report, makes the forging of RoCs and RoA more difficult. To
forge a RoC, the dishonest user needs to fist visit the Advertiser’s web site
while forging a RoA requires the performing of an action. More importantly,
Tokens prevent dishonest users from creating fictitious Ad-Reports ahead of
time as a RoC or RoA can be created only after the contained C-Token
and A-Token have been made available. Lastly, h(AR(N−1)) contains a
hash function digest of each previous Ad-Report that was composed by the
same user. This enables users to link all of their Ad-Reports in the form
of a blockchain-inspired architecture which is analyzed more minutely in
Section 6.2.3.
One last thing that needs to be mentioned is the fact that in every Ad-
Report, the sequence number N and hash h(AR(N−1)) are sent in plaintext
form while the remaining fields are encrypted with the Broker’s public key
2It is assumed that the random number generator which is used for the creation of
Tokens is secure and that the only feasible way to obtain the C-Token and A-Token is
by downloading them from the locations in which they were uploaded by a particular
Advertiser.
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Figure 6.2: Supported types of Ad-Reports and their contented elements.
BroKPub. Further clarification on the encryption process is given in Sec-
tion 6.3.
6.2.3 Information Components
Rather than dealing with individual Ad-Reports as they are being cre-
ated, ADS+R enables user to aggregate multiple Ad-Reports throughout
the course of a defined period and then submit all of them as a single unit.
As it has already been explained in Section 6.2.2, each Ad-Report N contains
the hash digest h(AR(N−1)) of the previous Ad-Report N − 1. This enables
the user to link several Ad-Reports together in a form that resembles the
architecture of a blockchain and is termed as the ARC (Ad-Report Chain).
As shown in Figure 6.3, the first block of the ARC contains an initiat-
ing value which is marked as ARC-ID. The ARC-ID is hashed to produce
h(ARC − ID) that is included in the second block N = 1 with each consec-
utive block following the same arrangement. The h(ARC − ID) essentially
works as a unique identifier which also marks the start of a specific ARC.
The ARC-ID is dictated by the Broker and sent to the user within the RF
(Report Form) as depicted in the same figure. Recall from Section 6.1.1 that
the RF (Report Form) is a message that comes as a response to the user’s
request to file Ad-Reports.
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In addition to the ARC-ID, the RF also contains a cryptographic Report
Signing Key RepKsiguser. While the ARC-ID is used to identify and mark the
start of an ARC, RepKsiguser is used to mark the end in such a way that
the removal or addition of blocks to a submitted ARC is prevented. More
specifically, the user calculates the hash digest h(ARC) of the ARC and then
signs it with RepKsiguser in order to produce an Integrity Hash IH which can
also be seen in the same in Figure 6.3. To confirm that the IH was created
by the user, the Broker can verify it with the use of the secret verification
key RepKveruser and she can then compare the h(ARC) from within the IH to
an h′(ARC) which the Broker computes herself in order to verify that the
ARC has not been altered.
Figure 6.3: Structural information components of ADS+R.
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6.2.4 SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board)
The SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board) is a digital database which
serves as an information sharing platform between all stakeholders of ADS+R.
The indexed entries of the SC-Board represent RFs (Request Forms) that
have been distributed to users and consist of five fields as shown in Fig-
ure 6.4.
The first two fields are input by the Broker when she issues a new RF
and respectively contains the ARC-ID and the identity Aid of the issuing
Ad-Dealer (the Ad-Dealer who forwarded the user’s RF-Request) along with
the corresponding date. The remaining fields are completed when the ARC
is submitted with the third field keeping the identity Aid of the submitting
Ad-Dealer (the Ad-Dealer who forwarded the user’s ARC and IH ) and the
date of submission while the fourth and fifth contain the Ad-Report Chain
ARC and Integrity Hash IH.
Indicated in the diagram with a darker shade under the second, third
and fourth field, are certain sections which are completed by the issuing Ad-
Dealer, the submitting Ad-Dealer, the Broker and the individual Advertisers.
These fields serve the purpose of verification checks. In more detail, VC-I
under the second field is signed by the issuing Ad-Dealer to verify the issue
of the new ARC-ID. In a very similar fashion, the submitting Ad-Dealer
signs the third field marked as VC-S in order to verify the submission of
the ARC and confirm the correctness of the hash digests h(N) of all blocks
(Ad-Reports). Recall that in Section 6.2.2 we briefly mentioned that the
content of Ad-Reports is encrypted except for the sequence number N and
hash h(N) which are still visible to the submitting Ad-Dealer. While the
ARC in the fourth section is published by the Broker after decryption, the
submitting Ad-Dealer confirms that the hashes have not been altered by
comparing them to his own copy. The individual verification checks, which
are marked as VC-1 to VC-N under the ARC, are filled either by the Broker
to indicate blocks that have been verified or by the Advertisers to indicate
blocks for which an Advertiser has awarded a commission to the respective
Publisher. More details on the exact operation and the reasons behind these
verification checks are provided in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Lastly, we need to
mention that all fields of the SC-Board are visible to Ad-Dealers, Publishers
and Advertisers but the first field which shows the ARC-ID also becomes
available to users after submission has been completed. Users only need
to have access to the first field in order to verify that their submission has
been delivered but cannot see any other information that is published on
the SC-Board.
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Figure 6.4: Visual representation of the CS-Board (Service Confirmation
Board).
6.2.5 Behavioural Verification
The detection of forged Ad-Reports is a challenging issue because users need
to remain anonymous, and anonymity prevents verification through tradi-
tional methods such as digital signatures. To resolve this problem, we pro-
pose an alternative means of verifying truthful reports while still allowing
users to maintain their anonymity. Users can be classified as honest or
dishonest based on the manner upon which they create Ad-Reports. As Ad-
Reports are rewarded at a low commission (typically at around $1 per 1000
impressions), dishonest users commit fraud by generating large volumes of
unverifiable Ad-Reports at a rate which is much higher than what is realisti-
cally possible for a legitimate consumer 3. Honest users on the other hand,
view adverts at a realistic rate and therefore generate Ad-Reports in a paced
manner over a longer time period. While composing their Ad-Reports, hon-
est users engage in typical social activities such as purchasing goods, moving
through space and interacting with other users. All of these social activi-
ties are distinguishing behaviours of honest users which can be exploited to
3Fraud that is committed at a limited scale (for e.g. users who periodically click adverts
with non-consumer intent) is practically unfeasible to detect but also yields trivial returns.
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verify legitimate Ad-Reports.
As we already described in Section 6.2.3, Ad-Reports that are created
by the same user are linked together in an ARC. The goal is therefore to
identify whether the creator of a particular ARC is honest or dishonest. We
accomplish this by embedding into the ARC certain elements (blocks) which
reveal the user’s social behaviour patterns during the time that Ad-Reports
were being created.
Advert Association
Honest users utilize adverts as consumers and are therefore likely to not
simply view an advert but to also engage with it by clicking or making a
purchase. The act of engaging with an advert can therefore be considered
as a typical behaviour of honest users but it also has to be noted that not all
honest users engage with adverts in the same rate, and some users do not
engage at all. In order to therefore avoid false positives, ADS+R regards
the engagement with adverts as an indicator of honesty but the lack of
engagement is not treated as suspicion of dishonesty. To compensate for
users who do not engage adverts, ADS+R exploits other forms of honest
behaviour as explained in the following sections.
In Section 6.2.2, we illustrated the available types of Ad-Reports and
called attention to the fact that a RoA is harder to forge than an RoC
which is in turn harder to forge than an RoV as the required C-Tokens and
A-Tokens can be acquired only after accessing an Advertiser’s domain. The
RoCs and RoAs can therefore serve as indicators of honesty as they signify
that a user took the time to visit an Advertiser’s website. The remaining
RoVs are not verifiable but can be validated by association when in the
same ARC as shown in Figure 6.5.
A limitation to this approach lies in the fact that RoCs and RoAs are
designed to be used by Advertisers who support the Pay-Per-Click (PPC)
and Pay-Per-Action (PPA) advertising models. This may limit the num-
ber of RoCs and RoAs as it excludes all the Advertisers who only support
Pay-Per-Impression (CPM). To overcome this shortcoming, ADS+R uti-
lizes the different types of Ad-Reports (RoV, RoC and RoA) not based on
theAdvertiser’s pricing model but in accordance to a user’s engagement with
an advert. Consider a simple example where an Advertiser supports CPM
which means that a simple RoV would normally suffice. For the same ap-
plication however, we can also use a RoC or a RoA when the user interacts
with the advert by clicking or by performing an action. The commission is
still going to be awarded based on the viewing but the use of a more secure
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Figure 6.5: Example of Behavioural Verification through advert association.
Ad-Report type adds validity to the authenticity of the claim (as RoCs and
RoAs are harder to forge than RoVs).
Time and Location Checkpoint
Tokens which are used in RoCs and RoAs are indicators of honest behaviour
as they demonstrate that a user invested time into performing a specific ac-
tion but they can also be used to determine the rate at which the Ad-Reports
of an ARC were created (as Tokens are periodically updated). However, as
not all users engage with adverts regularly enough for this method to be
effective on its own, the same principle can be extended by periodically
incorporating into the ARC some form of Time-Token (T-Token) which
can signify the time that a particular block was created. One limitation
that needs to be considered however, is that this T-Token cannot be ob-
tained through the internet, as this would expose the user’s IP address and
it would also be ineffective since a dishonest user could commit fraud by
creating multiple ARCs in parallel over a longer period of time.
To overcome this limitation, the T-Token is distributed directly from
Ad-Dealers in the same way as adverts. T-Tokens enable the Broker to
verify the time that a block of the ARC was created but also operates as a
location tag. Location tags are data that can be associated with a point in
space and time and have appeared in the literature before, in the context of
private (cryptographic) proximity testing in [108]. The location tag provides
additional proof of a user’s honesty as it verifies the user’s social behaviour
in terms of appearing within proximity of public locations, where Ad-Dealers
are broadcasting. To further comprehend this notion, consider the following
example of attempted forgery. If the T-Token were to be accessible online,
a dishonest user Û could periodically download it and use it to easily verify
set Ŝ = {ÂRC1, ÂRC2, ..., ÂRCi} of fictitious ARCs over a longer period of
time. However, when the T-Token is distributed by Ad-Dealers, it is more
difficult for Û to validate multiple ARCs since it requires them to physically
travel to the location of an Ad-Dealer and request multiple T-Tokens for
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each of the elements of Ŝ. Furthermore, so as not to raise suspicions, the
T-Tokens would also need to be requested at a slow rate and preferably from
different Ad-Dealers which adds a supplementary layer of difficulty for Û .
When entering the vicinity of an Ad-Dealer, users can send a Token
Request Message TRM. The TRM is encrypted with the System Encryption
Key SysEK and contains the hash digest h(ARn−1) of the last block of
the user’s ARC and a user-generated symmetric encryption key Kuser. The
Ad-Dealer decrypts the TRM with the System Decryption Key SysDK and
begins to compose a Checkpoint Block (CB). As illustrated in Figure 6.6, the
CB contains the Ad-Dealer’s identity Aid, the user’s hash digest h(n − 1)
and a time-stamp both signed with his Token Singing Key ToKsigB . The
time-stamp serves as the T-Token while the Ad-Dealer’s signature serves as
proof of the user’s location. Before being sent back to the user, the CB is
first encrypted with the Broker’s public key BroKPub and then encrypted
again with the user’s encryption key Kuser as shown in Equation (6.1):
EKuser [EBroKPub [CB]] (6.1)
When the cryptogram is received, the user decrypts it with his/her own
copy of Kuser and obtains EBPuK [CB] which is given a sequence number
N = n and is inserted into the ARC as shown in Figure 6.6 4.
Figure 6.6: Example of Behavioural Verification through the use of CB
(Checkpoint Block).
4All blocks of the ARC are encrypted with the Broker’s public key BroKPub as to
ensure privacy against Ad-Dealers and Agents. The encryption on the CB could had been
performed by the user but in this case is performed by the Ad-Dealer in order to relieve
some of the strain from the user’s mobile device. Ad-Dealers can be trusted with this
operation as they have no benefit from providing a defective CB.
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Social Affiliation
The social affiliations between honest users is an additional behaviour which
can be exploited to verify the rate that an ARC was created. When two
users meet, they may exchange ARC-IDs as well as the sequence number
N and hash h(n) of their last blocks. The two users can then verify the
date and time of the meeting (T-Token) by adding an Affiliation Block
AB in their respective ARCs with each others’ information. In order to
be valid, the ABs which are added to the ARCs of both users need to
have matching T-Tokens but this does not require perfect synchronization.
Mobile applications typically have a recommended refresh rate for adverts
that is between 30 to 120 seconds while automated clickers and Click-Farms
generate fake Ad-Reports at a much higher rate. For the purpose of detecting
fraud, the time difference between the two users can therefore be tolerant
to a margin of a couple of minutes without seriously affecting the system.
In the event that two ABs do not match because one of the users provided
an inaccurate date and time (either maliciously or accidentally), the Broker
can simply ignore it while relying on other Tokens to validate the particular
ARC.
Figure 6.7 illustrates an example where two users A and B have added
each others’ Affiliation Blocks within their respective ARCs. The AB which
was added by user B, is shown in the diagram to contain a new sequence
number n, the hash of the previous block h(n − 1), the T-Token of the
meeting (as registered by B) and the information that was sent by A which
includes her ARC-ID=ARC-1 as well as the sequence number m and digest
h(m) of her last block. The date which is registered in B’s ARC-2 works
as the T-Token which verifies the last block of A’s ARC-1 at a particular
time. Notice that ARC-1 and sequence number m are sent encrypted with
the Broker’s public key BroKPub while the h(m) is signed with A’s Report
Signing Key RepKsigA . This ensures that B does not learn any information
about ARC-1 nor is she able to alter h(m).
Through the exchange of ABs, the Broker can infer that two ARCs were
submitted by affiliated users but this does not compromise user privacy.
ARCs are submitted anonymously and the Broker has no means of obtain-
ing any information about a particular user’s social network nor is he able
to identify ARCs that were submitted by the same user. However, one lim-
itation of this verification method lies on the fact that a dishonest user may
be able to verify multiple fictitious ̂ARCs by exchanging ABs. Although
plausible, this is prevented by combining all three verification methods as
discussed in the following Section 6.2.5.
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Figure 6.7: Example of Behavioural Verification through the use of AB
(Affiliation Block).
Composite Verification
The individual methods of Behavioural Verification have certain limitations.
The social affiliation approach in Section 6.2.5 is susceptible to fraud by
means of creating multiple fictitious ̂ARCs while the methods which are
described in Sections 6.2.5 and 6.2.5 may not always be practically feasible
as they require user to regularly click on adverts or travel to certain locations.
To compensate for each others’ limitations, all three approaches were
designed to work in combination. In the example which is provided in Fig-
ure 6.8, user A submits an ARC which contains multiple Ad-Reports that
need to be verified (marked in the figure with exclamation marks). The hon-
esty of A is supported by the fact that his ARC also contains a verifiable
report (either a RoC or a RoA), a Checkpoint Block CB from an Ad-Dealer
and two Affiliation Blocks ABs.
Furthermore, we see that the respective ARCs of the two users X and
Y who provided ABs for A also have verifiable reports, CBs as well as
ABs from other users who also have their own verifiable credentials. As all
submitted ARCs show indications of social activity, it serves as significant
evidence to support the notion that they were composed by different honest
users rather than a single dishonest one. For reasons of simplicity, the ex-
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ample just described features only a few verification credentials. However,
in a more realistic scenario, the users would likely have multiple creden-
tials which would solidify their verification as the product of genuine social
activity.
Figure 6.8: Example of Behavioural Verification through the combination
of all available methods.
6.2.6 Statistical Analysis of Consumer Behavioural Patterns
In addition to combating advertising fraud, ADS+R can also prove to be
usefully for purposes of market research. ARCs offer invaluable insight on
the consumer preferences and social behaviour patterns of the submitting
users while still preserving the user’s privacy. By inspecting the Tokens of
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a submitted ARC, a market analyst would be able to infer complex corre-
lations between advertising interests, location habits and social affiliations.
For example, users who visit location X are likely to be interested in prod-
uct A and users who are interested in product B are likely to affiliate with
users that are interested in product C. Such insight will allow marketers
to fine-tune their targeting algorithms and consequently increase the sys-
tem’s effectiveness. To collect consumer information, marketers currently
need to rely on analytic companies who gather their data through the use of
tracking and questionnaire forms. Undoubtedly, such practices are threat-
ening for user privacy and have questionable reliability. The introduction of
ADS+R in market research will likely increase data quality, reduce the cost
and complexity data acquisition and most importantly it will ensure user
privacy.
6.3 Protocol
Report Form Issuing Sub-Protocol
The Report Form Issuing sub-protocol that is depicted in Figure 6.9 is run
when the user needs to acquire a new Report Form.
1. The user generates a symmetric key Kuser and composes it into an RF-
Request which is encrypted with the Broker’s public key BroKPub.
2. The RF-Request is sent to an Agent with the intent to be delivered to
an Ad-Dealer.
3. The Agent transfers the RF-Request to an Ad-Dealer.
4. The Ad-Dealer forwards the RF-Request to the Broker.
5. The Broker decrypts the RF-Request with his private key BroKPri
and obtains the user’s Kuser. The Broker then issues a new ARC-ID
in the SC-Board and afterwards computes a pair of asymmetric keys
RepKsiguser and RepKveruser. The Verification Key RepK
ver
user is stored
securely while the Signing Key RepKsiguser and the new ARC-ID are
composed into a Report Form which is encrypted with Kuser.
6. The encrypted Report Form is sent back to the Ad-Dealer.
7. The issuing Ad-Dealer verifies the transaction by signing the appro-
priate field on the SC-Board.
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8. The Ad-Dealer forwards the Report Form to the Agent.
9. The Agent transfers the Report Form back to the user.
10. The user receives the encrypted Report Form and decrypts it with his
copy of Kuser in order to obtain the ARC-ID and RepK
sig
user.
Figure 6.9: Report Form Collection sub-protocol.
Ad-Report Submission Sub-Protocol
The Ad-Report Submission sub-protocol that is depicted in Figure 6.10 is
used for the delivery of Ad-Reports by the user to the Broker.
1. The user gradually composes an ARC. The contents of the ARC are
encrypted with the Broker’s public key BroKPub except for the first
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block that contains the ARC-ID and the sequence number N and hash
digest h(N − 1) in all remaining blocks. When the ARC is ready for
submission, the user produces an Integrity Hash IH by computing
h(ARC) and signs the result with the signing key RepKsiguser.
2. The ARC and IH are sent to an Agent with the intention to be for-
wardsd to an Ad-Dealer.
3. The Agent transfers the ARC and IH to an Ad-Dealer.
4. The Ad-Dealer keeps a local copy of the ARC and IH.
5. The Ad-Dealer submits the ARC and IH to the Broker.
6. The Broker first decrypts the ARC with his private key BroKPir
and verifies the authenticity of the IH with the matching verification
key RepKveruser. The Broker then verifies the integrity of the ARC by
replicating the results of the hashes h(N−1) in the individual blocks as
well as the digest of h(ARC) that is found in the IH. When verification
has been completed successfully the Broker uploads the ARC and IH
onto the SC-Board in plaintext form. Finally, the Broker verifies the
validity of the Checkpoint Blocks CBs and Affiliation Blocks ABs and
marks them on the SC-Board.
7. When the ARC and IH have been uploaded to the SC-Board, the
Broker notifies the submitting Ad-Dealer with a Check Message.
8. The submitting Ad-Dealer verifies the hashes in the uploaded ARC
and IH by comparing them to his own copy (recall that the hashes
were not encrypted in the original ARC ). The submitting Ad-Dealer
then confirm the correctness of the ARC by placing his name and
signature in the third field of the SC-Board.
9. The Broken notifies the Advertisers for the new submission in the
SC-Board.
10. The Advertisers begin to reward Publishers and Ad-Dealers and each
reward is marked on the SC-Board by the appropriate Advertiser.
Each Advertiser is responsible for individually determining the hon-
esty of the user by assessing the embedded authentication credentials
which have been marked (CBs, ABs, RoCs and RoAs). The RoCs and
RoAs are validated and marked on the SC-Board by the respective
Advertisers after confirming the contained C-Tokens and A-Tokens.
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Depending on the number and significance of credentials in the ARC,
an Advertiser may choose to award a report or wait for more creden-
tials to be marked on the SC-Board (more awarded RoCs and RoAs
by other Advertisers and more confirmed ABs).
11. After a certain time has passed from the submission of the ARC, the
user’s mobile client checks the SC-Board in order to determine that
the ARC has been submitted. If the matching ARC-ID is present
within the SC-Board, the user may discard the original copy of the
ARC and IH or else she may need to resubmit them. Recall that the
only part of the SC-Board which is visible to the user is the ARC-ID
while the rest is kept private among the remaining stakeholders.
Figure 6.10: Ad-Report Submission sub-protocol.
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6.4 Evaluation
To evaluate ADS+R we follow a qualitative approach based on the system
requirements which we determined in Section 6.1.3. We determine possible
attack scenarios and gauge the level of threat which they pose to the system
in terms of feasibility, practicality and likelihood.
6.4.1 Reporting Effectiveness
In the currently deployed system, Publishers need to rely on Ad-Networks
in order to claim rewards from Advertisers. Although Ad-Networks have
no financial benefit from mismanaging reports, the lack on transparency is
a downside of the system’s reporting effectiveness. ADS+R overcomes this
limitation by offering Publishers the ability to audit the reporting process.
As ARCs are published on the SC-Board, Publishes can claim their rewards
directly from Advertisers without needing to trust any third parties.
In addition to transparency, our approach also offers supplementary re-
porting information which can be exploited for purposes of market research.
To conduct market research, Advertisers currently rely on big data anal-
ysis which requires additional funding and in many cases can be intrusive
for users. In contrast, ADS+R maintains user privacy but at the same
time provides fine-grained insight on consumer habits. By examining the
contents of ARC, Advertisers can associate advertising strategies to social
behaviours (e.g., consumers who are interested in product A are also inter-
ested in product B or consumers who visit location X tend to view adverts
through Publisher Y). This renders ARCs as a more effective means of ad-
vert reporting both in terms of comprehensiveness and privacy.
6.4.2 Reporting Fraud Prevention
Financial fraud against Advertisers is the main shortcoming of the currently
enforced model. The main perpetrators of fraud are BotNets (automated
clickers) and Click-Farms where low-paid workers are hired to click on ad-
verts. Such schemes commit fraud by generating a large bulk of Ad-Report
traffic that does not correspond to actual consumer activity. To combat this
problem, ADS+R enables Advertisers to (1) calculate the rate upon which
Ad-Reports are created and (2) verify that the user who submitter a par-
ticular Ad-Reports is an actual consumer rather a fraudster. The system’s
effectiveness at detecting fraudsters is akin to the quantity and variety of
verification credentials within each submitted ARC. A high concentration
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of assorted credentials signifies user honesty however, a low concentration
of credentials does not necessarily indicate dishonesty as it may also be
attributed to a lack of activity on behalf of the user. In this regard, the
behavioural verification mechanism of ADS+R may return a false positive
when the credentials of an ARC are insufficient to yield a conclusive ver-
dict. Additionally, a false negative may also be a theoretically possible if
a fraudster were able to forge fake credentials. To overcome this limita-
tion, ADS+R enables Advertisers to individually determine the validity of
a submitted ARC based on statistical standards such as the average num-
ber of social affiliations, average rate of advert viewing and average rate of
visitations of specific locations. The aforementioned statistical standards
represent the typical behavioural patterns of honest users and can be set by
analyzing previously sublimed ARCs that have been accepted by the Adver-
tisers as real. Naturally, there is always the possibility that some previously
accepted ARCs may have actually been false negatives. Despite this, pro-
vided that the sample of ARCs is large enough and considering the fact that
our systems assumes that the majority of participants are honest, it is safe
to infer that a limited number of ARCs which are false negatives will have
minimal effect at skewing the results of the statistical analysis.
To illustrate the system’s ability to distinguish between honest and dis-
honest users, we will examine an attack scenario where a dishonest user
Û attempts to commit fraud at a large scale by submitting a set Ŝ =
{ÂRC1, ..., ÂRCi} of fictitious ARCs. Recall that ARCs contain the fol-
lowing types of blocks: RoV (Report of View), RoC (Report of Click), RoA
(Report of Action), CB (Checkpoint Block) and AB (Affiliation Block).
Among all types of Ad-Reports, RoV is the easiest to fabricate as it
does not contain any verifiable information (Tokens). However, Û cannot
submit an ÂRC which only contains RoVs as this would be immediately
rejected by the Broker. RoCs and RoAs contain a C-Token (Click-Token)
or an A-Token (Action-Token) which can only be obtained by visiting an
Advertiser’s website within a particular time-frame. This prevents Û from
creating RoCs and RoAs ahead of time but Û can still attempt to commit
fraud by creating a ÂRC over a longer period of time. Although this makes
the creation of the ÂRC more difficult, it is still plausible with the use
of an automated process that automatically downloads Tokens when they
become available. This operation is very elaborate and time-consuming and
therefore impractical for use at a large scale. Despite this fact, the ÂRC
would still be rejected by the Broker due to the lack of additional verifies
such as CBs or ABs.
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CBs contain a time-stamp and a hash digest of the last block on an ARC
which have been signed with the issuing Ad-Dealer’s Token Singing Key
ToKsigAid. This makes it impossible for Û to forge CBs or use genuine CBs on
multiple fake ÂRC. In order to obtain valid CBs, Û has no other alternative
than to repeatedly travel to the physical location of an Ad-Dealer throughout
the course of the creation possess of the fictitious ÂRC. Moreover, Û would
need to be cautious not to request multiple CBs (for different ̂ARCs) at the
same time as this would provoke suspicion. Even if Û were to conspire with
one of the Ad-Dealers, a fake ÂRC would still be in danger of being exposed
due to the disproportionate number of CBs from just one source. For such an
attack to be successful, Û would need to conspire with multiple Ad-Dealers
and manage CBs in such a way that does not create an observable pattern
(e.g., multiple ̂ARCs containing CBs from the same group of Ad-Dealers).
Considering the fact that Ad-Dealers run the risk of being exposed, it would
be unlike for Û to be able to secure the cooperation of a large enough number
of compromised Ad-Dealers.
ABs are exchanged between users and serve a similar purpose as CBs as
they can be used to determine the rate in which the Ad-Reports of an ARC
were created. In contrast to CBs however, the T-Token which is contained
in ABs is not signed by an Ad-Dealer but by another user. This makes ABs
vulnerable to forgery as Û can exchange ABs between multiple fake ̂ARCs.
However, if Û were to compose ̂ARCs in such a manner, suspicions would
still be raised by the Broker due to the lack of CBs, RoCs and RoAs.
To conclude, in order for Û to fabricate ̂ARCs which are realistic enough
to fool the Broker, Û would need to use an automated process which down-
loads C-Tokens and A-Tokens over an extended period of time. During that
time, Û would need to exchange ABs between the ̂ARCs and also physically
collect CBs from different Ad-Dealers without raising their suspicion by sub-
mitting multiple requests at the same time. Click-farms lack the mobility,
sophistication and practical ability to operate in such a manner while auto-
mated clickers and bot-nets are limited by the time restraints of the process
which makes the conduct of large scale fraud impractical and ineffectual.
To further solidify the robustness of our verification method against im-
probable but theoretically plausible behavioural patterns and specialized
attacks which have been tailored specifically for the purposes of bypassing
ADS+R, will now examine a series of behavioural scenarios and assess their
likelihood and practical feasibility.
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Honest user imitates dishonest behaviour: ADS+R recognizes three
types of characteristic behaviour which may attributed to a dishonest user:
(1) high-rate advert engagement, (2) lack of mobility and (3) lack of so-
cial interaction. Any display of the aforementioned behaviours by a honest
user can potentially result in a false positive labeling by ADS+R. More
specifically, a high-rate of advert engagement is a characteristic behaviour
of auto-clickers, click-bots and click-farms. Auto-clickers typically gener-
ate hundreds of Ad-Reports per minute which is practically impossible for
a human operator to achieve. Sophisticate click-bots and click-farms may
potentially be tuned down to generate a reduced number of Ad-Reports per
minute but even this would still be too great for a normal consumer if we
consider the fact that mobile apps are restricted to the display of up to three
adverts per minute. A lack of mobility and social interaction are typical be-
haviours of click-farms but may also be potentially be exhibited by a honest
user who is physically restricted and remains isolated for extended periods
of time. Such a radical lifestyle is not entirely typical for most individuals
but theoretically possible. Considering the fact however that the ADS+R
relies on the distributions of promotional material either from Ad-Dealers
or Agents, it would be practically unfeasible for a user who adopts such a
lifestyle to be able to obtain adverts. We can therefore conclusively state
that any user who is lacking mobility and social interaction may have fewer
behaviours which prove their honesty but at the same time would be unable
to participate in ADS+R.
Click-farm imitates honest behaviour: The definitive characteristic
of click-farms is the lack of mobility which renders them unable to collect
Checkpoint Blocks CBs from designated Ad-Dealers. Furthermore, depend-
ing on their size and mode of operation, each mobile device of a click-farm
produces Ad-Reports at a rate that may not be as high as that of auto-
clickers but will still be substantially larger that what is expected from a
normal consumer. In order for a click-farm to imitate honest behaviour,
three operations would need to take place. Firstly, the devices within the
click-farm would need to imitate social interaction which is theoretically
possible by exchanging Affiliation Blocks ABs. Secondly, the operator of
the click-farm would need to click on adverts and refresh the ad banners
on each of the devices at a rate that more closely resembles the activity of
a genuine consumer. The success of such a mode of operation would call
for a great concentration of a fraudulent devices which would only be used
scarcely and for short intervals of time. Not operating at its fullest capacity,
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would result in diminished profits for the click-farm which would likely make
it unprofitable when considering the prices of smart phones and the power
which is required to run them. Lastly, the click-farm would need to fake
mobility by embedding the ARCs of each fraudulent device with CBs. Con-
sidering the fact that CBs are only available at the designated locations of
Ad-Dealers, the fraudster would be required to fist build some from of cus-
tom hardware device which remotely relays CBs and then manually carry
this device within range of various Ad-Dealers while at the same time being
mindful of the rate of requested CBs as to not raise suspicions. Although
hypothetically plausible, carrying out such en elaborate scam requires so-
phisticated technical knowledge and great deal of physical effort on behalf
of the fraudster.
Click-bot imitates honest behaviour: Elaborate click-bots are known
to imitate user behaviour by performing complex online activities such as
navigating through websites, sending emails and even logging in fake so-
cial media accounts. Considering the fact that click-bots victimize inspect-
ing users, an infected device within ADS+R could be committing fraud by
embedding fake Ad-Reports within a user’s ARC which also contains le-
gitimately acquired CBs and ABs. Under such circumstances, the user’s
mobility and social interactions would play no significant role in the verifi-
cation process but the click-bot could still be detected due to the high rate
of generated Ad-Reports. Click-bots rely on the fact that traditional fraud
detection systems have limited memory and processing power which restricts
them form easily detecting Ad-Reports which originate from the same source.
However, ADS+R composes all the Ad-Reports which are generated by the
same user into an ARC which makes it impossible for a click-bot to com-
mit fraud without being detected. In order for a click-bot to successfully
replicate the behavioural patterns of a honest user, the rate of generated
Ad-Reports would need to be reduced at a more realistic level which would
also reduce the revenue of the fraud. Imitating honest behaviour is therefore
possible for a click-bot but it also has limited profitability against ADS+R.
6.4.3 Reporting Integrity
After an ARC leaves the user’s device, it has to go through an Agent, an Ad-
Dealer and the Broker before finally being posted on the SC-Board (Service
Confirmation Board). This makes it possible for any of the intermediaries
to commit fraud by altering the content of a ARC. This type of fraud would
be particularly difficult to detect due to the fact that a legitimate ARC (one
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created by a real user) is likely to have valid Tokens. ADS+R prevents this
attack through the employment of hash functions and verification checks.
To demonstrate the operation of the integrity mechanism, we will consider
two attack scenarios.
Attack scenario 1: The Agent and the submitting Ad-Dealer attempt
to alter the content of a legitimate ARC in order to trick the Broker and
Advertisers into rewarding a malicious Publisher for a publication that did
not take place. Recall that the ARC follows the architecture of a blockchain
where the first block holds a unique ARC-ID and each following block N
includes the hash digest h(N − 1) of the previous block. Additionally, the
user also sends an IH (Integrity Hash) that contains the hash digest of the
entire ARC which has been signed with a Report Signing Key RepKsiguser.
Since the content of the Ad-Reports is encrypted with the Broker’s public
key BroKPub, it would be possible for a malicious Agent or Ad-Dealer to
create a fictitious Ad-Report. However, if the fictitious Ad-Report were to be
inserted into the ARC (either as a new block or by replacing an existing one),
this would result in a mismatch of both the hash digests within ARC’s blocks
(h(N − 1)) as well as the hash digest that is included in the IH (h(ARC)).
The hashes h(N − 1) within each block are in plain-text and therefore an
attacker could be able to change them but the h(ARC) within the IH is
signed and can therefore not be altered without the user’s Report Signing
Key RepKsiguser. To obtain RepK
sig
user, the attacker would need to intercept
the user’s RF-Request (Report Form Request) or RF (Report Form) which
is not possible without access to the Broker’s private key BroKPri.
Attack scenario 2: The Broker attempts to alter the content of a le-
gitimate ARC in order to cheat a Publisher or Ad-Dealer out of a reward.
ARCs are encrypted by users with the Broker’s public key BroKPub and
are published on the SC-Board (Service Confirmation Board) only after they
have been decrypted with the Broker’s private key BroKPri. The Broker
could therefore attempt to cheat Ad-Dealers and Publishers by altering the
Ad-Reports of a submitted ARC before uploading it to the SC-Board. To
prevent this attack, the submitting Ad-Dealer (the Ad-Dealer who forwards
the ARC to the Broker) holds a copy of the ARC in order to certify the
Broker’s integrity. Although certain parts of the ARC are encrypted with
Broker’s public key BroKPub, the hash digests h(N − 1) are transferred in
plain-text and are therefore legible to the submitting Ad-Dealer. This al-
lows the submitting Ad-Dealer to replicate the hash functions on the posted
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(decrypted) ARC in order to verify that decryption has been completed cor-
rectly. The submitting Ad-Dealer then marks the verification check VC-S
in the SC-Board which informs the Publishers and remaining Ad-Dealers
that the submitted ARC is valid.
6.4.4 User Privacy
ADS+R maintains user privacy on Ad-Reports via the same means as ADS
does on adverts. ARCs are encrypted with the Broker’s public key BroKPub
which ensures user privacy against Agents and Ad-Dealers. The use of
Agents (as partially trusted proxies) and the incorporation of anonymous-
download protocols also provides additional layers of privacy against Ad-
Dealers and the Broker. The same anonymous-download protocols are also
used for the collection of CBs (Checkpoint Blocks). Furthermore the re-
questing as well as the collection of CBs is done over encrypted channels
to ensure privacy against nearby eavesdroppers. ABs (Affiliation Blocks)
reveal meetings between users but do not expose their identities to the Bro-
ker. The users who participate in an AB exchange only swap the hash
digests of the last block within their respective ARCs and therefore have no
means of obtaining any information about each others Ad-Reports. At any
given moment, the Broker and Ad-Dealers have no means of obtaining the
user’s identity while Agents and other system users (who can be assumed
to already know each others identities) have no access to Ad-Reports.
6.5 ADS+R: Advert Fraud Prevention Summary
In this chapter we address the problem of advertising fraud and present
ADS+R as a potential solution. ADS+R was implemented based on the
infrastructure of ADS with the inclusion of additional elements and tech-
nologies. The main feature of ADS+R is the ability to identify fabricated
Ad-Reports without compromising the privacy of the submitting users. To
attain this goal, ADS+R features an innovative verification method which
allows Advertisers to determine the honesty of users based on their be-
havioural patterns. Our qualitative evaluation indicates that ADS+R offers
substation user privacy, protection against all common types of fraudsters,
protection against compromised system actors who may alter the content
of legitimate Ad-Reports and robustness against specialized attackers who
explicitly aim to bypass the system’s security by impersonating honest be-
haviour.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we performed a thorough examination of the OBA (Online
Behavioural Advertising) ecosystem and called attention to the threats it
poses for user privacy and Advertiser security against fraud. After analyz-
ing the state of the art, we reached the verdict that previous attempts to
address user privacy and fraud prevention as separate issues have been able
to partially resolve one of the two problems, but only at the expense of the
other. Consequently, the currently available privacy-preserving advertising
systems are susceptible to fraud or fail to offer fine-grain targeting, making
them undesirable by Advertisers, while the systems that focus on fraud pre-
vention require the collection of private data which renders them a threat
for users.
After considering all of the parameters, we presented ADS+R as an
innovative advertising system which supports the delivery of private and
personalized adverts as well as the submission of verifiable anonymous Ad-
Reports. To the best of our knowledge ADS+R is the first advertising system
to achieve user privacy as well as fraud prevention, effectively underlining the
significance of our research. Our qualitative analysis showed that ADS+R
offers the following advantages in comparison to analogous systems:
Increased user privacy against other parties: ADS+R incorporates
a fusion of multiple privacy-preserving mechanisms such as decentralized
networking, peer-to-peer (proxy) connections and anonymous-downloading.
Subsequently, ADS+R offers increased privacy in comparison to alternative
systems which typically present a single point of failure.
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User privacy against other users: Previous designs which benefit from
social networking generally assume users as trusted. ADS+R avoids such
assumption and treats users as malicious, preventing them from obtaining
private data through the application of public-key cryptography and privacy-
preserving protocols (used for performing user profile comparisons).
Robustness against sabotage: Alternative systems frequently focus ex-
clusively on privacy or fraud prevention while ignoring security against sabo-
tage such as impersonation attacks or data injection. ADS+R prevents such
attacks by integrating strong authentication protocols, public-key cryptog-
raphy and cryptographic hash functions.
Anonymous fraud prevention: ADS+R was designed with the intent
to actively preserve user anonymity, while in most of the previous attempts
to combat advertising fraud anonymity was considered to be outside the
research scope.
Reporting integrity: In contrast to the currently adopted OBA system,
ADS+R allows Advertisers and Publishers to directly audit the integrity
of Ad-Reports thus preventing the integrity of submitted Ad-Reports from
being called into question.
Beyond the improvements in fields of advertising privacy and fraud pre-
vention, ADS+R has also been shown to offer additional functional benefits
which are listed as follows:
Resource conservation: ADS+R encompasses a mechanism which al-
lows users to identify shared advertising interests and collectively have ac-
cess to the same encrypted adverts while still preserving their privacy. The
aforementioned aspect of ADS+R is not restricted to advertising systems
but can also be used in other applications which make use of peer-to-peer
networking.
Consumer data collection: A supplementary characteristic of ADS+R
is the ability to collect consumer behaviour data. Set feature is not a vital
trait of advertising systems but rather serves the complementary function
of assisting in market research. It needs to be stated that ADS+R performs
this operation without compromising user privacy.
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7.1 System Limitations
ADS+R relies on user participation to propagate data, much like analogous
systems which make use of social networking such as [70, 71, 133, 119, 111,
58, 57, 14, 125] and [147]. Subsequently, the performance of ADS+R is rela-
tive to the number of users who participate in the system. At the worst case
scenario where participation is minimal, the performance of ADS+R at dis-
tributing adverts will demote to a similar level as contemporary anonymous-
download schemes such as [124, 23, 24, 70, 71] and [133]. More specifically,
even if no Agents were available, users would still be able to directly collect
adverts from Ad-Dealers. However, users would need to rely on their own
mobility to physically commute to the designated locations where set Ad-
Dealers are broadcasting. In regards to fraud prevention, users would still
be able to compose ARCs (Ad-Report Chain) but without the inclusion of
ABs (Affiliation Blocks)1. Depending on the number of the remaining avail-
able verifiable blocks of an ARC (RoC, RoA and CB), the Broker would
may still be able to authenticate the legitimacy of a submission but with
less confidence. As possible ways to promote user participation, we propose
the following ideal:
• Promoting user privacy: User participation can be encouraged by
promoting ADS+R as a more private alternative to OBA and by call-
ing attentions to the significance of advertising privacy.
• Providing financial incentives: Financial incentives can be pro-
vided for participants in the form of reward points and exclusive
coupons. Financial incentives have also been proposed in previous
attempts such as [133, 119, 111] and [146].
• Integrating ADS+R in mobile devices: As a last resort, user par-
ticipation could be enforced by integrating ADS+R in mobile devices.
Although drastic, such as measure is realistically possible if promoted
by Advertisers who also benefit from the system.
A second limitation of ADS+R is in regards to the use of Tokens. The
security of ADS+R hinges on the principle that the Broker has access to
Tokens but remains unaware of the user’s identity. If anonymity were to
be compromised, the Broker would not only uncover the user’s advertising
interests but also additional information such as browsing habits, social
affiliations and location patterns. A compromise of the user’s anonymity
1ABs are authentication Tokens which are signed by other users.
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 128
could be achieved if the Broker were to tamper with the software client or
collude with a malicious Agent. Although theoretically possible, such actions
constitute as malicious behaviour on behalf of the Broker and therefore fall
outside the scope of this research.
7.2 Practical Implementation
To evaluate the feasibility of our system within the context of the marketing
industry, we perform a detailed examination of the conditions that need to
be met in order for a practical implementation of ADS+R to be successful.
Based on our assessment, the first factor which is essential for the imple-
mentation of ADS+R is the acquisition of Advertisers who are willing to
participate in the system. Advertisers provide the monetary capital which
drives the entire advertising industry. Under the currently enforced OBA
system, Advertisers benefit greatly from the provision of adverts which are
personalized to the particular advertising needs of the concerned consumers.
However, the operation of the OBA system has gradually been changing over
the past years due to a global shift towards the enforcement of user privacy
regulations [73]. A prime example would be the enforcement of the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which was established by the Euro-
pean Union in 2016 and became active in 2018. The GDPR dictates that
all businesses within the EU are obliged to enforce strict privacy-preserving
practices and are also prevented from processing personal data without first
acquiring the explicit consent of the concerned users [144].
Research suggests that as the advertising industry adopts evermore strict
privacy regulations such as the GDPR, the imposed cost for the Advertis-
ers will have significant negative effects for small and medium companies
who will find themselves being unable to compete with large firms [22].
Additionally, the lack of user identification data will also prevent analyt-
ics companies from easily identifying invalid traffic. As a result, a spike in
advertising fraud may be caused which will add to the already significant
problem and result in even greater monetary losses for Advertisers. It is,
therefore, understandable that Advertisers who may be concerned about
the added cost and progressive decline of OBA’s targeting effectiveness will
start seeking a suitable alternative system.
ADS+R was explicitly designed to offer both user privacy and fraud
resilience which it the ideal alternative to OBA. The client-side targeting
function which is incorporated into ADS+R ensures that private data never
leaves the user’s device. ADS+R is therefore unaffected by any privacy reg-
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ulation that may be imposed on the advertising market. At the same time,
ADS+R offers fine-grained targeting capability which may even be superior
to the currently adopted OBA model and also protects against fraud. The
combination of fine-grained targeting, fraud prevention and compliance to
user privacy standards constitute as notable incentives for Advertisers to
invest in ADS+R.
One limiting aspect of ADS+R which needs to be considered however,
is the lack of a central authority which would make the coordination of
Advertisers more difficult. To overcome this limitations, we propose the
creation of a self-regulatory federation of Advertisers. The main role of
self-regulatory bodies is to establish a set of standards that all members
need to adhere to. Establishing a federation of this nature for the needs
of ADS+R should be easy to achieve considering the fact that analogous
self-regulatory organizations are already in operation with the most notable
example being AdChoises. AdChoises is a self-regulatory program which call
for Advertisers to enforce targeting practices that comply with the privacy
needs of users [155]. Similarly to the way that AdChoises operates, a self-
regulatory organization of elected Advertisers can be formed for the purpose
of supervising the operation of ADS+R. This organization will be given the
responsibility for managing the Broker and Ad-Dealers and will be tasked
with performing administrative tasks such as employing the personnel that
operates as the Broker, maintaining the system’s infrastructure as well as
selecting and managing the Ad-Dealers.
The last factor that affects the practical feasibility of ADS+R is the
development and maintenance of the hardware and software infrastructure
that the system is based on. The two main elements of infrastructure which
are required by ADS+R are: (1) the mobile client software which operates
on the user side and (2) the networking devices which are hosted by the Ad-
Dealers. The user client is responsible for composing the user’s Advertising
Interest Profile (AIP), adding reports to the user’s ARC and exchanging
data with Ad-Dealers and other users. The functions of the mobile client
can be performed by a simple smart-phone application which has been given
access to the sensors and memory of the user’s device. Developing, dis-
tributing and maintaining a software application capable of performing the
set tasks is relatively easy and inexpensive. The networking device on the
Ad-Dealer side serves as an anonymous communication gateway between
Advertisers and the mobile clients of users who appear within range. The
Ad-Dealer’s networking device functions much like a WiFi access point with
the sole difference that it does not make use of standard networking proto-
cols in order to maintain the anonymity of the connection. In this regard,
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ADS+R does not require the development of any custom hardware but can
instead operate with the use of modified firmware which is installed on the
routers of the Ad-Dealers. Modifying the firmware of a router in order to ac-
commodate anonymous connections is relatively easy and has already been
implemented by several analogous systems such as [124, 23, 24, 70, 71] and
[133]. However, performing such a modification on multiple different router
devices and establishing compatibility between them may be impractical. To
work around the problem, instead of updating the existing infrastructure,
a supplementary router device, that will be used exclusively for ADS+R,
could be offered to the Ad-Dealers. Having a dedicated router will increase
the initial cost of the system but will also simplify the setup process and
reduce the long term maintenance cost.
All things considered, we can infer that an implementation of ADS+R
is practically attainable in terms of technological development as well as in
terms of functional integration within the currently enforced digital adver-
tising model.
7.3 Future Work
ADS+R offers a great deal of versatility which allows for the incorporation
of supplementary functionality. Some of the features which may be added
to ADS+R are listed in the following paragraphs.
Additional Tokens The current interactions of ADS+R only utilize four
types of authentication Tokens, but the system can easily accommodate
more Tokens based on additional user behaviours. Some examples of com-
mon user behaviours are listed as follows:
• Oﬄine Payment: A Token is collected from a physical retailer when
the mobile device is used to perform an oﬄine payment.
• IoT proximity: A Token is collected when the device enters the prox-
imity of IoT devices (for e.g., proximity beacons, virtual assistants,
remotely connected devices).
• Sensor Data: A Token is generated by the device itself when certain
environmental conditions are detected by the on-board sensors (for
e.g., the phone is moved or inserted onto a pocket).
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 131
• Online Activity: A Token is collected when the device performs cer-
tain online activities such as accessing social media sites or utilizing
messages services.
Incentive Mechanisms As discussed in Section 7.1, ADS+R could ben-
efit from the incorporation of an incentive mechanism which would reward
Agents for offering their services to other users. Such a mechanism could
be implemented in the form of reward points which would serve the role of
a digital currency within the system. It needs to be noted that in order
to comply with the overall design of ADS+R, the set incentive mechanism
would need to preserve user privacy.
7.4 Final Remarks
Despite the rapid development of the online advertising industry within the
past decades, the mechanism which are currently used for advert targeting
and fraud prevention are seriously lacking in terms of privacy and security.
This state of affairs can be attributed to the fact that digital advertising
corporations are mainly focused at maximizing their profitability while dis-
regarding the interests of users and business. All previous attempts by
academics to resolve the pressing issues of digital marketing have mostly
been unsuccessful. Part of the accountability for this lack of success on
behalf of the research community can be ascribed to the fact that there is
a serious deficiency of resources which greatly perplexes the development
of new systems. To effectively conduct their research, scholars require ac-
cess to information such as the algorithms which are used for matching
behavioral triggers to specific advertising interests, accurate trace-sets of
consumer mobility patterns and detailed reports of previously detected in-
stances of advertising fraud. However, due to lack of cooperation on behalf
of the advertising firms and limited funding, such useful insight is not al-
ways accessible and researchers are often forced to developed their systems
based on approximated parameters and simulated data-sets. Similar chal-
lenges were faced during the conduct of this research. Due to the scarcity of
suitable data-sets which accurately document the advertising interests and
social interactions of users, we had to adapt and modify an akin data-set
of Foursquare venue check-ins. Regardless of the setbacks that were faced,
the successful completion of ADS+R marks a milestone in the development
of security oriented advertising systems and forms a solid base for further
research.
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